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In this study, I examine how nature writers invest the non-human world with 
language in an effort to empower nature, and how, in the process. they subvert the 
prevailing views of humanism and scientific rationalism. I am most interested in the 
role of those I call "nature advocates," a group of writers who purport to represent 
nature's interests within the human political sphere. Some of the authors under 
consideration here include James Fenimore Cooper, Henry David Thoreau. Aldo 
Leopold, John Muir, Edward Abbey, Ursula Le Guin, Rachel Carson, and Annie 
Dillard, just to name a few. Most of this study is devoted towards examining how 
language affects the dynamics of power within the relationship between the advocate. 
nature, and the public. The advocate plays an intermediary role between nature (which 
is non-linguistic) and humanity (which defines itself as quintessential linguistic), 
interpreting a variety ~-" non-linguistic "meanings" in natural phenomenon which he or 
she then translates into language, often with didactic overtones. This intuitive and 
experiential perspective of the material world is markedly different than the "objective" 
approach privileged within the dominant culture. The advocate rejects the strict 
dichotomy between objective and subjective ways of knowing, suggesting instead that 
knowledge is transactional. Defining nature as a speaking entity achieves a sort of 
epistemological re-alignment in which scientific rationalism is replaced with the notion 
that understanding is created as the result of the interaction--a dialogue even--between 
the observer and the observed, mediated through language. Ultimately, the rhetoric of 
advocacy constitutes a form of praxis, where speaking for nature initiates the changes 
in perception necessary for realizing an ethical relationship between humanity and the 
rest of the biotic community. 
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PART ONE 
HISTORICAL CONTEXTS 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In The Natural Alien, the environmental ethicist Neil Evemden describes how 
scientists of the nineteenth century prepared laboratory animals for vivisection by 
severing their vocal cords. In experiments on dogs, cats, or other animals. scientists 
commonly cut the vocal cords of the animals in order to prevent them from wailing 
throughout the course of the painful procedure. The nineteenth-century physiologist 
Claude Bernard, dubbed "the father of experimental medicine," worked without 
anesthetics and, consequently, had to bind and debilitate his lab animals in order to 
conduct his experiments. He recognized that his subjects were suffering greatly, but 
justified his cruelty in the name of science: "A physiologist is not a man of fashion." 
said Bernard, "he is a man of science, absorbed by the scientific idea which he 
pursues: he no longer hears the cry of animals, he no longer sees the blood that flows, 
he sees only his ideas and perceives only organisms concealing problems which he 
intends to solve" (qtd. in Evemden 16). 
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Evemden points out that the act of unvoicing nature both affirms and denies the 
experimenter's humanity: "He was denying it in that he was able to cut the vocal cords 
and then pretend that the animal could feel no pain. that it was merely the machine 
Descartes had claimed it to be. But he was also affirming his humanity in that had he 
not cut the cords, the desperate cries of the animal would have told him what he 
already knew, that it was a sentient, feeling being and not a machine at all" (16-7). 
In addition to Evemden's observations, I would suggest that the act is uniquely 
human in that we, language-using animals, identify voice as the quintessential 
characteristic that invests a being with moral value. Denying the animal its voice 
represents a symbolic act of dissection where the physical, inanimate matter is severed 
from the animate, expressive being. In preparation for subduing and exploiting the 
animal, the scientist renders that which was animate functionally inanimate by 
disabling the primary outward expression of being: voice. 
In the following study, I will examine how nature writers invest the non-human 
world with language in an effort to empower nature, and how, in the process, they 
subvert the prevailing views of humanism and scientific rationalism. My primary goal 
here is to describe the rhetorical strategies of those who purport to speak for nature. 
This approach has been adopted by a variety of writers working in different genres, 
literary and otherwise, from the early nineteenth century to present. Despite the 
diversity of this group, these writers do share a core of common goals and strategies. 
By outlining these shared attributes, I hope to define nature advocacy as both a unique 
rhetorical strategy and a transformative cultural phenomenon. While an elaborate 
critique of this approach is beyond the scope of this book, I will offer some initial 
conclusions about the implications of the rhetoric of advocacy in the course of this 
study. 
Since the Industrial Revolution, speaking for nature has become a regular 
component of the nature writer's rhetorical strategy. I am most interested in the role 
of those I call "nature advocates," a group of writers who purport to represent nature· s 
interests within the human political sphere. Some of the authors under consideration 
here include writers like James Fenimore Cooper, Henry David Thoreau. Aldo 
Leopold, John Muir, Edward Abbey, Ursula Le Guin, Rachel Carson, and Annie 
Dillard, just to name a few. All of these nature advocates share the common goal of 
redefining nature as an ethical community as opposed to commodity or dead matter, 
and each emphasizes the role of language in effecting cultural transformations. To 
these ends, the advocate plays an intermediary role between nature (which is non-
linguistic) and humanity (which defines itself as quintessentially linguistic). Most of 
this study is devoted towards discussing how language operates in the relationship 
between the advocate, nature, and the public. 
In Chapters II and III of Part One, I will examine the historical contexts that 
engendered a tradition of advocacy in nature writing. Two traditions in particular, the 
wilderness perspective and the pastoral perspective, encouraged large-scale 
manipulation and destruction of the environment. The Puritans often depicted the 
wilderness as a hostile force, seeing it through the lens of typology as the setting for 
spiritual and physical trials. From this perspective, subduing the wilderness was a 
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religious mandate, and mastery of the physical environment came to be associated with 
spiritual and social "progress." Similarly, the pastoral tradition gave rise to an 
exploitative relationship with nature, since it depicted the American wilderness as a 
limitless material storehouse, existing solely for the satisfaction of human needs and 
desires. Under the pervasive influence of these traditions, Americans mined and 
manipulated the environment well into the nineteenth centlliy with little regard for the 
destructive and lasting consequences for human and non-human life. 
The rhetoric of advocacy developed, to a large degree, to redress the problems 
generated by these distorted representations of nature. In Chapter III, I describe the 
economic conditions which inspired many nature writers to speak for the wilderness. 
emphasizing in each case how the advocates are motivated by their unanimous 
opposition to the utilitarian perspective of nature perpetuated by market capitalism. 
The transition from viewing nature as indomitable to perceiving it as threatened 
coincides with the rise of industrialism and market capitalism. In the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries, America's economy began a phase of accelerated 
industrialization which, for the first time in American history, dramatically altered 
large areas of the environment. While the advocates of each age address themselves to 
rectifying different environmental crises, titcy all work to alter the underlying notions 
which engender and legitimate the destructive behaviors in the first place. 
In Part II, I outline the basic characteristics of the rhetorical conventions of 
advocacy over the course of three chapters. One of the defining characteristics of 
advocacy is that the representative gives voice to the voiceless. Since meaning and 
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value in human society are constructed with language, the non-human world is 
rendered powerless in situations where human physical and intellectual conduct are 
guided by language. Beginning in the early industrial age, nature writers increasingly 
identified nature's muteness as powerlessness and moved to represent voiceless nature 
within human political sphere. These advocates often act as "translators" in that they 
interpret a variety of non-linguistic "meanings" in natural phenomenon which they then 
translate into language, often with didactic overtones. In an effort to curb 
environmental exploitation, the advocate relays nature's interests (as they perceive 
them) in the form of direct or indirect discourse. Unlike other forms of nature \Vriting, 
the rhetoric of advocacy is distinctly political, and the advocates seek to transfer power 
to non-human nature through discourse. 
Part III deals with the implications of speaking for nature, both from an 
ontological and epistemological perspective. In Chapter VII, I describe how the 
advocates seek to replace the humanistic perspective of nature with a biocentric ethic. 
Since apologists for humanism have long pointed to language as evidence of human 
superiority, advocates redefme language to include the non-linguistic expressions of 
nature, thereby effectively removing the rigid line which divides human from non-
human, ethical being from inanimate matter. By attributing language to nature, the 
advocate redefmes nature as a self-motivated, moral entity. The trope of speaking 
nature achieves a sort of cultural re-alignment, where the traditional hierarchy based on 
language is up-ended and humanity becomes just another member of the biotic 
community. From the advocates' perspective, human conduct towards nature must be 
guided not by narrow self-interests, but with an appreciation for the well-being of the 
entire living community. 
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The act of speaking for nature also challenges scientific rationalism. In Chapter 
VIII, I describe the advocates' criticism of the mechanistic world view which. 
following Descartes, sees nature as an assemblage of inanimate matter. The majority 
of current environmental problems, argue many advocates, are the result of a tendency 
to see nature as so much quantifiable matter or resource, devoid of qualitative value. 
By privileging an "objective" approach to nature, science dismisses knowledge gained 
through experience and intuition, resulting in a narrowly materialistic understanding of 
nature. The advocate rejects the strict dichotomy between objective and subjective 
ways of knowing, suggesting instead that knowledge is transactional. Through their 
descriptions of the natural world, the advocates outline an epistemology based on the 
notion that understanding is created as the result of the interaction of the observer and 
the observed, mediated through language. There is a real world out there, they argue, 
but the only way we can know it is through language. As a result, our discourse about 
nature facilitates our understanding and influences our behavior. The fact that the 
nature advocates devote so much energy to defending nature in their discourse is 
testimony to their faith in the power of rhetoric to effect social change. Ultimately, 
the rhetoric of advocacy constitutes a form of praxis, where speaking for nature 
initiates the changes in perception necessary for realizing an ethical relationship 
between humanity and the rest of the biotic community. 
7 
CHAPTER II 
THE INDO MIT ABLE WILDERNESS AND OTHER DESTRUCTIVE MYTHS 
Describing nature as endangered and dependent upon human protection is a 
relatively recent phenomenon. In order to understand how "speaking for nature" 
became a regular strategy of many American writers, we must examine the traditions 
that contributed to its creation. In the early years of colonization, nature was 
frequently described as a hostile force that had to be subdued in order for a godly 
civilization to exist in the New World. Yet from the moment that the first explorers 
surveyed New England, America was also described as a second Eden. Two visions 
of nature, in particular, have had a great deal of influence on our perceptions of the 
natural world. First, in what has been called the wilderness tradition, nature is 
represented as an impediment to civilization and human well-being; second, in what 
generally passes for the pastoral tradition, nature is described as a boundless storehouse 
of material wealth. The two different representations of nature were often applied to 
the same landscapes, and, once rooted in the nation's consciousness, both tropes grew 
and flourished. The wilderness tradition and the pastoral tradition have encouraged 
massive alterations to the American frontier, and, in a variety of ways, the rhetoric of 
advocacy that developed in the nineteenth century was a response to the social and 
economic conditions that these two perspectives engendered. 
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2.1 Nature as Threatening: The Howling Wilderness 
Among the early Puritans, nature was often perceived as a hostile adversary. a 
force to be avoided or conquered. Upon arriving in the New World, William Bradford 
surmised that he and the colonists were confronted with "a hideous and desolate 
wilderness, full of wild beasts and wild men." Compared to the well cultivated and 
domesticated landscape of England, the tangled forests and rocky shores of New 
England seemed frightening and alien. After surveying the lands that hemmed the 
little colony, Bradford laments that the weary and anxious settlers would find little 
comfort in their new environment: 
Neither could they, as it were, go up to the top of Pisgah, to view from this 
wilderness a more goodly country to feed their hopes; for which way soever they 
turned their eyes (save upward to the heavens) they could have little solace or 
content in respect of any outward objects. For summer being done, all things 
stand upon them with a weatherbeaten face, and the whole country, full of woods 
and thickets, represented a wild and savage hue. If they looked behind them, there 
was the mighty ocean which they had passed, and was now as a main bar and gulf 
to separate them from all the civil parts of the world. (Bradford 62) 
To Bradford and the pilgrims the unfamiliar landscape of New England, with its alien 
plants and animals and its harsh climate, made daily living an arduous struggle. 
Certainly one reason that the wilderness elicited such fear and animosity in the 
minds of the early colonists is that life on the frontier was extremely difficult. In the 
first decade of their existence, the Plymouth and Massachusetts Bay Colonies were 
9 
beset by hardships, and the settlers struggled just to ward off starvation. The thick 
forests, rocky soil, and inclement weather of New England posed considerable barriers 
to their efforts to establish a safe haven. In the sermons and diaries of first generation 
Puritans, conquering the wilderness was described as a necessary condition of survival. 
Stories of failed settlements like the Lost Colony and accounts of Indian attacks 
weighed heavy on their minds, and the settlers set to work clearing the forests, 
cultivating the fields, and harnessing the rivers with a sense of urgency. 
But the physical barrier imposed by the frontier was only part of the wilderness 
threat. The wilderness represented a moral impediment to the Puritans' designs for a 
model society and threatened to undermine the success of their spiritual mission in the 
New World. The Separatists who ventured to the New World did so with the intent of 
founding a revitalized Christian society. As the ship Arbella made its way to the Bay 
Colony, John Winthrop delivered a sermon to the Puritan colonists in which he 
describes the objectives for the new settlement as a covenant with God. Concerned by 
the political and religious turmoil in his homeland, Winthrop developed an interest in 
the Puritan emigration movement. He became convinced that the only hope for the 
purification of the Christian Church was to begin anew, to found a godly society in the 
wilderness of North America. Like other Puritans in England at the time, Winthrop 
saw exile to a strange and distant continent preferable to enduring persecution, or 
worse, to betraying their religious principles. During the 1620s, Puritan leaders within 
the movement circulated pamphlets outlining their cause in an effort to solicit support 
for a sizeable Puritan migration. One such pamphlet attributed to Winthrop justifies 
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the planned creation of a New England colony. He describes the American wilderness 
as a godless waste, soon become the site for a new Christian society, as pre-ordained 
by providence: 
1). It will be a service to the Church of great consequence to carry the Gospell 
into those parts of the world, to helpe on the comminge of the fullnesse of the 
Gentiles, to raise a Bulworke against the kingdome of AnteChrist [which] the 
Jesuites labour to reare up in those parts. 
2). All other churches of Europe are brought to desolation, & [our] sinnes. for 
[which] the Lord beginnes allreaddy to frowne upon us & to cutte us short, doe 
threatne evill times to be comminge upon us, & whoe knowes, but that God hath 
provided this place to be a refuge for many whome he meanes to save. (Winthrop 
1:309) 
For the pious Puritans, the New World represented the opportunity to create a 
model ci-vilization which would better facilitate the elevation of the soul. In his 
famous sermon "Model of Christian Charity," Winthrop explained to the colonists that 
as members of the Bay Colony they had entered into a contract with God to set up an 
ideal state in New England: 
Thus stands the case between God and us. We are entered into a Covenant with 
Him for this work. We have taken out a commission. The Lord hath given us 
leave to draw our own articles. We have professed to enterprise these and those 
ends, upon these and those accounts. We have hereupon besought of Him favor 
and blessing. Now if the Lord shall please to hear us, and bring us in peace to the 
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place we desire, then hath he ratified this Covenant and sealed our Commission, 
and will expect a strict performance of the articles contained in it; but if we shall 
neglect the observation of these articles which are the ends we have propounded. 
and, dissembling with our God, shall fall to embrace this present world and 
prosecute our carnal intentions, seeking great things for ourselves and our 
posterity, the Lord will surely break out in wrath against us; be revenged of such a 
(sinful) people, and make us know the price of the breach of such a Covenant. ... 
For we must consider that we shall be as a City upon a hill. The eyes of the 
people are upon us. Soe that if we shall deal falsely with our God in this work we 
have undertaken, and so cause him to withdraw his present help from us, we shall 
be made a story and a by-word throughout the world. (Winthrop 2: 18-19) 
Thus, for the Puritans, the transformation of the wilderness was a divine edict. The 
mission they established for themselves was nothing less than the creation of a new 
Jerusalem in the wilderness. They were obligated, under this covenant with God, to 
tame the savage wilderness--both around them and in their hearts--by whatever means. 
lest God be incited to "break out in wrath" against them. 
Part of the reason the Puritans represented nature as hostile in their literature and 
sermons is that their perspective of the wilderness was based on their reliance on 
typology. As Sacvan Bercovitch has pointed out in his insightful study of Puritan 
rhetoric, The American Jeremiad, the Puritans usually framed their experience within 
the context of biblical history. They interpreted contemporary events in scriptural 
terms, looking for parallels between their own situation and that of God's people in the 
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Old and New Testament. In this context, notes Bercovitch, their exile from England 
was compared to the exile of the Israelites from Egypt: "The newness of New England 
becomes both literal and eschatalogical, and (in what was surely the most far-reaching 
of these rhetorical effects) the American wilderness takes on the double significance of 
secular and sacred place .... it was a territory endowed with special symbolic import, 
like the wilderness through which the Israelites passed to the promised land" 
(Bercovitch 15). In his sermon "The Heart Must be Humbled," Thomas Hooker 
explains to his congregation that the settlers' trials in the New World were like those 
of the Israelites in the wilderness: 
This [trial] was typified in the passage of the Children of Israel toward the 
Promised Land; they must come into, and go through a vast and roaring 
Wilderness, where they must be bruised with many pressures, humbled under many 
overbearing difficulties, they were to meet withal before they could possess that 
good Land which abounded with prosperity, flowed with Milk and Honey. (Hooker 
55) 
This suffering in the wilderness was not something to be avoided, but, in light of 
typology, was a test to be expected and welcomed. If they were truly the new 
Israelites, the Puritans had to persevere in a hostile wasteland before they could pass 
on to Canaan. To the Puritans, the many accounts of suffering in the wilderness in the 
New and Old Testament pre-figured the colonists' spiritual and physical trials in 
America. Increase Mather wrote that suffering in the wilderness was an essential 
component in the transition from sin to redemption: "As the children of Israel went 
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through the Red Sea. and through a wilderness before they could enter in Canaan, so 
must we wade through a Red Sea of troubles, and pass through a Wilderness of 
Miseries, e'er we can arrive at the heavenly Canaan" (I. Mather 7). Similarly, Edward 
Johnson constantly compared the Puritans to "The ancient Beloved of Christ, whom he 
of old led by the hand from Egypt to Canaan, through the great and terrible 
Wildemesse" (59). 
For the New England Puritans, wilderness typology served a useful theological 
purpose in that it allowed them to reconcile their suffering in the New World with 
their conviction that they were God's chosen people. The Bible is filled with accounts 
of God's elect suffering in the wilderness. In the Judea-Christian scriptures, the 
wilderness serves as a realm of spiritual conditioning, where the faith and humility of 
the devout are sorely tested. Humanity's relationship with God as free-willed beings 
begins in the wilderness, where, upon being cast out of Eden, Adam and Eve strive to 
redeem themselves after the fall. As Roderick Nash1 has pointed out in his 
examination of the Christian perspective of the environment, the wilderness acquired a 
meaning as "a testing ground where a chosen people were purged, humbled, and made 
ready for the land of promise" (Nash 16). Moses, the Israelites, and John the Baptist 
1Throughout this section, I incorporate elements of Nash's argument from 
Wilderness and the American Mind. Nash contends that the Puritans had an 
adversarial relationship with the wilderness, but some may argue that the Puritans 
perceived the frontier as challenging, though not necessarily "evil." Nonetheless, the 
metaphors created by the Puritans, even when seen in the context of typology, are 
framed in antagonistic terms, and certainly informed the colonists' perceptions of the 
physical world. 
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all had to undergo trials in the wilderness that would test and ultimately reaffirm their 
faith. Christ's trial of temptation took place in the wilderness, and as a result of his 
suffering and perseverance in this evil environment he has a spiritual catharsis. 
Wilderness, then, played a vital role in the typology of the Puritans, and its 
threatening character was already firmly established by religious tradition before the 
emigrants had ever set eyes on New England. If the Puritans were to be the new 
Israelites, then the American frontier necessarily had to serve as the barren, hostile 
setting for their spiritual quest. For the Puritan colonists, the New England landscape 
served as the parallel to the "howling wilderness" described in Deuteronomy 32:10 and 
elsewhere in the Bible. And in keeping with the scriptural tradition of depicting 
wilderness as the setting for physical and spiritual trials, the Puritans described the 
American landscape as adversarial, amoral, and desolate. In one of his impassioned 
jeremiads, Cotton Mather describes the wilderness as the agent of evil. admonishing 
the sinners amongst his congregation that "the Evening Wolves. the rabid and howling 
Wolves of the Wilderness would make ... Havock among you, and not leave the 
Bones till the morning" (C. Mather, Frontiers Well-Defended 10). In the Puritan 
cosmology, the frontier was the physical manifestation of the adversities God's people 
face in their struggles for spiritual redemption. Like persecution and pilgrimage. the 
trial in the wilderness was a necessary component of their holy errand. 
Even though the New England landscape seemed hostile and desolate, the Puritans 
never forgot that it was, in accordance with their own theology, offered to them by 
God as the site for a model Christian state, and hence it was inevitable that they would 
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take possession of it and tame it. The Puritans believed they were chosen by heaven 
as "instruments of a sacred historical design" (Bercovitch 7-8). The parallels that 
Puritan preachers established between themselves and biblical pilgrims compelled their 
congregations to see the frontier as both the setting for their trials and the setting for 
deliverance. After enduring the hardships of the wilderness, the pilgrims were to enter 
into Canaan. "According to the second- and third-generation orthodoxy," notes 
Bercovitch, "the New World at large--not just New England but the entire continent--
was destined for an errand in sacred history. Like Canaan of old, America was the 
child of prophesy and promise" (69). While Moses and the Israelites merely passed 
through their wilderness, the Puritans felt, as Bercovitch notes, that "migration and 
pilgrimage entwined in the progress ofNew England's holy commonwealth" (15). 
Thus, the creation and "progress" of their theocracy was part of the Puritan pilgrimage. 
The Puritans believed themselves to be the culmination of a cyclical history of holy 
errands. From this perspective, nature becomes much more than a site for trials as it 
was for the Israelites; it was also perceived as the site of deliverance. their promised 
inheritance. Consequently, their errand entailed not only surviving the trials of the 
wilderness, but making it ready for the Lord. 
The Puritans believed they, like the Israelites, would be delivered from the 
wilderness, but not by escaping it but by transforming it themselves. As Bercovitch 
observes, the typological parallels "develop into a sweeping prophetic comparison--of 
the errand then, at the birth of Christianity, with the errand now, to bring history itself 
to an end. In this sense," says Bercovitch, "errand means progress. It denotes the 
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church's gradual conquest of Satan's wilderness world for Christ" (Bercovitch 12). As 
God's chosen people, the Puritans would please Him by subduing both the external 
and internal wilderness--by transforming a wasteland into a new Jerusalem and by 
cultivating Christian souls among the sinful. 
Conquering the wilderness for God was primarily a battle fought on spiritual 
terrain. The physical environment mattered not nearly so much as the religious 
environment. If New England were to be the model Christian society, all aspects of 
life had to be conducive to the individual's spiritual salvation. The wilderness 
represented a region outside of God's domain, a spiritual wasteland where temptation 
and corruption lie in wait for unsuspecting pilgrims. The Puritan leaders frequently 
expressed fear that uncontrolled, chaotic, sensual nature might present an irresistible 
lure for the highly disciplined community. Corning from a culture where social, 
political, and religious life were highly prescribed and regimented, the Puritans worried 
that the appeal of total liberty, made possible by the vast stretches of "uncivilized" 
wilderness, would entice the colonists to throw off their cultural constraints and give 
expression to a more primitive, animal impulses. 
For many of the colonial leaders, the Indians seemed to be a physical incarnation 
of the corrupting influence of untamed nature. Since wilderness was thought to be 
antithetical to civility, living close to nature was seen as reverting to a more animal 
existence. Many of the clergy feared that contact with nature would undermine the 
religious resolve of the congregation. To a people indoctrinated in wilderness 
typology, it seemed as if the Indians had incorporated the wilderness into themselves 
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and, as a result, had forfeited their basic humanity. The struggle against the Indians 
was in many ways a struggle against the perceived dehumanizing aspects of the 
wilderness. According to Gary B. Nash, author of "The Image of the Indian in the 
Southern Colonial Mind," Europeans primarily depicted Indians as "savage, hostile. 
beastlike men, whose proximity in appearance and behavior was closer to the animal 
kingdom than to the kingdom of men" (G. Nash 56). For example, in "Gods 
Controversy with New England," Michael Wigglesworth suggests that the Indians were 
the enemies of God who inhabited a hellish wilderness. The New World was "a waste 
and howling wilderness, I Where none inhabited I But hellish fiends, and brutish men I 
That Devils worshipped" (83-4). In the Indians, colonists saw what they believed 
they might become if they gave in to the vast, lawless, alien frontier that enveloped 
them; hence, the conquest of the Indians was, at least in part, just one aspect of the 
overall struggle to subdue those aspects of themselves which the Puritans feared the 
most.2 
More immediately, however, the wilderness perspective had significant political. 
military, and economic applications. Englishmen, born of a culture which stressed the 
importance of property rights, felt a need to justify their possession of Indian lands. 
One way was to deny the humanity of the Indians. Writing in the early 1600s. Robert 
Gray, a promoter of colonization, argued that the Indians had no viable claim to the 
land because they were not fully human: "Although the Lord hath given the earth to 
2The connection between language and civility and savagery and silence is 
examined in further detail in Chapter VI. 
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children of men ... the greater part of it [is] possessed & wrongfully usurped by wild 
beasts, and unreasonable creatures, or by brutish savages, which by reason of their 
godless ignorance & blasphemous idolatrie, are worse than those beasts which are of 
most wilde & savage nature" (qtd. in G. Nash 64). By equating the Indians with the 
wilderness, the colonists were able to classify them as existing outside the bounds of 
both divine and human law. Consequently, in many instances they expressed no more 
reservations in evicting native people from their lands than they would about clearing 
trees for planting. 
According to typology, the Indians were the hostile Canaanites and the Puritans the 
vanquishing heros. Since Puritan doctrine identified the New World as God's new 
promised land, many found the presence of pagan Indians intolerable. Bercovitch 
argues that this conviction that the colonists were inheriting territory bequeathed to 
them by God justified, in their minds, the acquisition of lands by force. The frontier 
"separated them from the Indian 'outer darkness'--but they could hardly accept the 
restriction as permanent. America was God's Country, after all, and they were on a 
redemptive errand for mankind .... It became, in short, not a dividing line but a 
summons to territorial expansion" (Bercovitch 163-4). 
The wilderness perspective amounted to a cultural imperative to subdue and 
dominate the natural world. This adversarial perspective inevitably influenced other 
spheres of life. As religious fervor waned and the colonists developed a more 
mercantile perspective of the natural world, the belief that mastery over nature would 
benefit the spirit legitimated capitalistic desires to exploit the natural world for 
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resources. Furthermore, the motivation to subdue and control a hostile wilderness 
validated scientific manipulation of nature for human ends, and it influenced the way 
that scientists and naturalists interpreted natural phenomenon. Under the influence of 
this cosmology, conquest and domination are seen as part of God's plan or the 
universal order, and every battle won against the environment was touted as a victory 
for humanity. 
2.2 Nature as Paradise: The Benevolent Provider 
While the Puritans were busy battling to subdue the wilderness for their own 
spiritual well-being, there were others lately arrived in the colonies who sought to 
master nature for material gains. As the wilderness tradition was taking hold in New 
England, another view of nature, pastoralism, inspired many to plunder the riches of 
the New World. The clash between these two perspectives is most evident in the 
controversies that developed between Thomas Morton and the Bay Colony. Morton. a 
merchant adventurer and contemporary of Bradford and Winthrop, established an 
outpost of lax living at neighboring Mount Wollaston, or "Merry Mount." An 
Anglican, Morton was not bound by the same stringent religious restrictions as his 
devout neighbors, and he cavorted with the Indians, made merry round the Maypole. 
and generally courted all sorts of worldly pleasures. Unlike the Puritans who viewed 
the wilderness as a hostile adversary, Thomas Morton was guided by a pastoral 
perspective of nature and envisioned the New World as a limitless, benevolent 
provider. While the two views of nature are motivated by entirely different sets of 
assumptions, the consequences for nature are the same, since both call for the 
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domination and exploitation of nature. 
As Morton's biographer John Canup put it, the Puritans saw Morton as "a creature 
of cloven hoof' who had transplanted Old World paganism into their Christian 
sanctuary. Morton seemed to confirm the Puritans' suspicion that, given the chance, 
Christians could be tempted by the wilderness to embrace a more primitive, sensual, 
animal existence. Untamed, untrammelled nature offered the possibility of living 
without religious and civil law. Theologians of the day argued that without the checks 
of civilized society, human nature would be guided by the lowest of passions. 
Morton's band,--living as they did without the moderating effects of church and state. 
tucked away in the woods, communing regularly with the "savages"--had essentially 
immersed themselves in nature while the Puritans had done all in their power to 
exclude any taint of wildness from their nascent society. Eventually, Morton's 
Separatist neighbors could take no more, and for his habitual drinking, merrymaking, 
and fraternizing, Morton was set in the stocks, his home was burned to the ground, 
and he was sent back to England. 
The Puritan's banishment of Morton stemmed from a list of complaints about his 
lifestyle, his religious orientation (or lack thereof), his relations with the Indians, and 
his personal conduct in generaL But it becomes evident upon reading both parties' 
accounts of the conflict that their incommensurable views of nature contributed greatly 
to their mutual antagonism. To Morton, the vast stretches of untamed wilderness were 
not threatening, but liberating; nature was not hostile and desolate, but bountiful and 
nurturing. While Bradford, Winthrop, and Mather were determined to vanquish the 
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wilderness in order to ensure the colonists' spiritual salvation, Morton was intent on 
plundering nature for his own worldly gain. In contrast to the Puritan jeremiads which 
characterized the wilderness as brutal and barren, Morton's account of the colonies, 
The New English Canaan, waxes poetic over the beauty and plenty of the New World: 
The more I looked, the more I liked it. And when I had more seriously considered 
of the bewty of the place, with all her faire indowments. I did not thinke that in all 
the knowne world it could be para1el'd, for so many goodly groves of trees. dainty 
fine round rising hillucks, delicate faire large plaines, sweete cristall fountaines. 
and cleare running streames that twine in fme meanders through the meads, 
making so sweete a murmering noise ... [that] runne downe to Neptunes Court. 
Millions of Turtledoves ... sate pecking of the full ripe pleasant grapes that 
supported by the lusty trees, whose fruitful loade did cause the annes to bend: 
[among] which here and there dispersed, you might see Lillies and of the 
Daphnean-tree: which made the Land to mee seeme paradise: for in mine eie t'was 
Natures Masterpeece; Her cheifest Magazine of all where lives her store: if this 
Land be not rich, then is the whole world poore. (Morton 179-80) 
Morton's imagery of the New World reveals the unmistakable influence of the 
centuries-old traditions of the pastoral. The conventions of classical pastoralism 
pervade much of Morton's descriptions of his new environment. In New English 
Canaan, rural life is idealized, and Morton creates a highly stylized and symbolic 
representation of nature--one that is often quite different from the harsh conditions of 
life in New England. In keeping with the classical tradition of the pastoral, he 
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describes nature as a realm of escape from the complex world of society. Rural life in 
the colonies is idealized, and the Indians fit conveniently into the standard role of 
good-natured shepherds who live a more carefree and innocent existence in nature. As 
in traditional pastorals, nature in New English Canaan is both a harbor for and source 
of innocence and health. And like the pastorals of antiquity, the New World pastoral 
serves as a handy forum for Morton to criticize the corruption, sterility, and artifice of 
society--most notably Puritan society. 
But the American pastoral differs from the classical tradition in that it developed a 
unique economic emphasis. In Morton's early American pastoral, and in much of the 
nature-as-paradise literature that followed, nature is primarily depicted as a material 
storehouse, a natural larder stocked for the sole purpose of serving humanity. The 
trope of limitless bounty figures much more prominently in American pastoral than in 
traditional pastoral verse. At times nature is described as a wild, pre-lapsarian Eden 
where wild grapes bend the boughs of trees, almost to the point of breaking; in other 
instances nature is described as a cultivated human garden where the fertile soil and 
agreeable climate conspire to yield crops of enormous size and delectable flavors. In 
both cases, nature is described as supplying, almost willingly, an endless store of the 
material goods for human well-being and profit. 
The nature advocates' task of reversing this tendency to commodify nature entails 
challenging a view of nature which is deeply ingrained in economic, political, and 
literary institutions. The tradition of depicting the American wilderness as a boundless 
garden predates Morton. Undoubtedly, historical accounts of the New World as an 
earthly paradise from the likes of Captain John Smith, John Josselyn, William Wood 
and other explorers influenced Morton's own hyperbolic description of the landscape. 
Exploring the Carolinas for Walter Raleigh, Captains Barlowe and Amadas reported 
that it was a land of "wonderful plenty," with native crops "sweet, fruitful and 
wholesome" (qtd. in Kolodny 10). In his popular survey, Description of New England. 
John Smith describes how the rich fisheries of North America could provide the 
foundation for a stable economy in the colonies and Wood describes the New England 
forests as an "Indian Orchard." Morton was familiar with the writings of Smith. 
Wood, and Josselyn, and his survey of the land seems heavily influenced by their 
Arcadian imagery and their glowing descriptions of untapped natural wealth. 
The economic emphasis that developed in the American pastoral was influenced by 
the tendency on the part of early merchant adventurers to frame their solicitations for 
financial support within the conventions of the pastoral. Morton relies on stock 
pastoral tropes to convey his enthusiasm for North America's material bounty with the 
ultimate goal of inspiring investors to back his ventures. Like the promotional tracts 
of Smith and Wood, Morton's book, New English Canaan, is virtually an inventory of 
New England's natural resources. In his survey ofNew England, Morton describes in 
explicit detail every plant or animal he finds that may serve some monetary or 
practical end. He looks at the trees and sees "pipe-staves," "oares," "hoopes," and 
"masts." He looks at the birds and sees "fethers," "quiles," and "down." He looks at 
the animals and sees "skinnes," "good flesh," and "hids" that promise to yield profits 
beyond compare. Morton's survey ofNew England amounts to a commercial 
inventory of natural resources: 
Oakes are there of two sorts, white and redd; excellent tymber for the 
building both of houses and shipping .... They are excellent for pipe-staves. 
[which] at the Canary Ilands are a prime commodity. (182) 
Cypres ... is sweeter then Cedar, and, (as it is in Garrets herbal) a 
more bewtifull tree; it is of all other, to my minde, most bewtifull. and 
cannot be denied to passe for a commodity. ( 185) 
Of the Swanne, the flesh is not much desired by the inhabitants, but the 
skinnes may be accompted a commodity fitt for divers uses, both for fethers 
and quiles. (189) 
The skinnes [of the beaver] are the best merchantable commodity that 
can be found, to cause money to be brought in to the land. (205) 
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From this perspective, full appreciation of nature demanded consumption. The earth's 
"fruitfull wombe," writes Morton in a poem, "Not being enjoy'd, is like a glorious 
tombe" (114). For Morton, the material wealth of New England was untapped profit. 
waiting to be converted "by art and industry" into commodities. The landscape was 
deemed valuable not for its aesthetic beauty, but for its physical bounty. The ultimate 
end of the natural worid is only fully recognized in transformation or consumption that 
satiates human desire. 
Morton did not separate aesthetic delight from utility. In "New Canaans Genius," 
his tribute to Lake Erocoise (current-day Lake Champlain), Morton invokes the 
pastoral convention of the catalogue of attributes, but with an economic emphasis. A 
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stream was beautiful if it yielded "multitudes of fish"; the woods were lovely because 
they were a repository for "rich furres"; and the American frontier was a paradise 
because it was stocked with so many "useful! Beasts." The poem, which amounts to 
the climactic sales pitch at the end of Book II, is what Morton calls a "Catalogue of 
commodities" of the richest fur trading region in the New World. Written in the 
pastoral mode, the ode exemplifies this impulse to wed natural beauty to economic 
utility that developed within the nature-as-paradise tradition: 
New Canaans Genius: Epilogus 
Thou that art by Fates degree, 
Or Providence, ordain' d to see 
Natures wonder, her rich store 
Ne' -r discovered before, 
Th' admired Lake of Erocoise 
And fertile Borders, now rejoice. 
See what multitudes of fish 
She presents to fitt thy dish. 
If rich furres thou dost adore, 
And Beaver Fleeces store, 
See the Lake where they abound, 
And what pleasures els are found. 
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There chast Leda. free from fire, 
Does enjoy her hearts desire; 
Mongst the flowry bancks at ease 15 
Live the sporting Najades, 
Bigg lim'd Druides, whose browes 
Bewtified with greenebowes. 
See the Nimphes, how they doe make 
Fine Meanders from the Lake, 20 
Twining in and out, as they 
Through the pleasant groves make way, 
Weaving by the shady trees 
Curious Anastomases, 
Where the harmeles Turtles breede, 25 
And such usefull Beasts doe feede 
As no Traveller can tell 
Els where how to paralell. 
Colcos golden Fleece reject; 
This deserveth best respect. 
In sweete Peans let thy voyce, 
Sing the praise of Erocoise, 
Peans to advaunce her name, 
New Canaans everlasting fame. 
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Like much of the praise lavished on the New World at this time, this pastoral 
tribute is dominated by the fantasy of easy prosperity. By establishing a connection 
between the mythic golden fleece of Colcos and the abundant beaver pelts. Morton 
suggests that the fur trade will reward the investor with limitless riches. Furthermore. 
says the poet, the unparalleled value of Erocoise furs renders all comparison pointless. 
and thus even the most touted symbol of wealth, the golden fleece of antiquity, has 
been supplanted by the bounty of the New World. In lines 29-30, Morton rejects the 
"Colcos golden Fleece" for possessing inferior value to beaver pelts and advises his 
readers to tum their attention towards the greater riches of edenic Erocoise. In this 
new American pastoral paradise "deserveth best respect" because it had utility. because 
it was consumable and marketable. 3 
Informed by the fantasy of limitless bounty, the pastoral ideal elaborated by 
Morton, Smith, Wood, Josselyn and others established a myth of abundance that would 
become the dominant trope of American pastoralism. This version of the garden ideal 
continued to influence writers throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
Writing on the character of American pastoralism, Henry Nash Smith observes that 
"The master symbol of the garden embraced a cluster of metaphors expressing 
fecundity, growth, increase, and blissful labor in the earth" (Nash 123). The myth of 
limitless abundance has had a great impact on America's political, economic, and 
cultural destiny. In many ways, it generated a sense of optimism in the prospect of the 
3By comparison, the European pastoral emphasized the value of rustic life as an 
escape from the rigors of labor and the artifice of civilization. 
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young nation and it moved many to high praise of nature's benevolence. More 
detrimental, however, were the consequences of the metaphor for the environment. 
When people were guided by this ideal, their conduct resulted in some of the most 
extensive exploitation of the American wilderness. In regions of the West, it was this 
wishful notion of abundance, observes Leo Marx, that "activated stubborn settlers who 
struggled for years to raise crops in what was literally a desert" (142). Encouraged by 
the persistent assurances of nature's bounty, many Americans set out to extract the 
treasures promised them in paradisal images of America. With its assurances of a 
benevolent and nurturing nature, the pastoral tradition compelled Americans to feel 
entitled--even encouraged--to wrest whatever they desired from the wilderness. 
In the eighteenth century, when the colonies had firmly established an agrarian 
culture, the pastoral was adapted more frequently to describe paradise as a cultivated 
garden. Nature was seen as latent natural wealth which only needed cultivation to 
reach its greatest potential. In exchange for a little pleasant labor, nature rewarded 
humanity both materially and morally. Humanity's proper place in the garden was to 
act the role of cultivator. Paradise, in this case, is not an idealized wild garden that is 
ready for people to inhabit; instead, paradise was to be hewn out of the raw materials 
provided by the wilderness. In Morton's untamed Arcadia, mankind was a pampered 
guest and passive recipient of nature's bounty. For the agrarian pastoralist, on the 
other hand, the dream of abundance and happiness required human participation in the 
wilderness, since, in the rural imagination, the notion of harmony suggested a mutually 
beneficial relationship between humanity and nature. 
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The French-born American frontiersman, Hector St. John de Crevecoeur, initiated 
an agrarian literary tradition that was infused with pastoral idealism. Crevecoeur did 
not believe that nature was best left in a tangled, primitive state. Instead. part of the 
idyllic quality of nature was that it welcomed human transformations. Nature was a 
system devised by the Creator for the benefit of humanity, and pleasant labor in the 
garden yielded moral instruction as well as bread. Crevecoeur "admires improved 
nature," notes Marx, "a landscape that is a made thing, a fusion of work and 
spontaneous process" (112). In the agrarian tradition, the American wilderness, while 
beautiful and self-sufficient in its pristine state, is improved through human 
intervention. 
Crevecoeur describes how the farmer exerts an organizing and elevating influence 
on his environment. While nature was designed for man, he had to insert himself 
within that order. Thus, the creation of paradise required some vigilance. The natural 
community in which the farmer lives is subject to his governance, and his role as 
steward demands that he foster a harmonious relationship with nature. In this case. 
human well-being is the ultimate indicator of harmony, and what benefits the farmer is 
seen to benefit the whole natural community. Thus, for Crevecoeur, the farmer did 
not merely subsist in nature, he collaborated with it to realize the dream of abundance. 
both for humanity and "brute creation." Crevecoeur sought first and foremost to 
provide his family with all the necessities of life, but he delighted in being able to give 
a portion of his harvest to his non-human neighbors. However, if those creatures 
exhibited what he considered greed or violence, or if they threatened to diminish the 
30 
farmer's portion, Crevecoeur felt compelled to oppose them. 
In Sketches of Eighteenth Century America, Crevecoeur describes in detail the 
"Enemies of the Farmer" and lists their various offenses. The blackbird is depicted as 
a flying parasite of "the greatest degree of temerity." In an effort to eradicate the 
birds, the local farmers set out poisoned grain, attacked them with guns, and even 
established a bounty system to encourage their destruction. He concedes that their 
"depredations proceeded from extreme hunger, not from premeditated malice"; 
nevertheless, he says they "make great havoc" in the com fields, and, thus, they had to 
be exterminated. 
Similarly, in Letters, he writes of an incident where his soft-heartedness for king-
birds leads him to watch passively as they devour swarms of bees. But he realizes that 
his fondness for the wild freedom of these acrobatic birds must not blind him to his 
responsibility to put the land to productive ends. The value of cultivation supersedes 
the value of wilderness, and Crevecoeur opts to destroy that which threatens his efforts 
to bring the land into productivity: "Thus divided by two interested motives, I have 
long resisted the desire I had to kill them until last year, when I thought they increased 
too much, and by my indulgence had been carried too far" (Letters 26). As he 
watches the hungry birds eat the bees, he realizes that these insects provide him a 
valuable service in pollination, while the birds cannot contribute nearly as much to his 
well-being. "This made me resolve to kill as many as I could," reports Creveco•:ur, 
and upon shooting a king-bird, he opens its craw and releases those bees he could save 
(Letters 26). 
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Within the agrarian tradition of the pastoral, humanity is perceived as the good 
gardener, the kind steward, or the prudent manager. From reading Crevecoeur' s 
accounts of rural life, one is led to conclude that he feared that without human 
intervention nature would fall into chaos. A swarm of locusts, an infestation of 
cutworm, or an increase of rats in the granary is interpreted as an evidence that wild 
nature, left to its own, will go out of balance. All that is wanted to restore nature to a 
more idyllic state is management and manipulation by humanity. The farmer corrected 
the various imperfections in unruly nature in putting it under cultivation. [n 
Crevecoeur' s scheme of things, nature welcomes the order that humanity imposes. and, 
under the wise management of a sensitive steward, the control of predators, the 
cultivation of productive species, and the transformation of the environment benefit all 
the members of nature's community. Crevecoeur even suggests that nature conspires 
to serve the interests of humanity. "If Nature has formed mice," reasons Crevecoeur, 
"she has created also the fox and the owl. They both prey on these. Were it not for 
their kind assistance, the mice would drive us out of our farms" (Sketches 65). 
Crevecoeur argued, as did many of his day, that nature exercised a moral influence 
on those who live in close contact to the land. [n his Letters from an American 
Farmer, Crevecoeur presents farm life as an idyllic existence, testifying frequently that 
the relationship ennobles both nature and the farmer. Those who live the rural life, 
says Crevecoeur, are free from the distorting influences of artificial culture, and can 
observe, without prejudice, the moral machinery of the universe. [n many instances in 
his Letters, he describes how nature exerts a moral influence on him and, in general, 
on the American public. "[The] sagacity of those animals which have long been 
tenants of my farm," admits Crevecoeur, "astonish me." The hen will nurture her 
chicks, says an admiring Crevecoeur, "with a vigilance which speaks shame to many 
women" (54). 
Yet left to its own devices, nature could reproduce all the evils of human society. 
The passions of cattle, he claims, are "exactly the same as among men," and he finds 
himself correcting the barnyard tyrants who, like their human counterparts, "always 
strive to encroach on their neighbors; unsatisfied with their portions" (Crevecoeur. 
Letters 25). In addition to taking lessons from the natural world, Crevecoeur felt 
compelled to exercise some sort of moral influence over his domain. On checking one 
of his honey trees, he found that ants had been exploiting the hive for honey. "This 
intrusion," says Crevecoeur, "gave me a bad opinion of the vigour and vigilance of the 
[ants]." To "deliver [the bees] from the rapacity of an enemy which they could not 
repel," Crevecoeur resolves himself to do battle against the ants, thereby setting nature 
aright by imposing a degree of balance and justice upon disorder: 
Next day, accompanied by my little boy, I brought a kettle, kindled a fire, boiled 
some water, and scalded the whole host as it ascended and descended. I did not 
leave one stirring. The lad asked me a great many questions respecting what I was 
doing, and the answers I made him afforded me the means of conveying to his 
mind the first moral ideas I had yet given him. On my way home I composed a 
little fable on the subject, which I made him learn by heart. God grant that this 
trifling incident may serve as the basis for a future moral education. (Sketches 64) 
..,.., 
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This pastoral penchant for mastery finds expression in a number of American 
institutions designed to impose order on the wilderness. Agencies like the Bureau of 
Land Management, the Department of Agriculture, and the Bureau of Reclamation 
have sought to tidy up and make productive unruly nature, usually with grave 
consequences. 
Crevecoeur' s enthusiasm for rural life in America came at a time when Europe 
was becoming increasingly urbanized. In many ways, the pastoral mode was created 
as a reaction against the pressures of urbanization and mechanization. For Crevecoeur. 
and other eighteenth-century pastoralists, argues Marx, agrarian culture was seen as an 
ideal "middle state" between savagery and artificial civility. Like Crevecoeur. Thomas 
Jefferson romanticized the notion of an agrarian culture. Jefferson held that the ideal 
society would be an Arcadian republic, where farmers constituted America's nobility. 
Throughout his writings, the shepherds of the Virgilian tradition are replaced with 
images of contented yeomen farmers whose devotion to agriculture stems from their 
commitment to "rural virtue." Ultimately, he dreamed of a nation where all Americans 
could be self-sufficient landowners. He goes so far in Notes on Virginia to argue that, 
to avoid becoming industrialized, the nation would be better off exporting raw 
materials to Europe and importing manufactured goods. 
But Jefferson remained realistic about the inevitable industrialization of the 
country, and he claimed that his nation of independent noble husbandmen was "theory 
only." Upon comparing the nation's economy to those of Europe, he believed that 
American society needed to incorporate manufacturing into its economic base. During 
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his presidency and throughout his political life, he felt pressured to abandon the 
agrarian dream and embrace the new wave of industrialism. While Jefferson expressed 
grave reservations about implementing a mills system in the United States like that in 
Britain, he was fascinated with machines and wrote very favorably of the steam 
engines he saw in the factories near London. His optimism regarding technology 
represented the mood of the nation, and, on the eve of American industrialism. many 
observers believed that the machine would fmally make the pastoral dream of 
unlimited plenty attainable. 
At first glance, the metaphor of the bountiful garden appears to be incongruent 
with the emerging industrial culture of the nineteenth century. But the economic 
aesthetic of American pastoralism made it easily amenable to industrialization. In 
America, the pastoral tradition has frequently been used to encourage industry, and, 
when Americans' faith in "progress" was at a fever pitch. it also supplied the rhetorical 
means by which to incorporate industrialism into the garden. Working under the 
assumption that nature existed to provide humanity with unlimited material resources, 
pastoralist saw the machine as just an extension of the pastoral design to achieve 
material abundance. From this perspective, the Arcadian shepherd who plucks the fruit 
from wild vines and the yeoman farmer who harnesses the land for profit are no 
different than the industrialist who smelts ore for making rails. Since nature, in this 
pastoral ethic, is a system that exists for the sole benefit of humanity, the land will 
only achieve its highest potential when it has met the material demands of all people. 
As the mechanical world increasingly infiltrated the pastoral, the distinction 
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between the realms of city and country begin to break down. The machine finds a 
place within the cosmology of the garden, and the result, argues Leo Marx, is the 
development of an "industrial version of the pastoral design" (32). In his landmark 
study of American pastoralism, Machine in the Garden, Marx argues that, in this 
tradition, machine and garden are reconciled, generating a new "industrialized version 
of the pastoral." By extending the definition of nature to include both the physical 
world and all the laws that guide phenomenon in that world, the machine is co-opted 
into the pastoral metaphor as the manifestation of the laws of nature. Writers in the 
early 19th century touted the machine as the embodiment of humanity's most noble 
aspirations. "Armed with this new power," observes Marx, "mankind is now able. for 
the fust time, to realize the dream of abundance" ( 192). 
Of American writers working within the pastoral tradition, Emerson and Whitman 
"pay the most direct, wholehearted tribute to this industrialized version of the pastoral 
ideal" (Marx 222). In the imagination of early industrial America, the machine was 
seen as a force for liberation. By discovering and harnessing the laws of nature. 
humanity was, in the opinion of the most optimistic, fulfilling its greatest promise. In 
the minds of many nineteenth-century Americans, the machine had the potential for 
instituting a new democratic society where prosperity and luxury were accessible to all. 
Human intellectual and technological prowess developed cheaper and easier ways to 
extract wealth from the environment, and transportation and communication 
technologies promised to unite people from the most distant comers of the nation. To 
the industrial pastoralist, the machine represented humanity's ability to overcome 
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physical limitations by utilizing the higher intellectual powers. As material prosperity 
increased as the result of human manipulations of the environment, it seemed that 
nature was rewarding humanity for fmally exerting a level of ingenuity and 
perseverance worthy of its potential. As the industrial became integrated into the 
pastoral, it seemed that the second Eden in America would only be realized if 
humanity maximized its ability to force nature to meet ever-expanding human needs. 
Emerson adopts what Marx calls the "rhetoric of the technological sublime." In 
his case, the machine is seen as a natural outgrowth of nature itself. since the human 
inventive genius is an expression of the same universal will that informs all nature. In 
Nature, Emerson applauds the ingenuity and creativity that grants humanity control 
over the physical world: 
[Man] no longer waits for favoring gales, but by means of steam, he realizes the 
fable of Aeolus's bag, and carries the two and thirty winds in the boiler of his 
boat. To diminish friction, he paves the road with iron bars, and, mounting a coach 
with a ship-load of men, animals, and merchandise behind him, he darts through 
the country, from town to town, like an eagle or a swallow through the air. By the 
aggregate of these aids, how is the face of the world changed, from the era of 
Noah to that of Napoleon! (13) 
The application of technology to nature is described as a most natural behavior for 
humankind, and, for the most part, such transformations are welcomed by nature. Like 
other pastoralist, Emerson imagines a benevolent universe--one that consciously assists 
in facilitating human spiritual evolution: "Nature, in its ministry, is not only the 
material, but is also the process and the result. All the parts incessantly work into 
each other's hands for the profit of man" (Nature 13). More than providing for 
physical necessities. argues Emerson, nature exists to fulfill human spiritual needs: 
"But nature has a higher end, in the production of new individuals. than security. 
namely, ascension, or, the passage of the soul into higher forms" ("The Poet" 24). 
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Emerson is confident that "the advance of science will be followed by a 
comparable improvement in political morality" (Marx 230). The machine represents 
the strength and vitality of human Reason. Whereas Whitman would later describe the 
machine as human artifice integrated into nature, Emerson describes the machine as an 
extension of nature. Technologies like railroads and factories, says Emerson. "fall 
within the great Order not less that the beehive or the spider's geometrical web. 
Nature adopts them very fast into her vital circles, and the gliding train of cars she 
loves like her own" ("The Poet" 19). The person of true vision will not see nature and 
machine as incommensurable, but will understand that one's tools necessarily grow out 
of oneself. The poet, Emerson's "man of vision," "reattaches things to nature and the 
Whole,--re-attaching even artificial things and violations of nature, to nature, by a 
deeper insight-disposes very easily of the most disagreeable facts ("The Poet" 18-19). 
Part of the reason that industrialism was so easily integrated into the pastoral 
scheme is that nature was perceived as incorruptible. Emerson felt that contact with 
America's wilderness would have a "sanative and Americanizing influence, which 
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promises to disclose new virtues for ages to come" (Nature 370).~ While Emerson 
thought that cities were oppressive to the soul, that did not dissuade him from 
embracing machines, which he believed could, in a rural setting, improve spiritual and 
material conditions in the nation. Furthermore, his transcendentalism allowed him to 
see machines and human artifice as merely an extension or expression of nature, since 
humanity and nature, in his view, were in essence one and the same. 
Whitman also integrates the locomotive, icon of the industrial age, into his 
American garden. In "Passage to India," his tribute to American technological 
ingenuity, Whitman exclaims, "I hear the locomotive rushing and roaring ... through 
the grandest scenery in the world (51-52)." In this industrialized version of the 
pastoral, America still possess the most sublime and elevating natural beauty, but that 
beauty is improved by the introduction of nobler human artifice. The most impressive 
aspects of American wildemess--"plentiful larkspur and wild onion," "noble Elk," 
"clear waters," and "majestic pine"--are viewed by Whitman from "continual trains of 
cars" that thread their way from coast to coast. By "surmounting every barrier," the 
4From the early days of American manufacturing, enthusiasts of industrialism also 
believed that a vast, vital American wilderness would have a corrective effect on the 
machines that had brought misery to the crowded dirty mill towns of England. 
Jefferson rejected the idea that America would reproduce the oppressive factory system 
that existed in Europe. "Once the machine is removed from the dark, crowded, grimy 
cities of Europe," notes Marx, "[Jefferson] assumes that it will blend harmoniously into 
the open countryside of his native land" (150). Other early proponents of 
manufacturing, like Tench Coxe, argued that America would purify the manufacturing 
system of some of its more oppressive elements. Coxe, like many of his generation, 
felt, that "Just as the American sun is a more potent bleaching agent, so the entire 
social climate of the new Republic will cleanse the factory system of its unfortunate 
feudal residues" (Marx 158). 
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train does not displace nature, but brings humanity in direct contact with it. The 
machine becomes the mediator between humanity and nature, a tangible intersection of 
internal mind and external world. 
For Whitman, nineteenth-century America stood on the verge of great 
achievements, and progress held the promise that humanity would overcome all 
physical impediments to well-being, and in the course, the nation would attain a higher 
spiritual state. In this vision of paradise, the machine was seen as an outgrowth of the 
human spirit and intellect, and, as such, it is capable of perfecting humanity. The new 
high priests of this industrialized paradise, "engineers," "architects," and "machinists," 
would labor "not for trade or transportation only,/ But in God's name, and for thy sake 
0 soul" (39-40). In "Passage to India," Whitman expresses the general sentiment of 
the day that the industrial age could in fact be a harbinger of humanity's complete 
dominion over nature. The building of the Suez Canal, the linking of the nation by 
rail, and the laying of the Atlantic cable bolstered Whitman's faith that America was a 
worthy nation for the site of a second Golden Age. Nature, from this perspective, 
welcomes human control, since "God's purpose from the first" is for "The earth to be 
spann'd," "the oceans to be cross'd," and "The lands to be wedded together" (30-35). 
In mastering the natural world, humanity accomplishes the ultimate purpose of the 
earth--the satisfaction of our "never-happy hearts" and the alleviation of all human 
yearning that began with the fall. Since being evicted from paradise, humanity has 
been separated from nature, and has served a sentence of suffering and strife. Human 
mastery of nature amounts to a re-unification. Within Whitman's pastoralism, the 
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physical manipulation of the globe by "the great captains and engineers" is testimony 
to our intellectual and spiritual progress. The great human accomplishments of the 
century suggested to Whitman that America had progressed to such a point that it 
could give rise to a visionary or poet, "The true son of God," who would make the 
fmal strides towards human redemption. At that point, where humanity realizes its 
highest potential, nature will come under complete control of humanity: "All these 
separations and gaps shall be taken up and hook' d and link' d together" (1 09). Within 
this myth, our ultimate reward for mastery will be our re-admittance to Eden. With 
the perfection of the human soul, "Nature and Man," explains Whitman, "shall be 
disjoin'd and diffused no more" (114). 
Earlier in the poem, Whitman contends that nature has some "inscrutable purpose. 
some prophetic hidden intention" for humanity (86). He imagines that nature acts as a 
facilitator for human progress and suggests that, as we come closer to achieving our 
fullest potential, the universe metes out rewards. Proof of human progress is 
registered by nature's complicity in human designs, and our successes in mastering the 
physical world are interpreted as examples of encouragement offered up by a 
benevolent universe. In light of advances he witnessed in technology, Whitman 
pronounces that human perfectibility is within our grasp, and exclaims that we stand 
perched on the precipice of just such a time in human history: 
Year at whose wide-flung door I sing! 
Year cf the purpose accomplish'd! 
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I see 0 year in you the vast terraqueous globe given and giving all (116-20). 
Under this pastoral ethic, the more the globe is made to give, the more it appears to 
condone the course of human moral and (by implication) industrial progress. In this 
way, industrialism was a self-fulfilling prophecy, where each new mode of extraction 
and every new conquest of nature was seen as evidence that the world was willingly 
submitting to its subjugation. 
Since the pastoral metaphor encouraged people's faith in the resilience and 
fecundity of nature, few saw industrialism as capable of generating permanent 
environmental change. Guided by this distorted vision of a boundless frontier, and 
inspired by the elevated status conferred upon the machine by industrial pastoralists, 
manufacturers and speculators yoked pastoralism to capitalism to create a powerful 
new destructive metaphor: "natural wealth." Extracting and harnessing the nation's 
"resources" was validated under pastoralism as a patriotic service of sorts, where the 
industrialists, above all, were the agents who could transform the nation into a new 
Acadia. "Harmony" with nature was increasingly defined as an exploitative 
relationship in which nature was primarily an inanimate treasure trove of latent wealth 
that rewarded humanity for aggressive plundering. By integrating industrialism and 
the pastoral, these writers sanctioned--often unwittingly--the wholesale 
commodification and degradation of the environment. 
The power of machinery to extract greater yields from the land suggested to many 
a masochistic relationship in which nature responded positively to force. Whereas 
Morton's wild garden and Crevecoeur's cultivated farm acted as passive provider, 
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nature in industrialized pastoralism seemed to demand its own subjugation. The 
machine's introduction into the garden intensified the degree to which humanity 
exercised power in the relationship. As enthusiasm for the exploitative force of 
industrialism mounted, nature was increasingly described as fawning servant. 
Theodore Parker, a member of the Transcendentalists Club, brims with pride at the 
deference with which nature yields to humanity: "At the voice of Genius, the river 
consents to turn his wheel, and weave and spin for the antipodes" (Parker 253). He 
goes even further to suggest that nature itself offers up the machine to mankind. to 
expedite its own manipulation: "The mine sends him iron Vassals. to toil in cold and 
heat. Fire and Water embrace at his bidding, and a new servant is born. which will 
fetch and carry at his command" (Parker 253). The integration of industrialism and 
pastoralism ultimately legitimated humanity's exercise of aggressive force against 
nature, and encouraged a perspective of nature as compliant servant. 
Historically, the pastoral depiction of nature as submissive provider has been 
closely associated with representations of nature as female. In Carolyn Merchant's 
study of shifting perspectives of nature, she describes the gender politics implicit in the 
pastoral: "It depended on a masculine perception of nature as a mother and bride 
whose primary function was to comfort, nurture. and provide for the well-being of the 
male. In pastoral imagery, both nature and women are subordinate and essentially 
passive" (Death of Nature 9). But when human demands on the environment exceeded 
the land's carrying capacity, the decades-old promises of paradise only aggravated 
Americans' sense of deprivation, and nature became the target of their anger and 
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frustration. More often than not, life in the New World was a matter of survival rather 
than plenty. Settlers and investors lured to America by the promise of the abundance 
of "mother nature" felt betrayed by a world that had violated its obligation to nurture 
and provide for mankind. 
As ecofeminist Annette Kolodny points out in her book The Lay of the Land, the 
tradition of symbolizing nature as feminine in a patriarchal society resulted not only in 
a descriptive link, but also a "structuring link" in which the repressive relationship that 
exists between man and woman is mirrored and reproduced in the relationship between 
humanity and nature. In the grips of a pervasive, misogynistic pastoral tradition, 
Americans feel entitled to reap (rape) nature's "maternal" bounty and to impregnate the 
"virgin" landscape with monuments to masculine virility. The pastoral is in many 
ways an eroticized male fantasy, where the land is seen as mother, mistress, or virgin. 
The consequence of extending the repression of women to a "feminine" landscape is 
that humanity is now faced with an environmental crisis of global proportions, a crisis 
engendered by the metaphorical representations of nature that encourage its 
subjugation. 
Kolodny argues that our understanding of the world is facilitated through language. 
Expanding on models of cognitive development offered by theorists like Jean Piaget, 
Kolodny speculates that the human propensity for "symbol-making or image-
producing" is necessary for making sense of reality. These symbols we use to 
comprehend the world tend to color our subsequent experiences. By extension, says 
Kolodny, our perceptions, influenced by our metaphors, come to shape behavior: 
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"Students of language, following [Benjamin L.] Whorf and Edward Sapir," offers 
Kolodny, "are coming more and more to assert the intimate interaction between 
language. perception, and action" (148). The implication of feminizing the landscape. 
says Kolodny, is that we have strived "master the beautiful and bountiful femininity of 
the new continent," and, when pastoral fantasies have been frustrated, Americans have 
responded with anger and violence towards the land. The dream of abundance, as 
envisioned in the American pastoral, was doomed to disappointment from the 
beginning. The insistence that a feminized, passive nature existed for the sole purpose 
to satiate man's desires led Americans to feel entitled to extract whatever resources 
deemed necessary with no regard to long term consequences. 
The metaphors we have created to help us symbolize experience ultimately 
influence our perception of reality. Kolodny concludes that our symbols affect the 
way we act towards the symbolized, and, accordingly, we must take responsibility for 
the metaphors we have created. But Kolodny cautions against reductive social 
constructionism. Just because we can reject the destructive patterns of symbolization, 
we "should not ... assume ... that we have only to abandon [the pastoral vocabulary] 
altogether in order to solve our ecological problems" ( 14 7). The work of changing 
habits, language, and perception is a long and arduous project, especially, she notes, in 
the case of the image of nurturing nature because it seems to resonate with human 
psychological experiences and needs. Nonetheless, Kolodny suggests that one way to 
begin reforming our destructive relationship with nature is to replace outworn and 
destructive perceptual frameworks with positive, productive metaphors: "the more we 
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understand how we use language and, conversely, how (in some sense) language uses 
us, the possibility becomes that we may actually begin to choose more beneficial 
patterns for labeling and experiencing that mysterious realm of phenomena outside 
ourselves and, hopefully, with that, better our chances of survival amid phenomena 
that, after all, we know only through the intercession of our brain's encodings" (147). 
Both of the major cultural representations of nature, as adversary and as paradise. 
have resulted in widespread degradation of the environment. Both have contributed to 
a culture of exploitation by compelling humanity to gain a mastery of the natural 
world. This impulse towards dominion, when paired with the belief that human 
strivings have little or no effect on the overall order of the physical universe, has 
imbued the wilderness and the pastoral tropes with very destructive implications. The 
end result of both traditions is that the most horrendous human exploitation of nature 
is legitimated and Americans feel entitled to radically alter all life on the planet. 
Recognizing that our conduct is, to a great extent, guided by the language we use. 
advocates seek to rectify the problems created by destructive representations of nature 
by re-shaping our discourse. One of the ways that advocates accomplish this task is 
by offering an alternative perspective to the pastoral and wilderness ethic, one that sees 
nature not as indomitable, but as fragile and threatened. In the rhetoric of advocacy, 
nature is depicted as a living, moral community which includes humanity. This new 
vocabulary, much like an innovation in art or science, broadens our conceptual 
horizons, making it possible to understand and experience nature in new ways. Unlike 
the pastoral or wilderness tropes, the image of the nature-human community allows the 
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advocate to examine human conduct holistically, as it afficts nature, rather than how it 
serves humanity. To counter the destructive views exacerbated by the wilderness and 
pastoral traditions, concerned writers, naturalists, and scientists developed a rhetoric of 
advocacy both to protect the physical integrity of America's wilderness and to create 
an alternative, productive pattern of symbolization. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF A RHETORIC OF ADVOCACY 
A conservationist ethic did not appear with any regularity in American culture until 
the early nineteenth century when a growing number of advocates began to question 
the world views promulgated by the wilderness and pastoral traditions. As science. 
industry, and agriculture increasingly extended their powers over the environment. it 
became more and more difficult to perceive humanity as the persecuted martyr of a 
hostile frontier or the pampered dependent of a nurturing garden. Instead. evidence of 
rapid environmental degradation at the turn of the century caused a growing number of 
naturalists and writers to speculate that humanity was fast becoming nature's 
oppressor. The environmental destruction witnessed by Americans at the tum of the 
century served as physical testimony to humanity's increasing mastery over nature. 
Over the years, the myth of an indomitable nature was revised one ecological disaster 
at a time, engendering a new perspective of the wilderness as fragile and finite. 
The development of a rhetoric of advocacy in America coincided with the rise of 
market capitalism, as concerned naturalists and writers bore witness to the devastating 
effects of industrialization and profiteering. The wilderness and pastoral traditions 
contributed equally to the commercial exploitation of the environment at the tum of 
the century. For example, many nineteenth-century merchants and politicians 
described the forests as a harbor for savage beasts and savage peoples, and they 
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welcomed exploitative timber companies as agents of civilization. Similarly, the 
agrarian version of the pastoral encouraged farmers and woodlot owners to "improve" 
their land, and, in an effort to realize the dream of plenty and prosperity, Americans 
shifted from subsistence farming to intensive cultivation methods that exhausted the 
soils. Both the wilderness and pastoral traditions shared the assumption that humanity 
was entitled to manipulate nature to meet its needs, a view that served to legitimate 
(though for different reasons) market capitalism's exploitation of the environment. 
Reacting against the notion that nature was valuable only when tamed and 
commodified, nature advocates--from the earliest days of the movement to present--
have sought to revise the utilitarian approach to nature with a variety of ethical 
perspectives. A sampling of innovative and prominent nature writers from the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries reveals that the rhetoric of advocacy developed in 
large part to remedy the destructive world views promoted by market capitalism. 
In this chapter, I will examine the economic, political, and historical factors which 
contributed to the development of a rhetoric of advocacy in America. In particular, I 
will discuss the perspectives of nature that inspired four of the most prolific and 
influential nature writers to act as representatives for the wilderness. Henry David 
Thoreau, John Muir, Aldo Leopold, and Rachel Carson all shared the conviction that 
society's destructive metaphors exercised a transformative force on the environment, 
and each, in his or her own way, worked to subvert those images by redefining nature 
as an animate, moral community. 
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3.1 Nature as Threatened and the Role of Market Capitalism 
In almost any age or culture, the wanton destruction of nature tends to illicit 
condemnation from thoughtful observers. In the early history of the republic, wasteful 
agricultural and lumbering practices motivated a few farsighted individuals to speak in 
defense of the wilderness. Noah Webster complained that heavy logging in New 
England was responsible for more intense flooding: "When land iz cuvered with trees 
and leevs, it retains the water, but when it iz cleered, the water runs off suddenly into 
the large streems. It is for this reason that freshe[t]s in rivers have become larger, 
more frequent, sudden and destructiv, than they were formerly" (Essays and Fugitiv 
Writings 371-2). For James Madison, the country's "injudicious and excessive 
destruction of timber and firewood" threatened to lead to serious shortages and 
hardships for affected communities (qtd. in Merchant, Ecological Revolutions 227). 
Despite these and other scattered voices of protest, the majority who wrote about 
nature felt little cause for concern because the American wilderness seemed so vast 
and immutable. 
In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, New England's economy 
began a phase of accelerated industrialization which, for the first time in American 
history, dramatically altered large areas of the environment. In her historical survey of 
New England ecology, Ecological Revolutions, Carolyn Merchant writes that a 
commercial boom in the 1790s resulted in a shift from subsistence farming to intensive 
agriculture. The expanded markets in Europe and at home encouraged exploitative 
methods as farmers geared production toward profit: "The choice of increasing 
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production for the market sometimes entailed labor-intensive fertilizing, or plowing 
and harvesting additional tillage" (Ecological Revolutions 189). This transition from 
farming for "family reproduction" to production for profit marked "a turning point in 
American consciousness" says Merchant, where an organic, animate model of nature 
gave way to an increasingly mechanistic world view. The shift to commercial 
agriculture ultimately accelerated soil depletion, monoculture, and deforestation 
throughout New England. 
By the tum of the century, it was becoming obvious to many observers that 
humanity did indeed possess the power to permanently alter the face of the earth. On 
many of the major waterways in New England, mills with their weirs and holding 
ponds had stagnated once free flowing streams and seriously depleted the stocks of 
migratory fish like alewife, shad, and Atlantic salmon. Careless slash and burn 
clearing techniques had resulted in extensive forest fires, some scorching tens of 
thousands of acres at a time. In 1820s and 30s, the forests of Maine suffered 
numerous severe burns, and the smoke from some of these fires could be seen several 
states away. In their descriptions of the Great Fire of 1825, "Contemporary writers 
told lurid tales of flames that roared like thunder and could be heard a dozen miles, 
and of smoke so thick that Penobscot ferrymen were obliged to use compasses" (Wood 
73). Throughout New England, destructive logging practices had left streambanks 
denuded, shorelines flooded, and river channels choked and polluted. 
The destructive consequences of the transition to a market economy are most 
dramatically illustrated by deforestation rates in nineteenth-century New England. As 
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lumbering practices shifted from woodlot subsistence to clear cutting, lumbering 
became a corporate interest and new technologies and exploitative production methods 
resulted in unprecedented ecological destruction. Clearing for agriculture and logging 
increased sharply in the early 1800s, denuding much of New England of its native 
forests by mid-century: "From a uniform high or 95 percent at the time of European 
settlement, Connecticut's forests had been reduced to 30 percent by 1850, Rhode 
Island's to 52 percent, Massachusetts' to 40 percent, Vermont's to 45 percent, New 
Hampshire's to 50 percent, and Maine's to 74 percent" (Merchant, Ecological 
Revolutions 225). Due to the wasteful practices of loggers and farmers over the 
century, Maine's forests were cut so extensively that by 1900 an estimated 75% of the 
original pine had been removed (Coolidge 136). 
Shocked by the rapid degradation of their beloved American wilderness, nature 
writers began to act as representatives or advocates for nature with greater and greater 
frequency in the nineteenth century, and by the 1850s this role had become an 
established (though fringe) tradition in American literature. One theme that resonates 
through the rhetoric of most all advocates is the condemnation of the utilitarian 1 
approach to nature promulgated by market capitalism. American economic discourse 
is pervaded with the wilderness and pastoral perspectives, each serving--in their own 
ways--to encourage and justify the commodification of nature. With its emphasis on 
material abundance, industrialism was easily amenable to the pastoral idiom, and 
1By utilitarian I mean the view that values objects or actions because they are 
useful, not the doctrine of promoting the greatest good for the greatest number. 
corporate plunderers often described their actions as merely the efficient "harvest" of 
nature's bounty. With much the same results, the view of nature as hostile adversary 
was used to justify political and economic programs designed to transform and conquer 
the frontier for commerce. Early in the nation's history, the imperative to subdue the 
wilderness for spiritual or social progress was fused with the accumulation of property 
and the expansion of trade. 
Rejecting the capitalistic notion that the regress of the wilderness represented 
human progress, advocates conceived of nature as a complex community of life which 
included humanity. For early advocates like Thoreau, the dominant image of nature as 
a boundless paradise or indomitable adversary was contradicted by the bulk of his 
personal experience which suggested that the wilderness was increasingly threatened by 
human economic activities. Thoreau was one of the first observers to record the 
environmental impact of market capitalism on agriculture and logging. 2 He had 
noted on his Maine excursions that destructive cutting and fires had left much of the 
north woods a scarred patchwork. The environmental abuses of the mid-nineteenth 
century so disturbed Thoreau that he commented extensively about the devastating 
ecological impact of unchecked profiteering. In the Maine Woods, "Walking," 
2A few decades before Thoreau started advocating for nature, writers like James 
Fenimore Cooper and Thomas Cole (discussed at length in Part II) condemned what 
they perceived to be the moral deficiencies of the materialistic approach to nature. In 
The Prairie (1825), Cooper's nature advocate, Natty Bumppo, criticizes the avarice of 
the settlers he meets on the plains and suggests that the barren prairies may bear the 
scars of ancient human exploitation. Similarly, in the 1820s Cole published a variety 
of poems condemning the thoughtless destruction of the American forests. 
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Walden, and other writings the observant naturalist records with dismay the reckless 
and irreverent attitude that humanity displays towards nature. 
On August 31, 1846, Thoreau left his temporary home on Walden Pond for 
Bangor, Maine on a trek to Mount Ktaadn, the highest peak in the state. His journey 
would take him to the booming mill towns of Bangor and Old Town, up the Penobscot 
River, and through some of Maine's most productive timber country. Over the next 
eleven years, Thoreau would make two more extended trips to Maine, exploring the 
waterways, woods, and lakes of the northern frontier. His journals from his three trips 
to Maine confirm that logging had made a severe impact on the environmental 
integrity of Maine forests and rivers. Thoreau reports in "Ktaadn" that as early as 
183 7 "there were ... two hundred and fifty sawmills on the Penobscot and its 
tributaries above Bangor, the greater part in this immediate neighborhood, and they 
sawed two hundred millions of feet of boards annually" (Maine Woods 5). Along all 
his travel routes in Maine, Thoreau saw signs of civilization, and only the remote and 
rocky slopes of Ktaadn appeared free of human presence. Interspersed with Thoreau's 
philosophical musings and his accounts of the events of each trip are detailed 
observations of the destructive land clearing techniques being practiced by both loggers 
and farmers. 3 
, 
3Thoreau was well qualified to testify about the detrimental impacts of industry on 
the forest ecology. A keen observer of American flora and fauna and a studied 
naturalist, Thoreau attended Harvard from 1833 to 1837, taking course in natural 
history and reading travel narratives on a variety of locations including Canada, 
Columbia, Mexico, and current-day Vietnam. He was an esteemed naturalist among 
his peers and in 1859 was appointed to Harvard's Committee for the Examination in 
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In The Maine Woods, Thoreau records images from a world in transition, giving us 
insight into a pivotal period in America's environmental history when anthropogenic 
changes were beginning to occur on such a large scale that they dramatically and 
permanently altered what then seemed to be a limitless and indomitable American 
wilderness. After making three treks through the northern woods over eleven years, 
Thoreau was able to record in detail the destructive impact of corporate logging 
methods then used, as well as document the changes brought about by these practices 
over successive years. Thoreau was motivated to speak for nature, like so many other 
advocates, as a result of his realization, over the course of many years, that the 
utilitarian perspective of nature promoted by market capitalism was responsible for 
Natural History. As early as 1847, Thoreau submitted natural history specimens to 
Louis Agassiz, a renowned Swiss scholar on glaciers and ichthyology who had been 
working on classifying North American fauna. Before all his journeys, Thoreau would 
prepare himself thoroughly by reading geographical descriptions or historical accounts 
of the prospective sites. Other than loggers, few whites had reason to explore Maine's 
interior, so relatively little had been written about the region's environment. But in 
the course of preparing for several trips, Thoreau managed to examine much of the 
information then available, drawing from the earliest exploration narratives to the most 
contemporary government reports. He was familiar with John Josselyn's descriptions 
of seventeenth-century Maine and compared his predecessor's impressions of the 
region to his own. He also reviewed reports from the more recent expeditions to the 
area and made regular use of Charles Jackson's 1838 geological survey. In addition to 
reading extensively about the geography of Maine, we may infer from the texts 
Thoreau selected that the subject of logging was of special interest to him. In 
preparing his travel journals, Thoreau fully acquainted himself with the writings of the 
lumberjack clergyman JohnS. Springer, whose book Forest Lifo and Forest Trees 
(1851) is one of the earliest and most comprehensive accounts of logging practices. 
He also referred to the works of the French naturalist F. A. Michaux for his 
descriptions of logging practices on the Kennebec. In addition to drawing from the 
experiences of these noted explorers, Thoreau was familiar with the works of an early 
conservationist, Alexander von Humboldt, a scientist and forester who wrote about the 
deleterious impacts of deforestation. 
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significant environmental degradation. 
In each of Thoreau's essays, he describes how the lumbermen harnessed the 
waterways to their advantage and discusses how these modifications adversely affected 
the surrounding environment. In accounts of all three of his treks, Thoreau makes 
frequent mention of the dam systems erected by the logging companies. While the 
manipulation of stream flows greatly benefitted Maine loggers, it dramatically altered 
the shoreline habitat of lakes and streams, often killing thousands of acres of trees. 
Thoreau records the impact of damming in each of his Maine Woods essays, but 
describes the conditions most extensively in "The Allegash and East Branch." On his 
1857 trip, Thoreau and his companions traveled across Moosehead Lake, down the 
West Branch, onto Chesuncook Lake and Chamberlain Lake, then returning down the 
East Branch. All along this route, Thoreau recounts with dismay the destruction 
lumbermen have done to the forests by raising water levels on nearly every lake on the 
waterway: 
They have thus dammed all the larger lakes, raising their broad surfaces many feet: 
Moosehead for instance, some 40 miles long, with its steamer on it; thus turning 
the forces of Nature against herself, that they might float their spoils out of the 
country. They rapidly run out of these immense forests all the finer and more 
accessible pine timber, and then leave the bears to watch the decaying dams. Not 
clearing nor cultivating the land, nor making roads, nor building houses, but 
leaving it a wilderness, as they found it. In many parts only these dams remain. 
like deserted beaver dams. Think how much land they have flowed without asking 
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Nature's leave~ (Maine Woods 252-53) 
The extensive damage done to the forest watershed was due in large part to the 
shift from woodlot harvesting to commercial production. As opposed to pre-boom 
days when private landowners cut selectively from dispersed and relatively small plots. 
logging companies purchased the rights to extensive tracts of forests and conducted 
intensive cutting practices to maximize profits. According to a botanical survey 
conducted in 1861, just four years after Thoreau's last expedition to the interior. 
relatively all the merchantable timber had been culled from the Penobscot river bed as 
far north as Medway, where the East and West Branch meet (Wood 29). In many 
areas throughout New England, loggers shaved stream beds clear of trees, sending the 
timber downstream to the mills, and then moved on to the next tributary. In the 
spring, the flow of logs down the waterways could be prodigious. In his history on 
the Maine lumber industry, Richard G. Wood notes that during the 1849 log drive "a 
newspaper reported that the Moosehead [a steamer] had towed a raft of logs twenty-
one acres in extent" (98). 
Reacting to the expanding timber trade of the early nineteenth century, logging 
companies scrambled to satisfy the market demand for specific species of trees. The 
intense competition between various logging companies caused them to pursue the 
various trees of preference with a fervor which nearly eradicated some species from 
certain areas. As is the nature of the capitalist market, when certain commodities 
become scarce, their value increases, creating even greater incentives for their 
exploitation. From colonial times to the turn of the century, the white pine was the 
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tree of choice. During his travels, Thoreau constantly searched for the white pine. but 
found that loggers had been so successful in their pursuit of these old giants that the 
trees had become quite scarce in the Maine woods. While traveling the carry from 
Umbazookskus Lake to Mud Pond in 1857, Thoreau comments on how the new 
market forces had dramatically altered the composition of species within the Maine 
woods: 
Here commences what was called twenty years ago, the best timber land in the 
State. This very spot was described as "covered with the greatest abundance of 
pine," but now this appeared to me, comparatively, an uncommon tree there.--and 
yet you did not see where any more could have stood, amid the dense growth of 
cedar, fir, &c. (Maine Woods 212-13) 
Prized for its even grain, its straight and relatively knot-free trunk, the pine was 
scouted out and selectively cut from New England's forests for almost two centuries. 
Travelling along the lower reaches of West Branch in 1846, Thoreau was disappointed 
to find that few pines in the region had been spared the ax. "The woods hereabouts 
abounded in beech and yellow birch, ... also spruce, cedar, fir and hemlock; but we 
saw only the stumps of the white pine here, some of them of great size, these having 
been already culled out, being the only tree much sought after, even as low down as 
this" (Maine Woods 22). As successive waves of cutters entered the woods over the 
years, they became less and less particular about their cutting habits, and white pines 
became ever more scarce. 
The rhetoric of advocacy which Thoreau employs throughout is motivated in part 
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by the desire to curb the destructive lumbering and farming practices he witnessed on 
his trips, but it also functions to create the conditions necessary for such a critique. 
When nature is perceived as object or commodity, there is little reason to extend it any 
moral consideration. Our ability to pass judgment upon human conduct towards the 
environment depends upon our willingness to believe that nature possesses value as a 
living entity. Thus, throughout the Maine Woods, Thoreau consistently supplants the 
dominant economic vocabulary with metaphysical language, redefining the extensive 
"harvest" of the trees as an offense against an animate world possessed of "spirit." 
The prodigious flow of logs from the forests, to the streams, to the mills troubled 
Thoreau, and he comments almost prophetically that, as the result of profiteering, the 
very existence of the forests seemed to be in jeopardy of complete annihilation: 
Think how stood the white pine on the shore of Chesuncook, its branches soughing 
with the four winds, and every individual needle trembling in the sunlight--think 
how it stands with it now--sold, perchance, to the New England Friction Match 
Company! ... The mission of men there seems to be, like so many busy demons. 
to drive the forest all out of the country. (Maine Woods 5) 
Here Thoreau reverses the utilitarian perspective of nature, presenting living nature 
as valuable and forest products as comparatively worthless. The naturalist draws a 
sharp contrast between the majesty of the living trees, "soughing with the four winds." 
and the insignificant and transitory gains--represented appropriately by the match stick-
-which loggers made by cutting them down. Thoreau's shock at the deforestation 
stems from his alternative value system, which measures worth as an expression of 
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being or spirit as opposed to mere utility. "Every creature is better alive than dead.'' 
asserts Thoreau, "men and moose and pine trees, and he who understands it aright will 
rather preserve its life than destroy it" (Maine Woods 135). Right action, implies the 
naturalist, proceeds from right thinking. Thoreau realizes that in order to change 
habits, he must change people's understanding. 
In an effort to evoke in his audience greater concern for nature, Thoreau 
anthropomorphized the forest, depicting it as the suffering and persecuted victim of 
human avarice. After considering the cumulative damage he had witnessed as a result 
of lumbering, Thoreau describes the loggers as a plague upon the forest: 
The wilderness experiences a sudden rise of all her streams and lakes, she feels 
1 0000 vermin gnawing at the base of her noblest trees. Many combining drag 
them off jarring over the roots of the survivors, and tumble them into the nearest 
stream, till, the fairest having fallen, they scamper off to ransack some new 
wilderness, and all is still again. It is as when a migrating army of mice girdle a 
forest of pines. (Maine Woods 252) 
Thoreau's anthropomorphized vision of nature as innocent victim is at once antithesis 
and antidote to the wilderness tradition. Thoreau revises the view of nature as savage 
and indomitable by depicting the trees as quite defenseless and passive in the face of a 
brutal human onslaught. Based on what he had witnessed in the Maine woods, 
Thoreau contends that the timber industry had developed the power to "drive the forest 
all out of the country." Within this didactic narrative, Thoreau reverses traditional 
assumptions of the oppressed and oppressor, representing the lumbermen as an "army" 
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of "vermin" and the forests as a noble race struggling for survival. 
In The Maine Woods, Thoreau counters the destructive force of capitalism's world 
view with alternative explanatory metaphors. The strategies Thoreau employs suggests 
that the naturalist developed his rhetoric of advocacy in an effort to dispel the myth 
that the wilderness was largely unaffected by human manipulations. One of the 
necessary conditions for the act of representation is the recognition of a disparity of 
power. In any mediated relationship, the advocate is motivated to speak for those 
represented (children, nature, a defendant, migrant workers, battered women, etc.) 
because they are under some form of persecution and lack the means to adequately 
defend themselves. In Thoreau's case, historical evidence and his own writings 
suggest that the decision to speak for nature derived from his realization that humanity 
possessed both the physical means to dramatically alter the environment and the will to 
do so. Through language, Thoreau worked to lay the foundation for an ecological 
conscience that might guide human conduct in the natural world. 
3.2 The Measure of Value: Commodified Nature at Risk 
A decade after Thoreau's last trip to the Maine woods, John Muir set out on foot 
on a "botanical" expedition that took him from Indianapolis, Indiana to Cedar Keys, 
Florida. Muir's A Thousand Mile Walk is taken from his journal which he kept over 
the course of his journey. More than a catalogue of flora and fauna, Muir's journal 
includes observations on the troubling state of humanity's relationship to the natural 
world. While his contemporaries were increasingly caught up in the excitement of 
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America's rapid push to take its place among the industrialized nations of the world. 
Muir viewed economic and technological "progress" with skepticism. Like Thoreau. 
Muir felt that the capitalistic view of nature as simply the raw material of wealth 
neglected to account for the non-economic, qualitative value of nature as an expression 
of life. 
In his account of his travels through the South, Muir worries that, under the 
impression that nature was a boundless cornucopia of raw materials, society had begun 
to do irreparable damage to the wilderness. In a remote area of Tennessee. Muir met 
up with what he describes as backwards people whose poverty was exacerbated by 
their exploitative relationship with the land. One member of an impoverished family 
observed that "Our fathers came into these valleys, got the riches of them, and 
skimmed the cream of the soiL The worn-out ground won't yield no roastin' ears 
now" (Thousand Mile Walk 38). Yet the poor man accepts without question his 
ancestors' assumption that nature existed to be exploited, and he suggests 
optimistically that more wealth may yet be wrestled from the land: "But the Lord 
foresaw this state of affairs, and prepared something else for us. And what is it? 
Why, He meant us to bust open these copper mines and gold mines, so that we may 
have money to buy the com that we cannot raise" (Thousand A1ile Walk 38). 
For Muir, the purely utilitarian approach to nature common in his day struck him 
as blatantly irreverent and short-sighted. Rejecting the notion that the wilderness was 
humanity's storehouse, Muir viewed nature holistically as an animate community: 
"They tell us that plants are perishable, soulless creatures, that only man is immortaL 
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etc.; but this, [think, is something that we know very nearly nothing about. Anyhow. 
this palm was indescribably impressive and told me grander things than [ ever got 
from human priest" (Thousand Mile Walk 92). Feeling that the natural world was, like 
humanity, infused with spirit, it pained him to see nature destroyed indiscriminately. 
Commenting on the tendency of people to eradicate that which did not immediately 
serve human needs, Muir suggests that human self-interests and prejudices may prevent 
people from apprehending the interconnectedness of all life: "Many good people 
believe that the alligators were created by the Devil, thus accounting for their all-
consuming appetite and ugliness. But doubtless these creatures are happy and fill the 
place assigned to them by the great Creator of us all" (Thousand Mile Walk 98). 
Muir spent the greater portion of his life speaking for voiceless wilderness, but his 
greatest challenge came at the turn of the century. Facing possible water shortages for 
their growing community, city planners for San Francisco considered the possibility of 
damming the Hetch Hetchy Valley as early as 1882. An act of Congress in 1890 
preserved Hetch Hetchy and Yosemite as a national wilderness preserve, but the city 
deemed its need for water more important than the protection of wilderness, and, in 
1908, Secretary James Garfield approved plans to turn the valley into a reservoir. 
Believing that the goal of conservation was to ensure the steady supply of resources 
and not to protect wildlife, Gifford Pinchot, Chief Forester at the time, advised 
President Roosevelt to approve plans to develop the valley. 
The views of Gifford Pinchot and John Muir represent the two diverging branches 
of the budding environmental movement of the early twentieth century. Educated as a 
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sylviculturist, Pinchot studied the conservation practices of European foresters and 
came to recognize that humanity did indeed possess the ability to seriously degrade 
nature. But Pinchot argued that,. if managed properly, nature could provide for all 
human material needs. True forestry, he says, has an economic motive and the 
wilderness should be used for profit. "The job was not to stop the ax," offers Pinchot 
in his autobiography, "but to regulate it" (29). rn one report on preserves issued by 
the Forest Commission and endorsed by Pinchot, officials assert that "These great 
bodies of reserved lands cannot be withdrawn from all occupation or use. They must 
be made to perform their part in the economy of the Nation. Unless the reserved lands 
of the public domain are made to contribute to the welfare and prosperity of the 
country, they should be thrown open to settlement and the whole system of reserved 
forests abandoned" (Pinchot 120). Pinchot's perspective of nature is shot through with 
pastoralist assumptions, and he contends that nature had an obligation to meet human 
material needs; thus it was quite natural to exploit the wilderness as a "resource." 
Pinchot and Muir knew one another, and in the early stages of their relationship 
they went on outings together and shared ideas for protecting the nation's forests. But 
the difference between the two men's motives for conservation soon became apparent. 
and Muir and Pinchot became increasingly estranged over the years. On one trip to 
the Colorado River and Grand Canyon, they encountered a tarantula, and their 
divergent responses illustrates how differently each man measures nature's value. 
Pinchot moved to crush the spider, but Muir intervened; "he wouldn · t let me kill it," 
wrote an astonished Pinchot. "He said it had as much right there as we did" (103). 
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To Pincho~ this was a bit baffling because he calculated that the spider had no value, 
since it did not appear to fulfill any human needs and, worse, could do an individual 
serious harm. Echoing these utilitarian sentiments, Roosevelt argued in 190 1 that "The 
fundamental idea of forestry is the perpetuation of forests by use. Forest protection is 
not an end in itself; it is a means to increase and sustain the resources of our country 
and the industries which depend upon them .... We have come to see clearly that 
whatever destroys the forest, except to make way for agriculture, threatens our well-
being" ( qtd. in Pinchot 190). 
By contrast, Muir spoke for nature in an effort to protect it for its own sake, and 
he contended that nature had a value outside of human economics. Muir sought to 
save the tarantula because, to him, all nature was infused with spirit and was thus 
worthy of moral consideration. Hetch Hetchy Valley, said Muir, "is a grand landscape 
garden, one ofNature's rarest and most precious mountain temples" (Yosemite 255). 
For many conservationists of the day, the loss of one valley more or less meant little, 
since there were plenty of untamed spaces left throughout the country. But to Muir, 
not all places were interchangeable, and the loss of a specific species or unique natural 
setting was irrevocable. Hetch Hetchy was not just another high alpine valley, it was 
home to "things frail and fleeting," said Muir, intertwined in a close "communion" 
(Yosemite 255). 
Muir was particularly distressed by plans to destroy Hetch Hetchy for strictly 
economic reasons, and, together with Robert Underwood Johnson, he began a 
campaign of protest against what he perceived was the gross commercialization of 
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nature. The environmental historian Roderick Nash notes that Muir hoped to generate 
support for his cause by posing the conflict as a case of crass materialism against 
nobel idealism: 
They made Hetch Hetchy into a symbol of ethical and aesthetic qualities, 
disparaging San Francisco's proposal as tragically typical of American indifference 
toward them. This line of defense took advantage of national sensitivity to charges 
of being a culture devoted entirely to the frantic pursuit of the main chance. It 
criticized commercialism and sordidness of American civilization, while defending 
the wilderness. (164) 
Muir recognized that the gravest threat to nature was not human physical activity 
but the concepts of nature which guided those activities. For instance, an evaluation of 
nature based upon economic self-interest would always favor development, since, 
under such a rationale, the value of a mountain in tin cans will always outweigh its 
intangible value as scenery. The Hetch Hetchy incident underscored for Muir and 
other nature advocates the fact that the American wilderness would face increasing 
threats to its integrity as long as the public conceived of nature as humanity's 
boundless larder. Measuring the valley from an economic standpoint, it made perfect 
sense to convert Hetch Hetchy into a reservoir for San Francisco, since it was the 
cheapest way to satisfy human desires for water and power. "Applying the time-
honored utilitarian yardstick to the problem," reports Nash, "Representative Raker of 
California asserted that the 'old barren rocks' of the valley have a 'cash value' of less 
than $300,000 whereas the reservoir would be worth millions" (171). 
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To counter this materialistic approach to nature, Muir imbued the wilderness with 
religious significance. He describes the untrammeled mountain valley as a "temple" 
and characterized human manipulation of that environment as an act of "desecration." 
The park, lamented the naturalist, is: 
subject to attack by despoiling gain-seekers and mischief-makers of every degree 
from Satan to Senators, eagerly trying to make everything immediately and 
selfishly commercial, with schemes disguised in smug-smiling philanthropy, 
industriously, shampiously crying, "Conservation, conservation. panutilization." that 
man and beast may be fed and the dear Nation made great. Thus long ago a few 
enterprising merchants utilized the Jerusalem temple as a place of business. 
(Yosemite 256) 
Using the Christian parable of the money-changers in the temple, Muir suggests that 
the offense done to Hetch Hetchy in damming would be so great as to provoke the ire 
of God. The analogy serves to codify human behavior in nature. Drawing on the 
prescriptive power of religion, Muir re-defines nature as sacred, enabling him to 
characterize certain human actions in nature as profane. Muir suggests that people are 
welcome to "worship" in Hetch Hetchy, but that economic activities are inappropriate 
because they entail alterations that transform the very quality of the environment that 
makes it "holy." 
The notion that nature is sacred is inherently ecological since it promotes an ethic 
of homeostasis. In the context of religion, the devotee's behavior within the temple is 
circumscribed by ritual and tradition to perpetuate and reproduce the faith. In much 
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the same way, the metaphor of a sacred wilderness implies that human conduct within 
nature should be guided by a set of ethics designed to maintain and reproduce the 
processes of life. In our relations with things sacred. we tend to see them as perfect 
and sufficient in and of themselves, and we oppose circumstances that would disrupt or 
distort that continuity. By redefining nature as a holy space, Muir encourages his 
audience to transfer this conservative impulse to the wilderness. Furthermore, the 
temple metaphor implies that humanity also stands to benefit in preserving nature. 
Sacred spaces afford humans spiritual, aesthetic, and emotional solace, and by 
preserving the wilderness, suggests Muir, we protect our own interests. In this way, 
the religious metaphor conveys a sense of interdependence in which the devotee has an 
obligation to protect and preserve that which is sacred, and the sacred, in turn, affords 
the worshipper with the sanctuary necessary for spiritual rejuvenation. 
In the battle over Hetch Hetchy, the utilitarian view prevailed over the spiritual 
perspective. As Muir feared, motivated by the prevailing rationale that nature was a 
resource to be used, Congress passed the Hetch Hetchy bill in 1913, marking the 
beginning of the end for the naturalist's beloved valley. But Muir and Johnson were 
able to raise a significant protest, sparking letter campaigns, a wave of critical media 
reports, and debate on the floor of the House and Senate. Considering the controversy 
that raged over the legislation, Nash surmises that the loss was not a total failure since 
"wilderness preservation had, in truth, become a national movement": 
Indeed the most significant thing about the controversy over the valley was that it 
occurred at all. One hundred or even fifty years earlier a similar proposal to dam 
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a wilderness river would not have occasioned the slightest ripple of public protest. 
Traditional American assumptions about the uses of undeveloped country did not 
include reserving it in national parks for its recreational, aesthetic, and inspirational 
values. The emphasis was all the other way--on civilizing it in the name of 
progress and prosperity. Older generations conceived of the thrust of civilization 
into the wilderness as the beneficent working out of divine intentions, but in the 
twentieth century a handful of preservationists generated widespread resistance 
against this very process. What had formerly been the subject of national 
celebration was made to appear a national tragedy. (Nash 181) 
While the developers had their way with the valley, Muir and his colleagues in the 
preservationist movement had succeeded in changing, however slightly, the terms of 
the debate. Whereas conservationists like Pinchot spoke about nature as the material 
foundation of human life, Muir and other preservationists spoke for nature as a sacred 
community of life which included humanity. As America entered the twentieth 
century, society had slowly come to recognize that it did possess the ability to 
dramatically alter the natural environment, but the majority of the public perceived that 
power as having only positive implications. By challenging the utilitarian view of 
nature with an alternative ethical perspective, Muir and his followers initiated a subtext 
to the rhetoric of progress that provided the vocabulary with which to evaluate the 
moral consequences of humanity's manipulation of the natural world. 
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3.3 The Price of Masterv 
Muir's work to protect the environment became a well-established tradition in the 
twentieth century. The conflicts remained centered on values, and a variety of 
naturalists and writers in this century have worked to subvert the utilitarian perspective 
by espousing an ecological ethic. Two writers in particular, Aldo Leopold and Rachel 
Carson, represent a tradition of advocacy that combines science and ethics in an effort 
to redefine nature as a valuable living community. In this section I will discuss how 
economic and political factors in the first half of the century motivated Leopold and 
Carson to develop a rhetoric of advocacy with a distinctive ecological emphasis. 
Following in the tradition of Pinchot and utilitarian conservationists, Aldo 
Leopold began his career in the 1909 with a job as a forest assistant and later a game 
manager. Working with the Forest Service in the Southwest, Leopold enforced game 
laws, stocked the preserves with fish and game, and exterminated predators. In A 
Sand County Almanac, Leopold describes how as a young man he had killed wolves 
for no more reason than the fact that they competed with hunters for deer. In this 
early stage of his career, Leopold primarily followed the conservationist creed that the 
land should be "managed" for the optimal use of humanity, whether that was 
recreational or commercial. 
But as Leopold became more acquainted with the close interconnections between 
the living and non-living components of nature, he began to challenge traditional 
utilitarian values. Leopold's transition from a conservationist to a preservationist was 
gradual. In 1913, Bright's disease incapacitated him for over a year, and he spent a 
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great deal of time in recovery reading the works of nature writers like Muir. 
Burroughs, Thoreau, and others. Leopold, trained as a scientist, also read the works of 
ecologists like Frederick Clements, William Temple Hornaday, and Henry Cowles 
whose arguments--combined with his years of experience in the wilderness--convinced 
him of the interdependence of all living things. In the waning years of his career with 
the Forest Service, Leopold tried to reconcile his work of managing nature as a 
"resource" with his ethical convictions that nature was a "being." According to 
environmental historian Frank Stewart, the naturalist's experiences in a Madison forest 
products laboratory led him to become "increasingly uncomfortable with the economics 
of forestry," and in 1928 he resigned from the Forest Service (149). Leopold's 
biographer, Susan Flader, marks 1935 as the year when Leopold's conversion to a 
preservationist ethic was complete. In that year, he and others concerned with the 
continuing degradation of the environment formed the Wilderness Society, a political 
organization dedicated to preserving wild species and habitats as they were. not as 
humanity wanted them. 
Leopold's conversion to the role of nature advocate came about as a result of his 
recognition that efforts to manage or control the wilderness had resulted in the general 
impoverishment of the environment. Programs to eradicate wolves. cougars, coyotes. 
and other predators were so successful that deer populations in affected areas exploded. 
leaving herds to starve slowly on overgrazed ranges. In the prairies, the farmers' 
policy of plowing under "weeds" in favor of mono-cultured cash crops had pushed 
countless species of native plants to the verge of extinction. And in America's deserts. 
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manipulation of rivers and underground aquifers to transform "wasteland" into 
farmland wiped out entire biotic communities which were adapted to drought 
conditions. Humanity's faith in its ability to control nature had led the country's 
politicians and leaders of industry on a quest to "improve" the wilderness by making it 
a more efficient producer. Over the years Leopold began to realize that land 
management guided by the assumption that nature existed exclusively to serve 
humanity had neglected to consider the ecological and ethical implications of 
environmental destruction. 
In his later life, Leopold worked on outlining what he called a "land ethic" in 
which he tried to replace the utilitarian view with guidelines for relating to the "land-
community" as being rather than resource. In a chapter of A Sand County Almanac 
(1949), Leopold describes nature as a "round river," a "never-ending circuit" of life 
that flows from the soil to life and back to the soil again. "We of the genus Homo ride 
the logs that float down the Round River," says Leopold, "and by a little judicious 
'hurling' we have learned to guide their direction and speed" (188). The technique of 
trying to control our life raft is called economics, says Leopold, and, unfortunately, we 
tend to conduct economic policy in total disregard of our place in the stream of life. 
For instance, in the national forests, notes Leopold, replanting concentrates on 
marketable species, and native cedar and tamarack are "purged on the grounds of 
economic inefficiency" ( 195). Yet decisions made with the express aim of increasing ... 
the "productivity" of nature never bother to examine the effect of such tinkerings on 
the animals, plants, and soils which depend upon the integrity of their respective biotic 
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communities. As a result, short-sighted decisions may actually remove a key fungi 
here or essential insect there upon which the whole system--and, hence, our own well-
being--depends. Ecology is essential, says Leopold, if we are going to "learn the 
hydrology of the biotic stream" and amass the "collective wisdom" necessary to 
navigate effectively (189). 
Leopold was motivated to speak for the wilderness because he, like Muir and 
Thoreau, recognized that our misguided concepts of nature threatened to diminish or 
completely eradicate sensitive habitats and species. By the 1920s and 30s, the public's 
perception of nature as resource had changed little since Muir's day, and, while the 
government had established agencies to look after the nation's parks and reserves, 
these institutions were still guided by the utilitarian approach. Leopold questioned the 
validity of a world view that measured the value of nature strictly in terms of cash or 
utility. Within the conservation movement in Leopold's day, many felt compelled to 
protect nature by employing similar utilitarian measures, arguing that conservation 
could be profitable. But Leopold considered market economics a poor substitute for a 
land ethic: 
Considering the prodigious achievements of the profit motive in wrecking the land. 
one hesitates to reject it as a vehicle for restoring land. I incline to believe we 
have overestimated the scope of the profit motive. Is it profitable for the 
individual to build a beautiful home? To give his children a higher education? 
No, it is seldom profitable, yet we do both. These are, in fact, ethical and 
aesthetic premises which underlie the economic system. Once accepted, economic 
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forces tend to align the smaller details of social organization into harmony with 
them. (201) 
Leopold calls for "an ethical underpinning for land economics." speculating that as the 
public developed an ecological conscience, economic structures would reflect those 
values and "align ... social organization into harmony with them." 
For Leopold, self-serving economics and conservation were ultimately 
incommensurable, since profiteering would always encourage destructive consumption. 
To illustrate this point, he describes the consequences of a Wisconsin plan that allowed 
farmers to determine their own soil conservation policies: "The farmers. in short. have 
selected those remedial practices which were profitable anyhow, and ignored those 
which were profitable to the community, but not clearly profitable to themselves" 
(Leopold 245). As a result, overgrazing and destructive plowing methods continued 
unabated. The problem with relying on "enlightened self-interest" to guide conduct. 
notes Leopold, is that it depends on the individual identifying the self as a component 
of the larger human and non-human community. As many critics of capitalism have 
pointed out, this social view is actively discouraged by market economics. 
In many ways, Leopold developed a rhetoric of advocacy to supplant the rhetoric 
of capitalism.4 Leopold claims that "An ethic to supplement and guide the economic 
relation to land" is the most sensible remedy to the problems generated by the 
4While Leopold never attacks "capitalism" directly, his critique on profiteering, 
economic self-interest, and the whole network of institutional influences between 
universities, the government, and capital suggests that he was strongly opposed to 
laissez-fair economics when it came to the environment. 
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economics of self-interest (251 ). Seeking to undermine the notion that nature is 
valuable only as a commodity, Leopold points out that we have other ways of valuing 
nature. evidenced by the aesthetic or spiritual satisfaction-what he calls a "social 
asset"--, that we derive from non-human nature. To illustrate the limitations of 
measuring nature by its "exchange value," Leopold applies the method to the "music of 
the goose" and finds it completely at a loss to account for its holistic, social worth: 
If birds and animals are a social asset, how much of an asset are they? It is easy 
to say that some of us, afflicted with hereditary hunting fever, cannot live 
satisfactory lives without them. But this does not establish any comparative value. 
and in these days it is sometimes necessary to choose between necessities. In 
short, what is a wild goose worth? I have a ticket to the symphony. It was not 
cheap. The dollars were well spent, but I would forgo the experience for the sight 
of the big gander that sailed honking into my decoys at daybreak this morning 
(228-9). 
If society were rely on the market to save the environment, there would be little nature 
left that did not turn a profit. "One basic weakness in a conservation system based 
wholly on economic motives," says Leopold, "is that most members of the land 
community have no economic value. Wildflowers and songbirds are examples. Of the 
22,000 higher plants and animals native to Wisconsin, it is doubtful whether more than 
5 per cent can be sold, fed, eaten, or otherwise put to economic use" (246): 
To sum up: a system of conservation based solely on economic self-interest is 
hopelessly lopsided. It tends to ignore, and thus eventually to eliminate, many 
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elements in the land community that lack commercial value, but that are (as far as 
we know) essential to its healthy functioning. It assumes, falsely, I think, that the 
economic parts of the biotic clock will function without the uneconomic parts 
(251). 
Against the utilitarian perspective, Leopold offers an alternative ecological 
approach in which the non-human beings are viewed as "members of the community"--
a living web which includes humanity. To Leopold, this new metaphor better 
represents the real bonds that exist between humanity and nature, and such a view 
encourages people to relate to nature as a moral, as opposed to a strictly commercial. 
entity. While Leopold admitted that market capitalism provided the dominant view of 
nature, he noted that the public had made a noticeable shift toward an ecological 
perspective: "We have no land ethic yet, but we have at least drawn nearer the point of 
admitting that birds should continue as a matter of biotic right, regardless of the 
presence or absence of economic advantage to us" (247). Leopold observes that for 
those who embrace this "enlightened view," it becomes evident that "no special interest 
has the right to exterminate [other creatures] for the sake of a benefit, real or fancied. 
to itself' (247). 
By the mid-twentieth century, science had gained a better appreciation of what 
Leopold called the "small cogs and wheels" of nature, but industry had used that 
knowledge to better manipulate the natural world for the convenience of humanity. 
For Rachel Carson, who, like Leopold, had been trained as a scientist, the 
unwillingness of science and industry to weigh the value of inventions against related 
environmental damage was unconscionable. As a result of our technological hubris. 
argues Carson, we had "waged war" on the environment in an effort to subdue and 
control it. From the early part of the century through the 1950s, science made 
astounding discoveries in chemistry, genetics, and physics that greatly enhanced 
humanity's understanding of the physical universe. Instead of inspiring a degree of 
reverence and restraint, this newfound understanding of nature's complexities led 
scientists and policy-makers to be more confident than ever about their ability to 
manipulate and exploit nature. In light of the awesome new powers conferred upon 
humanity through technology, says nature historian Frank Stewart, "the natural world 
had come to seem quaint and backward compared with the marvelous conveniences 
that American industry and technology provided in the 1950s" ( 162). 
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One of the "marveious conveniences" of the technological age, DDT, threatened to 
destroy whole populations of insects and birds, as well as damage human health. 
Alarmed by the growing tendency of science to micro-manage nature in total disregard 
of broader ecological implications, Carson wrote Silent Spring in 1962 to expose the 
dangers of the indiscriminate use of pesticides. She begins her book by describing 
how hypothetical "Anytown," once thriving with human and non-human life, succumbs 
to a sinister blight: 
There was once a town in the heart of America where all life seemed to live in 
harmony with its surroundings. . . . Then a strange blight crept over the area and 
everything began to change. Some evil spell had settled on the community .... 
No witchcraft, no enemy action had silenced the rebirth of new life in this stricken 
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world. The people had done it to themselves .... This town does not actually 
exist, but it might easily have a thousand counterparts in America or elsewhere in 
the world. (1-3) 
Relying on assurances from the government and industries that pesticides like DDT 
posed a minimal threat to humanity, the public was little concerned with the aerial 
extermination campaigns being waged in rural and suburban America. In a calculated 
effort to shake the public out of its lethargy, Carson relied on pathos to generate 
widespread concern, offering apocalyptic visions of a world thrown out of balance by 
human meddling. 
The destructive effects of many of the chemical compounds discussed in Carson's 
book had been known for some time, but various governmental institutions and the 
corporations that manufactured the chemicals minimalized the dangers and kept their 
products' most unappealing aspects from the general public. In Silent Spring, Carson 
demonstrates that chemical variations of chlorinated hydrocarbons like DDT or dieldrin 
destroy non-target species of insects, fish, amphibians, and birds, and, once in the food 
chain, pose significant health risks to people. What's more, Carson questions the 
integrity of scientists who, funded by industry, had betrayed their obligation to 
improve the lives of general public by serving commercial interests instead. As proof, 
she underscores the fact that many scientists have developed chemicals, herbicides, or 
other toxins without ever fully considering the consequences of their tinkering. They 
are like the wizard's assistant who, having cast the spell, becomes overwhelmed by the 
magic he performed. The most obvious example is the by-product of nuclear fission--
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radiation, which, says Carson, "is now the unnatural creation of man's tampering with 
the atom" (7). Carson depicts modem physicists and chemists as real life 
Frankensteins whose abominations of nature are turned loose on society. 
Carson's criticism of corporate interests and industry scientists was met with a 
vicious counter-attack. Members of the scientific community, industry representatives. 
and government officials questioned Carson's standing as a scientist because she was a 
woman and--on a related theme--because she had diverged from accepted standards of 
"objectivity" by integrating ethics and emotions into science. Stewart compiled a 
sampling of the attacks on her character: 
For advocating for a more cautious approach to biocides--many of which 
contaminated the environment globally and perhaps irreversibly--she was labeled a 
"hysterical woman," an old maid, and "not a real scientist." One government 
official quipped, "I thought she was a spinster; what's she so worried about 
genetics for?" Another government leader dismissed her as part of the "vociferous. 
misinformed group of nature-balancing, organic gardening, bird-loving, 
unreasonable citizenry." ( 163) 
As a woman in a male dominated field, Carson challenged not only the gender 
boundaries which had so long silenced women's voices, but also the patriarchal modes 
of thinking which inevitably suppress the interests of both women and nature. In the 
1950s and 60s, the science upon which government and industry depended reflected 
the patriarchal values of the day. Guided by the dominant hierarchal, mechanistic 
perspective of nature, science and industry treated the physical world as lifeless matter 
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meant to satisfy human desires. The "sentimental" view of nature as animate and 
sentient was rejected as an inaccurate account of reality. Because Carson assessed 
nature in qualitative terms and anthropomorphized nature, her work was discounted as 
the "mystical" rantings of one whose judgement was irrevocably tainted by emotions. 
But to Carson, emotion and ethics were exactly what was missing from the scientific 
assessment of nature. By holding the world at arm's length, as if it were a separate 
and lifeless object, science and industry were able to justify the most horrendous acts 
of ecological destruction. Like Leopold, Carson extends the notion of community to 
nature in an effort to redefme our connection to nature as an ethical rather than 
economic relationship. 
The venom with which corporate America attacked Carson is an indication of the 
danger that this new ethical perspective of nature posed to market capitalism. Fearing 
that concerns over public health and environmental destruction would cut into profits, 
chemical manufacturers scrambled to shore up society's confidence in science's ability 
to control nature. Carson's biographer, Paul Brooks, reports that Monsanto Chemical 
responded to Silent Spring with a parody called The Desolate Year. In this piece of 
corporate propaganda, the company described a terrible world in which, in the absence 
of pesticides, the human race is overwhelmed by parasites and vermin. Reiterating the 
perspective promulgated in the wilderness tradition, Monsanto suggests that humanity 
and nature are adversaries, and that chemicals are the magic bullet that finally shifts 
the balance of power in humanity's favor. Similarly, the an article in the American 
Agriculturalist described a future without chemicals in which people had to resort to 
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foraging for acorns to survive. In this an other instances, the chemical manufactures. 
government agencies, and agri-businesses fought to deny Carson's claims that nature 
was threatened by re-asserting the validity of the old standard image of the "howling 
wilderness." 
The concerted effort to suppress Silent Spring also demonstrated that the utilitarian 
view promulgated by corporate America permeated government institutions and. 
consequently, all walks of public life. Brooks reports that university nutritionists lined 
up to criticize Carson's contention that prepared foods contained pesticides. But, as 
the historian points out, university laboratories were heavily funded by the food 
industry, and scientists may have been compelled to lambaste Carson rather than risk 
their funding. The American Medical Association also supported the chemical 
industry, but the organization's stance suggested some bias, since "Carson's strongest 
supporters came from specialists in public health" (Brooks 297). By contrast. the 
reviews of the popular press, says Brooks, "were overwhelmingly favorable" (297). 
The greatest threat to the chemical manufacturers was that Silent Spring moved 
people from a position of relative apathy to moral indignation. Carson accomplished 
this shift in perspective by demonstrated that it is impossible to separate our physical 
modifications of nature with their ethical consequences. For instance, she explains that 
once DDT is released in the environment and makes its way to our food chain "the 
poison may ... be passed on from mother to offspring," causing fetal mutations or 
even death. The "chemical barrage" employed to subdue a few specific pests is 
indiscriminately "hurled against the fabric of life," says Carson, like a crude "cave 
man's club" (297). In the end, clumsy and often violent efforts to manage a few 
threads of nature threaten to unravel the whole fabric: 
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The "control of nature" is a phrase conceived in arrogance, born of Neanderthal 
age of biology and philosophy, when it was supposed that nature exists for the 
convenience of man .... It is our alarming misfortune that so primitive a science 
has armed itself with the most modem and terrible weapons, and that in turning 
them against the insects it has also turned them against the earth. (Carson 297) 
The question that is raised by this monomaniacal drive for mastery, offers Carson, is 
"whether any civilization can wage relentless war on life without destroying itself, and 
without losing the right to be called civilized" (99). 
In her critique of the chemical "war" on the environment, Carson succeeded in 
generating public concern over pesticides. More importantly, however, Carson 
succeeded in raising serious doubts in the mind of the average citizen about the 
credibility of the utilitarian perspective of nature promulgated by industrial capitalism. 
Carson begins by dismantling old assumptions about the regenerative powers of nature. 
underscoring the fact that humanity wielded the power to destroy species, habitats, 
and, potentially, all life. This allows her to expose the irony of modern society's quest 
for mastery: the power to manipulate life, now largely realized, has forced us to admit 
our dependence. In addition, Carson raises concerns about the motives behind the 
utilitarian world view, suggesting that pesticides were created by "Neanderthal" science 
and rushed to market without complete testing. In the service of industry, Carson 
showed how science had manipulated the natural world in the interests of profit. all the 
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while compromising the environment and public health. As a result, the public began 
to question not only the fmdings of science, but its methods. 
Like Leopold. Carson offers ecology an alternative to the utilitarian view of nature 
promoted within the institutions of capitalism. Carson realized that technological 
hubris paired with economic exploitation posed a grave threat to the integrity of both 
human and non-human life. Her response, like that of advocates before and after, was 
to redefine both nature and, more importantly, humanity's relationship to the natural 
world in ecological and ethical terms. Re-inserting humanity into the living matrix of 
nature's fragile web, Carson shows that our survival depends upon the continued health 
of the whole bio-sphere. With this compelling alternative cosmological model comes 
new obligations for humanity, including a radical set of ethical guidelines with which 
to measure human conduct. Viewed as part of nature, humanity is compelled to 
measure the value of its actions by their consequences on the whole environment. 
Upon establishing this perspective, Carson is able to encourage her audience to look to 
their own self-interests in a way that protects both human and non-human existence. 
PART TWO 
CHARACTERISTICS OF ADVOCACY 
CHAPTER IV 
INTERPRETING THE LANGUAGE OF NATURE 
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I wish to speak a word for Nature, for absolute freedom and wildness. as 
contrasted with a freedom and culture merely civil,--to regard man as an 
inhabitant, or a part and parcel of Nature, rather than a member of society. I wish 
to make an extreme statement, if so I may make an emphatic one. for there are 
enough champions of civilization; the ministers and the school committee and 
every one of you will take care of that. 
H. D. Thoreau, from "Walking" 
Speaking for nature is a relatively new development in Western culture and entails 
a host of rhetorical approaches unique to the act of advocacy. Distinctly different 
from traditional representations of nature as an object or resource, advocacy depicts 
nature as an animate, sentient participant in human affairs. But unlike other 
anthropomorphic depictions of nature which simply mirror humanity in non-human 
nature, the advocates are motivated by the desire to promote nature's perceived 
interests within the human political sphere. The advocates reject depictions of nature 
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as a hostile wilderness, a boundless paradise, or a useful commodity as inaccurate and 
destructive. Attempting to describe nature in ways that coincide more closely with 
their actual experience of the natural world, the advocates represent nature as a 
speaking entity. What's more, the advocates accomplish this by redefining both our 
views of nature and our notions of language. The result is that the advocates create an 
image of nature as an animate, sentient, moral community, making it possible to 
completely reinterpret humanity's relationship to the natural world. 
While nature advocates come from a wide range of social, political, and religious 
backgrounds and employ an incredible array of rhetorical devices, those who speak for 
nature share a few distinctive approaches. First, the advocate draws on a close affinity 
with nature to interpret the language of the natural world; second, the advocate 
represents the language of nature as direct or indirect discourse; finally, the discourse 
that develops out of this translation is distinctly deliberative in its aims, or, more 
specifically, it seeks to transfer power to nature. In this chapter, I will focus primarily 
on describing the first characteristic of advocacy: the act of interpreting the language 
of nature. Subsequent chapters in Part II will examine the rhetorical conventions that 
advocates use to convey nature's interests and the ways that advocacy functions to 
transfer power to non-human nature. 
4.1 Who Speaks for Wolf?: The Role of the Advocate 
In 1982, Paula Underwood Spencer, an Oneida Indian, began translating into 
English the many stories passed down to her by her family. One of those tales is 
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entitled "Who Speaks for Wolf," and it dramatizes the need for humanity to advocate 
for non-human nature. In the story, an expanding tribe fmds itself outgrowing the 
bounds of its current territory, so the elders send a search party out to discover an 
alternative place. The new site the tribe considers has many desirable qualities. but it 
also happens to be "the center place for a great community of wolf." The tribal 
council meets to discuss the matter and listens to all who had views on the matter. 
with one exception. Wolfs Brother, named for his affinity with the pack, was away at 
the time. Noticing Wolfs Brother's absence at the council, one of the community--
concerned that not all parties would be duly represented--cautions the tribe not to 
proceed, asking "who, then, will speak for wolf?" But the council makes up its mind 
without hearing what Wolfs Brother might say on behalf of the wolves and settles on 
moving the tribe into the pack's territory. 
When Wolfs Brother returns, he is dismayed by the fact that none had considered 
the lives of the wolves in making such an important decision. He, more than any 
other person in the tribe, understood the wolves: 
He was so much Wolfs brother 
that he would sing their song to them 
and they would answer him 
He was so much Wolfs brother 
that their young 
would sometimes follow him through the forest 
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and it seemed they meant to learn from him. (20)1 
Knowing that this expropriation would impose hardships on all, Wolfs Brother 
advised his people to re-locate, arguing that the intrusion of humans into the 
community of wolf was a short-sighted solution. Altering human habits to agree with 
the environment, he suggests, would be more efficient and ethical: 
I think that you will fmd 
that it is too small a place for both 
and that it will require more work then--
than change would presently require. (27) 
Despite these protests, "The People closed their ears I and would not reconsider" (27). 
In time, they come to regret excluding the voice of Wolfs Brother, as the needs of the 
wolf and the desires of the tribe come into conflict time and time again: 
They began to see--
for someone would bring deer or squirrel 
and hang him from a tree 
and go for something to contain the meat 
but would return 
to find nothing hanging from the tree 
and Wolf beyond. (29) 
When the problems associated with occupying the wolves' territory become 
1The myth is related in prose with stylized line breaks. No line numbers are 
indicated, thus, parenthetical notations designate page numbers. 
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intolerable, the council convenes to determine the appropriate response. One of the 
options the people consider is the eradication of the pack in order to secure their O\\TI 
well-being. But such a solution has both economic and moral costs, and the tribe is 
compelled to re-evaluate their relationship to their non-human neighbors: 
The tribe met again to consider their options. 
They saw 
That it was possible 
to hunt down this Wolf People 
until they were no more 
But they also saw 
That this would require much energy over many years 
They saw, too 
That such a task would change the People: 
they would become Wolf Killers 
A people who took life only to sustain their own 
would become a People who took life 
rather than move a little 
It did not seem to them 
That they wanted to become such a people. (33-4) 
A deteriorating quality of life for both the tribe and the animals forces the council to 
recognize that human efforts to secure material needs from nature necessarily entails 
an obligation to consider the continued well-being of nature. 
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The tale concludes with a lesson about living in this world as members of a larger 
community. The tribe learns that its survival is intimately intertwined with the 
interests of the non-human community. Protecting those interests requires a concerted 
effort on the part of the tribe to represent nature in the human political sphere. Since 
human opinion and consequent conduct are largely guided by language, the speechless 
wolf is practically powerless in the realm of human affairs. As a result, the elders 
determine that it will be necessary to advocate for those interests in the council: 
At the end of their Council 
one of the Eldest rose again and said: 
"Let us learn from this 
so that not again 
need the People build only to move 
Let us not again think we will gain energy 
only to lose more than we gain 
Let us now learn to consider Wolf1" (36) 
The story illustrates the methods the Oneida devised to facilitate their 
understanding of how human actions impacted other animals in their environment. 
The process is only possible if the interests of nature are represented linguistically by a 
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human advocate. Wolfs Brother is close to the wolf, speaks its "language." and 
understands its needs. When the wolves are threatened, Wolfs Brother dissents from 
the group and speaks out of an allegiance to both wolf and people. In this way. 
Wolfs Brother is a necessary mediator between nature and humanity who. by virtue of 
his intimate association with nature, employs language to bridge the gulf that separates 
the human tribe and the "wolf people." 
The Oneida tale of Wolfs Brother demonstrates how one culture's impact on the 
environment leads to a state of crisis which can only be resolved by a fundamental 
transformation of relations of power between humanity and nature. The legend of 
Wolfs Brother provides a broadly applicable example of the conditions which compel 
a society to develop a rhetoric of advocacy. Like the Oneida, the nature writers 
examined in this study are motivated to integrate the voice of nature into the sphere of 
human political life because they recognized that nature was threatened by human 
actions. The advocate works to alter destructive conduct towards nature by changing 
our perceptions of the natural world. More significantly, as Wolfs Brother 
demonstrates, the advocate seeks to transform the way we talk about nature, making 
advocacy a necessary and permanent component of human discourse on the natural 
world. 
4.2 Interpreting the Language of Nature 
One of the defining characteristics of the rhetoric of advocacy is that the advocate 
attributes language to nature. Working against a long standing tradition of defining 
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language as exclusively a human prerogative, the nature advocate invests the non-
human world with its own voice. Relying on evidence gained through experience and 
intuition, many nature writers conclude that other organisms. far from being 
inarticulate, inscrutable beings, are capable of exhibiting various ranges of needs. 
desires, preferences, emotions, and interests. Similarly, the ecosystem--the whole 
connection of animate and inanimate nature--expresses its relative health and well-
being to the attuned observer. However, since we rely exclusively on language to 
apprehend intent and interests in others, we are forced to dismiss the needs and desires 
of non-human nature as unknowable and even non-existent. The advocate asserts that 
we can know, even if imperfectly, the interests of an animal, a species. or an eco-
system by interpreting the non-linguistic phenomena of the natural world as the 
meaningful expression an animate and purposeful community. Such interpretation 
develops out of intimate contact with the natural world and the application of affective 
ways of knowing. 
The initial challenge for the advocates in representing the voice of nature is the 
task of interpreting their observations or intuitions of the external world. The nature 
writer is, obviously, a language-using human, and thus is inescapably a member of a 
society which exercises linguistic and physical domination over nature. But spiritually 
and physically the advocate identifies with nature and forms a strong allegiance to 
non-human life. The nature writer often underscores this affinity with the natural 
world, and claims to feel an overwhelming sense of community with other organisms. 
Dave Foreman, founder of EarthFirst!, describes his connection to the natural world as 
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intense physical and mdral sympathy: "When a bulldozer rips through the Amazon rain 
forest, it's ripping into·my side.· When a-.Japanese whaler fires an exploding harpoon 
into a great whale, my heart is blown to smithereens. I am the land. the land is me" 
(Foreman 5). Similarly, the love of wilderness, says Edward Abbey, "is an expression 
of loyalty to the earth ... the only paradise we ever need--if we only had eyes to see" 
(Desert Solitaire 190). This identification with nature, expressed by almost all 
advocates, predisposes them to be nature's representatives. 
Yet the advocate does not completely renounce humanity, but occupies a position 
on the fringe of it. The advocate lives in both worlds--human and non-human--, 
speaks both "languages," is allied to both categories of life, and therefore is ideally 
qualified to serve as a medium or conduit for transforming the relationship between 
humanity and nature. In fact, the interpretive powers of the advocates depend upon 
their membership in both realms. Like Wolfs Brother, advocates generally see 
themselves not as distinct from nature, but as an extension of nature's "tribe" or 
community. Our alienation from the non-human members of the living community is 
largely self-imposed, as we use language to establish a qualitative difference between 
ourselves and the rest of existence. In an effort to dismantle this conceptual barrier, 
the nature representatives shuttle back and forth between silence and language, nature 
and humanity, and experience and meaning, constructing a more productive 
understanding of non-human nature. 
Almost every nature writer who acts as advocate claims to occupy the role by 
virtue of a "nature experience." The nature experience takes a variety of forms, but it 
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generally involves a profoundly moving interaction or connection with nature in which 
the advocate experiences the sensation--if even for a moment--that he or she exists as 
an inseparable component of nature. Hiking through the Sierra Nevadas, John Muir 
makes a difficult climb in which he comes dangerously close to falling. After a 
moment of fear, he fmds that this elemental struggle in and with nature redefines him 
fundamentally as a part of the natural world, motivated as much by "Instinct" and 
"experiences" as rationality: 
When this fmal danger flashed upon me, I became nerve-shaken for the first time 
since setting foot on the mountains, and my mind seemed to fill with a stifling 
smoke. But this terrible eclipse lasted only a moment, when life blazed forth again 
with preternatural clearness. I seemed suddenly to become possessed of a new 
sense. The other self, bygone experiences, Instinct, or Guardian Angel,--call it 
what you will,--came forward and assumed control. ... I found a way without 
effort, and soon stood upon the topmost crag in the blessed light. (Muir Mountains 
of California 64-65) 
Muir suggests in this passage and elsewhere that there are other ways to know nature 
besides the rational and "objective" assessment of facts. In instances where one seeks 
a clear understanding of the natural world, dramatized most vividly in Muir's basic 
struggle for life, instinct, experience, and intuition--in short, affective ways of 
knowing--prove invaluable perceptive faculties. In Muir's nature experience, his very 
survival depends upon the mind relinquishing control to feeling and faith, and that 
shift in perception provides the understanding that allows him to navigate his way 
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safely up the mountain. The incident provides a model of Muir's interpretive approach 
to nature. One's understanding of nature, suggests the naturalist, depends on intimacy 
and integration over alienation and detachment, and on intuition and experience over 
cold analysis. 
In a world far removed from the breathtaking heights of the Sierra Nevadas, 
Edward Abbey had a similar experience in the barren Arches National Monument. On 
one of his many hikes in the Moab Desert, Abbey describes how, as the result of days 
of intense solitude in nature, he begins to feel his self dissipate, blending and merging 
with the external world: 
I climbed through the caves that led down the foot of Mooney Falls. 200 feet high. 
What did I do? There was nothing that had to be done. I listened to the voices, 
the many voices, vague, distant but astonishingly human, of Havasu Creek. ... 
The days became wild, strange, ambiguous--a sinister element pervaded the flow of 
time. I lived narcotic hours in which like the Taoist Chuang-tse I worried about 
butterflies and who was dreaming what .... I slipped by degrees into lunacy, me 
and the moon, and lost to a certain extent the power to distinguish between what 
was and what was not myself; looking at my hand I would see a leaf trembling on 
a branch. (Desert Solitaire 225) 
As a result of intense and intimate contact with nature, Abbey, like Muir, develops an 
intuitive understanding the non-human world. Nature's strangely human 
expressiveness and Abbey's own animal nature bring observer and observed into such 
close symmetry that it becomes difficult for the author to distinguish where one ends 
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and the other begins. Removing the strict barriers between self and other, nature and 
human, Abbey is able to detect in the workings of nature a language which is 
"astonishingly human." As with Muir, that interpretation is made possible by Abbey's 
identification with nature, and, by extension, his readiness to attribute voice to nature. 
The end of this nature experience is signaled by the return of a sense of alienation and 
radical difference fostered by the more exclusive forces of human language. Abbey's 
heightened sense of awareness is broken when the ego or self--which is culturally 
constructed through language--reasserts itself; at this point, says Abbey, he "regained 
everything that seemed to be ebbing away." 
Most advocates consider their affinity with nature a rarity, and in many cases. 
nature writers lament the fact that they are among the few who can hear, as Abbey 
did, nature's "voice." To those initiated into the silent discourse of nature, the 
majority of the human race has been led to suppress the affective faculties necessary to 
interpret nature's meaning and thus must rely on the advocate to interpret and 
translate. Those who live in close contact with nature are not automatically attuned to 
its voice. It takes a special mind set--one of appreciation as opposed to appropriation. 
one geared to contemplation and aesthetics as opposed to conquest and economics--to 
become literate in the language of the wilderness. For Aldo Leopold, the landscape 
was animated with expression, the whole community of nature infinitely capable of 
communicating intentions, emotions, and designs to those patient enough to learn 
nature's various dialects: 
There is much small talk and neighborhood gossip among pines. By paying heed 
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to this chatter, I learn what has transpired during the week when I am absent in 
town .... Every spring I find a few such decapitated trees, each with its wilted 
candle lying in the grass. It is easy to infer what has happened. but in a decade of 
watching I have never seen a bird break a candle. It is an object lesson: one need 
not doubt the unseen. (89) 
Some would argue that attributing language to non-human nature is merely the 
anthropomorphic flights of the imagination and that there is no rational basis for 
discerning language in the behaviors of other species or natural events. Ursula Le 
Guin, author of many talking animal stories, addresses the problems associated with 
investing animals with speech in the preface to her series of short stories. Buffalo Gals. 
She points out that we universally assume that animals are mute, but suggests that we 
do so out of our own ignorance of nature's language. Incapable or unwilling to hear 
nature's voice or speak nature's language, it is we who are dumb--both mute and 
stupid--for having alienated ourselves from the community of nature: 
Animals don't talk--everybody knows that. Everybody. including quite small 
children, and the men and women who told and tell talking-animal stories, knows 
that animals are dumb: have no words of their own. So why do we keep putting 
words into their mouths? 
We who? We the dumb: the others. (Le Guin II) 
For those who enjoy an intimate relationship with the natural world, the "continuity. 
interdependence, and community of all life, all forms of being on earth. is a lived 
fact," says Le Guin; in giving voice to nature, that reality is "made conscious in 
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narrative" (11). For Le Guin, interpretation is merely a matter of making articulate in 
human discourse what nature acts out daily in the interactions of the whole living 
community. 
In the short story "Buffalo Gals," Le Guin suggests that privileging detached 
reason over immediate experience has effectively silenced nature's voice and. hence. 
distorted our perception of our own importance relative to non-human life. In the tale. 
a young girl gains a more intimate understanding of nature when she is compelled to 
rely more on insight than vision. Lost in the mountains after a plane crash. the girl 
suffers a severe injury to her eye. Taken in by the animal community, a bluejay 
replaces her damaged eye with a lump of pine pitch. Miraculously, her vision is 
restored and she sees all her animal companions clearly (although through a slight 
yellow tint). What she sees through this organic eye is a community of sensitive. 
conscious, articulate animals living in balanced symbiosis. It is as if her vision of this 
world is facilitated by the merging of her self and the external world, represented--
appropriately enough--by the pitch lodged in her eye socket. As the child discusses 
returning to the human world, she asks if she can keep her pine pitch eye, suggesting 
that her ability to perceive the living community of which she is a part depends upon 
her continued integration with nature (Le Guin 51). 
The slow forgetting of nature's language, suggests Le Guin, is accomplished 
through indoctrination into a world view that is distinctly mechanistic, one that 
privileges reason and a hierarchal ordering of the natural world. For Le Guin as well 
as many environmentalists and feminists, the will to dominate manifests itself in a the 
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form of an oppressive regimen to silence the disempowered and unrepresented: 
By climbing up into his head and shutting out every voice but his own, "Civilized 
Man" has gone deaf. He can't hear the wolf calling him brother--not Master. but 
brother. He can't hear the earth calling him child-not Father, but son. He hears 
only his own words making up the world. He can't hear the animals, they have 
nothing to say. Children babble, and have to be taught how to climb up into their 
heads and shut the doors of perception. No use teaching women at all, they talk 
all the time, of course, but never say anything. This is the myth of Civilization, 
embodied in the monotheisms which assign soul to Man alone. ( ll-12) 
Denying language to all but man reflects a pervasive belief in a hierarchy of life, with 
mankind placed securely at the top. Objectivity facilitates a hierarchal and mechanistic 
world view in that it reduces all of nature to quantifiable entities. Under the dominant 
paradigm of scientific rationalism, objectivity is valued over other methods of knowing 
because it assumes a higher degree of control--asserting that it is possible to hold the 
world at arm's length for observation and, ultimately, mastery. 
By contrast, the advocate contends that to be effective, reason must integrate 
intuition because it allows for a more immediate knowledge of one's subject. 
Advocates set themselves apart from those who seek only quantifiable understanding 
of the external world; interpreting nature involves both the intuitive and the rational in 
construction of a qualitative understanding of nature. From this perspective, opinions 
about the aesthetic or moral value of nature constitute valid "knowledge" of the natural 
world. Instead of promoting detachment, the advocates contend that one's ability to 
interpret nature is dependent upon one becoming as fully integrated into nature as 
possible. 
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As part of nature. humanity has the ability to comprehend nature's language. but as 
a result of societal pressures, artificial distractions, or moral or spiritual defects. say 
advocates, the majority of the general public have stopped their ears to all but their 
own voice. Annie Dillard contends that nature's voicelessness is largely a function of 
our atrophied perceptive faculties. As a culture we have divested nature of any 
meaning or purpose outside of the bio-mechanical principles discemable through 
science. Pointing to overturned religious cosmologies, Dillard contends that Western 
society lost an important avenue for understanding nature when we denied nature spirit 
and dignity: 
God used to rage at the Israelites for frequenting sacred groves. I wish I could 
find one. Martin Buber says: "The crisis of all primitive mankind comes with the 
discovery of that which is fundamentally not-holy, the a-sacramental. which 
withstands the methods, and which has no 'hour,' a province which steadily 
enlarges itself." Now we are no longer primitive; now the whole world seems not-
holy. We have drained the light from the boughs in the sacred grove and snuffed 
it in the high places and along the banks of sacred streams. We as a people have 
moved from pantheism to pan-atheism. Silence is not our heritage but our destiny; 
we live where we want to live. (Teaching a Stone to Talk 87) 
The voice of nature is exuberant and persistent, yet we choose not to hear it, suggests 
Dillard, being too fearful of what those voices reveal about our universe and ourselves. 
The incredible profusion of life exhibited in nature and the power with which the 
forces of the universe shape human existence can be such a humbling experience. 
speculates Dillard, that we elect to deny the evidence of our own senses in favor of 
safer and more flattering imaginings of ourselves: 
They [the Israelites] heard God's speech and found it too loud. The wilderness 
generation was at Sinai; it witnessed there the thick darkness where God was: 
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"and all the people saw the thunderings, and the lightnings, and the noise of the 
trumpet, and the mountain smoking." It scared them witless. Then they asked 
Moses to beg God, please, never speak to them directly again. "Let not God speak 
with us, lest we die." Moses took the message. And God, pitying their self-
consciousness, agreed. He agreed not to speak to the people anymore. (Teaching 
a Stone to Talk 87-88) 
Fear of a hostile wilderness, distrust of our own intuitive powers, and our narcissistic 
rationality have blunted our perceptive and imaginative powers, and we have sabotaged 
our ability to comprehend nature's language. "It is difficult to undo our own damage," 
laments Dillard, "and to recall to our presence that which we have asked to leave .... 
The very holy mountains are keeping mum" (Teaching a Stone to Talk 88). 
In many of the "nature experiences" described by advocates, integration with the 
natural world is facilitated by a loss of language. One of the challenges of interpreting 
the voice of nature, suggests Dillard, is circumventing our own language long enough 
to apprehend the non-linguistic discourse going on continuously in the natural world. 
In Pilgrim at Tinker Creek, Dillard describes how she achieves a state of silent 
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awareness in the relatively settled confines of Virginia. Driving along the interstate, 
Dillard pulls off a quiet road to get gas and, in the span of a few meditative moments 
petting a puppy, she experiences a moving connection with nature: 
My hand works automatically over the puppy's fur, following the line of hair 
under his ears, down his neck, inside his forelegs, along his hot-skinned belly. 
Shadows lope along the mountains' rumpled flanks; they elongate like root tips. 
like lobes of spilling water, faster and faster. A warm purple pigment pools in 
each ruck and tuck of the rock; it deepens and spreads, boring crevasses, canyons. 
As the purple vaults and slides, it tricks out the unleafed forest and rumpled rock 
in gilt, in shape-shifting patches of glow. These gold lights veer and retract, 
shatter and glide in a series of dazzling splashes, shrinking, leaking, exploding .... 
The air cools; the puppy's skin is hot. I am more alive than all the world. 
(Pilgrim at Tinker Creek 78-9) 
For Dillard--as with Abbey, Muir, and many other nature writers--interpreting the 
language of nature requires opening the channels of intuition, sensation, and other 
forms of perception that by-pass self-consciousness and intellectual reasoning. Part of 
relinquishing that self-consciousness and reasoning entails shutting off, as much as 
possible, one's own language. In the fleeting moments in which this is accomplished, 
the speechless language of nature rushes in to fill the linguistic vacuum created in the 
mind of the advocate. 
However, as Dillard can attest, when one moves from experiencing nature to 
conceptualizing the experience, language intervenes and the experience of the present 
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is lost: 
This is it, I think, this is it, right now, the present, this empty gas station, here. this 
western wind, this tang of coffee on the tongue. and I am patting the puppy. I am 
watching the mountain. And the second I verbalize this awareness in my brain, I 
cease to see the mountain or feel the puppy. I am opaque, so much black asphalt. 
(Pilgrim at Tinker Creek 78-9) 
For Dillard, verbalizing experience shifts the observer's awareness away from the 
observed and onto language and the self. What concerns Dillard and other advocates 
is the tendency of human language to act as a divisive force between humanity and 
nature. As our internal voices prattle on through experience, it tends to prevent us 
from attending to the expressions of the nature going on all about us. Too often, 
language is used to shore up our sense identity and distinctness, to prevent us from 
having to face the unsettling proposition that we are unavoidably integrated with the 
natural world. The nature experience seems to be contingent upon letting the self 
become transparent, upon relinquishing the ego and the control it affords.2 
For advocates, interpreting nature demands, to a certain degree, the suppression of 
2Dillard's perspective harkens back to Emerson's "transparent eyeball," and the 
nature writers resemble each other in their notions of the role of the observer. While 
Emerson is less interested in nature as an end in itself, he and Dillard seem to agree 
that nature can serve as a medium for elevating human spirit. Like Dillard, Emerson 
describes how moments in nature are accompanied by a loss of self ("mean egotism 
vanishes") and a corresponding flash of insight--"I see all; the currents of the Universal 
Being circulate through me." While Emerson focuses primarily on the importance of 
nature to the human soul, he, like many advocates, contends that both humanity and 
nature are manifestations of the same essence. 
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the self. The self, which is largely constructed by abstractions and reflections made 
possible by language, maintains itself through differentiation. The slow dissolve of the 
self is described by many advocates as one strategy that helps them identify with non-
human nature. In the short story "Teaching a Stone to Talk," Annie Dillard describes 
the unique mental conditioning necessary to attune oneself to the voice of nature. 
Dillard recounts the efforts of Larry--a loner who lives in a remote shack--who is 
trying to teach a stone to talk. The ability to hear and understand what nature has to 
tell us involves patience, concentration, and a degree of selflessness characteristic of 
the advocate. Observing Larry's efforts, Dillard concludes that "the ritual involves 
sacrifice, the suppression of self-consciousness, and a certain precise tilt of the will, so 
that it becomes transparent and hollow, a channel for the work" (Teaching a Stone to 
Talk 86). The ability to hear the voice of nature seems contingent upon the ability to 
transcend language, the defining characteristic by which we distinguish ourselves as 
separate from the rest of the universe. Once that exclusive barrier is removed, 
restrictions on what does and does not constitute language disappear, and nature 
becomes infinitely expressive. In the wordless nature experience described by the 
advocate, the observer joins nature in its silence in order to apprehend an entirely 
different language. 
Dillard describes the process of attuning oneself to nature's language as a matter of 
clearing the mind of one's own voice and making way for the presence of another's: 
At a certain point you say to the woods, to the sea, to the mountains, the world, 
Now I am ready. Now I will stop and be wholly attentive. You empty yourself 
103 
and wait, listening. After a time you hear it: there is nothing there. There is 
nothing but those things only, those created objects, discrete, growing or holding, 
or swaying, being rained on or raining, held, flooding or ebbing, standing or 
spread. You feel the world's word as a tension, a hum, a single chorused note 
everywhere the same. This is it: this hum is the silence. (Pilgrim at Tinker Creek 
89-90) 
Dillard suggests that the ability to interpret nature's voice is a matter of attentiveness. 
By quieting her own speech, by "emptying" herself, she sets aside all expectations 
about what nature should or might say and accepts nature's language on its own 
terms. 
From the perspective of scientific rationalism, the unintelligible chirp of birds or 
the mysterious symbiosis of species intend nothing and mean nothing. For Dillard, 
Abbey, and others, nature's silence is its language. It says nothing recognizable by 
our linguistic standards, yet "the world's word [is] a tension, a hum," says Dillard, that 
you "feel." Nature's language--the whistle of a bird, the scat of a coyote, the rings of 
an oak--is by contemporary linguistic standards nothing intelligible at all. In light of 
these interpretive shortcomings, the task for the advocates is to re-invest nature's 
silence with voice. But rather than foisting human defmed language on nature, we 
must begin, say many advocates, with the silence. Within the speechless silences of 
the wilderness, observes Dillard, lies nature's voice: 
Now speech has perished from among the lifeless things of earth, and living things 
say very little to very few. Birds may crank out sweet gibberish and ... pigs say, 
104 
as you recall, oink, oink. But so do cobbles rumble when a wave recedes, and 
thunders break the air in lightening storms. [ call these noises silence. It could be 
that wherever there is motion there is noise, as when a whale breaches and smacks 
the water--and wherever there is stillness there is the still small voice, God's 
speaking from the whirlwind, nature's old song and dance, the show we drove 
from town. At any rate, now it is all we can do, and among our best efforts, to try 
to teach a given human language, English, to chimpanzees. (Teaching a Stone to 
Talk 88) 
To Dillard, the phenomena of nature represent the universe's "still small voice." We 
can try to attune ourselves to that language, or try to wrest from nature some meaning 
in the form of some "given human language." 
Like Dillard, Edward Abbey takes nature's silence as its unmistakable, resounding 
voice. The refusal on the part of nature to say anything intelligible to humanity is its 
only comment. Abbey posits that nature's existential meaninglessness is, 
paradoxically, the source of a transcendent value: 
Whirlwinds dance across the salt flats, a pillar of dust by day; the thombush breaks 
into flame at night. What does it mean? It means nothing. It is as it is and has 
no need for meaning. The desert lies beneath and soars beyond any possible 
human qualification. Therefore, sublime. (Desert Solitaire 219) 
Listening intently for nature's voice the advocate is confronted with silence; and in 
that mute meaninglessness the advocate discovers that nature is articulate in its own 
way to suit its own purposes. And that, says Abbey, is the beauty in nature's 
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discourse. 
One explanation that advocates offer for their unique ability to interpret the voice 
of nature is that they operate under a broader definition of language. It is not that 
they claim to possess a mysterious, psychic sixth sense, but that this broader frame of 
reference allows for a more insightful and worthwhile perspective of nature. We have 
to relinquish our exclusive hold on language, argue the advocates, in order to hear 
meaning outside of human discourse. Thus, from this perspective, interpretation of 
nature is not a mystical matter, but a conceptual one. Our knowledge of the natural 
world and our ability to live as a member of its community is improved by seeking to 
interpret nature qualitatively. One way to do this, demonstrate the advocates, is to 
give hearing to nature's various "voices"--to bring to nature the assumption that the 
yelps of tortured animals, or the bloated bellies of floating fishes, or the blasted 
landscape of a clearcut forest offer moral commentary to those attuned to a wider 
discourse. 
Language, according to many advocates, is too narrowly defined by human-
centered criteria. In his chapter on sounds in Walden, Thoreau implies that the human 
language is but one dialect of many, and that nature speaks constantly in its own 
tongue: "But while we are confined to books, though the most select and classic, and 
read only particular written languages, which are themselves but dialects and 
provincial, we are in danger of forgetting the language which all things and events 
speak without metaphor, which alone is copious and standard" (Walden and Other 
Writings 101 ). Expanding the boundaries of acceptable definitions of communication, 
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the nature writer argues that the natural world does indeed have the means for 
expressing a range of will and sentience, but that the criteria we apply will not allow 
us to recognize anything as language that is not human language. 
Consequently, the nature advocate frequently challenges the existing definitions of 
language, offering alternative criteria for assessing linguistic behavior in an effort to 
extend language to non-human nature. Rather than demanding that animal 
vocalizations demonstrate intentionality before it can be considered language, the 
advocate attributes intent and purpose to animal communication and then fits 
observations of subsequent behaviors to confirm those speculations. In other cases, the 
advocates' notion of sentience is extended to nature at large, and the advocates 
attributes purpose or even a sort of collective consciousness to nature, testing those 
assumptions against their personal experiences of various natural systems. In other 
words, when brought to bear on observations, common sense and intuition lead the 
advocate to assume that animal gestures or physical phenomena are not purely 
arbitrary and that they mean something. 
The nature writer will often apply inferential reasoning to observations in an effort 
to understand the function and motivation of nature's language. Beginning with the 
common sense notion that an exercise of voice proceeds from some internal motivation 
and that it is intended to convey something, the advocate works inductively towards 
the conclusion that the communicative behavior of non-human nature constitutes 
language. Frogs sing, says Abbey, "out of spontaneous love and joy." The validity of 
this intuited truth is tested against and supported by the advocate's experience of the 
world: "Has joy any survival value in the operations of evolution? I suspect it 
does; ... Where there is no joy there can be no courage" (Desert Solitaire 143). 
107 
Yet the advocate is solidly rooted in the material world, and he or she measures 
subjective impressions of nature against the realization that nature exists independent 
of and external to the observer. In Desert Solitaire, Abbey cautions: "I am not 
attributing human motives to my snake and bird acquaintances. I recognize that when 
and where they serve purposes of mine they do so for beautifully selfish reasons of 
their own" (23-4). Elsewhere, he attacks the notion that the external world is a 
creation of the mind, citing as evidence the fact that if you lob a rock at an avowed 
idealist he will necessarily duck. But trusting only in the empirical and quantifiable, 
warns Abbey, would also be a mistake: "I suggest, however, that it's a foolish, simple-
minded rationalism which denies any form of emotion to all animals but man and his 
dog" (Abbey 24). Building upon this premise, the advocates assume that the behaviors 
of other species are motivated by conscious intent, and then they seek to discerned 
intent in nature's various forms of expression. The alternative--of dismissing a priori 
anything that did not demonstrate patently intelligible motives--condemns all but 
human language to be nothing more than physical phenomena or biological reflex. For 
instances, Le Guin points out that in studies of language acquisition in apes, "if the ape 
is not approached as a grammatical subject, failure of the experiment is guaranteed" 
(157). 
However, as Dillard notes (tongue in cheek) a too literal interpretation of the 
advocate's project to comprehend nature's language yields an absurd perspective on 
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advocacy. Returning to "Teaching a Stone to Talk," the island eccentric, Larry is like 
the nature advocate in that he is trying to re-invest nature with voice, with meaning. 
The man has a stone, says Dillard, that he keeps in a leather pouch. At times he takes 
it out and performs a ritual, unknown to all, to teach the stone to talk: "For this 
purpose he has not, as some have seriously suggested, carved the stone a little mouth. 
or furnished it in any way with a pocket of air which it might then expel" (Teaching a 
Stone to Talk 86). Those who seek to interpret nature's "language," Dillard seems to 
be saying, are not so much interested in discovering with instruments and empirical 
observation irrefutable evidence that chimp communication, for instance, does in fact 
conform to our criteria for language, albeit encoded in chimpanese. "I do not think," 
muses Dillard, "he expects the stone to speak as we do, and describe for us its long 
life and many, or few, sensations" (Teaching a Stone to Talk 86). Dillard suggests, as 
have other nature writers, that the advocate seeks to understand the voice of nature on 
its own terms--to shift the criteria of perception and comprehension altogether. 
In an extended analogy, Dillard compares the chore of interpreting nature's 
language to translating a foreign language. As a child she had naively assumed that 
French was merely a code for English, and that at base all languages were English, but 
dressed in other sounds or letters. She recounts that she had held firmly to the notion 
that there was a key out there to the encoded language, and all she had to do was learn 
it in order to decode all the gibberish she heard directly and immediately into English: 
"On the first day of my first French course, however, things rapidly took on an 
entirely unexpected shape. I realized that I was going to have to learn speech all over 
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again, word by word, one word at a time--and my dismay knew no bounds" (Pilgrim 
at Tinker Creek 104-5). By applying human linguistic criteria to nature, we are often 
guilty of a sort of Dr. Doolittle fallacy, where we believe that animals are really 
speaking human language but in code. But the nature advocate seeks to dissuade us of 
that illusion, arguing instead that we begin from the ground up, learning nature's 
words and nature's grammar rather than appending it to our own. "We need someone 
to unlock the code of this foreign language and give us the key"; muses Dillard: "we 
need a new Rosetta stone. Or should we learn, as I had to, each new word one by 
one?" (Pilgrim at Tinker Creek 106). Dillard answers her own question in the 
affmnative. In seeking to decode the language of nature, we need to assume that 
nature has its own grammar or grammars, and that we must accept its rules and 
lexicon: 
[W]e have been as usual asking the wrong question. It does not matter a hoot 
what the mockingbird on the chimney is singing .... The real and proper question 
is: Why is it beautiful? .... Beauty itself is the language to which we have no 
key; it is the mute cipher, the cryptogram, the uncracked, unbroken code. And it 
could be that for beauty, as it turned out to be for the French, that there is no key, 
that 'oui' will never make sense in our language but only in its own, that we need 
to start all over again, on a new continent, learning the strange syllables one by 
one. (Pilgrim at Tinker Creek 106-7) 
For Dillard, nature's language may be based on an entirely different principle like 
some natural aesthetic, while we--chasing our own fancies--try diligently to force it to 
conform with human semantics. In their attempts to understand the language of 
nature, the advocate is willing to "start all over again," even on an entirely new 
linguistic "continent" if need be. 
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Aldo Leopold describes how, in lieu of an intelligible language, he is able to 
comprehend what communication nature offers. In many instances he extends the 
boundaries of language to include a variety of non-linguistic forms of communication. 
Watching his dog track game with his nose, the nature writer admires an interpretive 
skill unknown to the human species. Yet despite the foreign nature of the modes of 
inscription and methods for decoding, this non-human dialogue is nevertheless 
language to Leopold. He follows the confident dog as it reads the signs, scents, and 
markings created by its quarry: "Now (the dog] is going to translate for me the 
olfactory poems that who-knows-what silent creatures have written in the summer 
night" (Leopold 46). 
To the advocate, the voice of nature is not necessarily limited to an audible 
expression. "Like people," observes Leopold, "my animals frequently disclose by their 
actions what they decline to divulge in words. It is difficult to predict when and how 
one of these disclosures will come to light (Leopold 83). Edward Abbey, among 
others, shares this opinion. In his accounts of Moab, Abbey translates with a 
proficiency born of familiarity the language of one of the desert's more visible 
residents. Coming across the tracks of a lone coyote, Abbey follows the trail past a 
spring: "Under the juniper he has left two gray-green droppings knitted together with 
rabbit hair. With fingertip I write my own signature in the sand to let him know. to 
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tip him off; I take a drink of water and leave" (Desert Solitaire 37). The coyote's 
signature or writing is his scat. And like the animals that designate their territory or 
their comings and goings with scent or sign, Abbey inscribes on the landscape his own 
claim to the territory. Significantly, the two acts are set next to each other. two 
parallel declarations in alternate dialects. 
Plants, too, have something to communicate to those familiar with their lexicon. 
On several occasions in A Sand County Almanac, Aldo Leopold interprets the language 
of the trees or of plants for his readers The wild silphium near his Wisconsin farm 
represented "a remnant of the native prairie," a living relic from an age when 
"thousands of acres ... tickled the bellies of the buffalo." Upon seeing the last of the 
indigenous prairie silphium cut by a road crew, Leopold likens the plants to "history 
books" and despairs that most of us are oblivious to the tales they tell: 
The Highway Department says that 100,000 cars pass yearly over this route during 
the three summer months when the Silphium is in bloom. In them must ride at 
least 100,000 people who have "taken" what is called history, and perhaps 25,000 
who have "taken" what is called botany. Yet I doubt whether a dozen [out of 
100,000] have seen the Silphium, and hardly one will notice its demise. If I were 
to tell a preacher of the adjoining church that the road crew has been burning 
history books in his cemetery, under the guise of mowing weeds, he would be 
amazed and uncomprehending. How could a weed be a book? ( 49) 
Even inanimate nature has a language of its own. Leopold describes the 
satisfaction he got out of "reading" the history inscribed on old boards: "The 
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autobiography of an old board is a kind of literature not yet taught on campuses, but 
any riverbank farm is a library where he who hammers or saws may read at will. 
Come high water, there is always an accession of new books" (27). In this case, the 
linguistic medium of nature is not speech but writing. To the educated eye, the boards 
serve as a collaborative palimpsest, authored initially by nature in the form of the tree. 
writ over by the human language of saw and plane and hammer, and finally erased and 
inscribed again by water, wind, and weather. To the astute interpreter. this simple 
"text" provide clues to understanding humanity, nature, and humanity's relationship to 
the natural world. 
However, in translating nature's wordless refrain into language, the advocate is 
inevitably caught in what can be called the "paradox of substance." In his essay 
"Nature as Text," David Cratis Williams examines the paradox of substance that arises 
when language is used to represent the world. In this paradox, "a thing or idea is 
'known' only in relation to that which it is not. Burke's discussion of the term 
'substance' in A Grammar of Motives vivifies the posit: while the idea of 'substance' 
is generally something along the lines of identifying what something's 'essence' 'is,' it 
literally means to stand beneath--sub-stance--or outside of what the thing or idea 'is"' 
(Williams 330). Our words and the things they represent are not the same thing, and 
for this reason we are perpetually separated from the object of our intellectual 
attention. 
The act of making meaning is a matter of dealing with metaphors and not with the 
object itself. As soon as language is in place to facilitate our perception of the world. 
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it intercedes between us and the object of our perception. Language impedes 
immediate experience, transforming the silent present to the present recollected through 
words. Language stands between observer and observed, like "the noise of useless 
interior babble," complains Dillard, "that keeps me from seeing just as surely as a 
newspaper dangled before my eyes" (Pilgrim at Tinker Creek 32). While the nature 
advocate strives to attribute language to non-human nature, the language they identify 
at once fulfills and denies their aspirations. Once the howl of the wolf is translated 
into "defiant sorrow," it is meaningful, but it is no longer the expression of a wild 
animal but the impressions of the romanticist. 
Listening to the western grebe whistle a warning to its neighbors, Leopold wonders 
what the bird might be communicating: 
I have never been able to guess, for there is some barrier between this bird and all 
mankind. One of my guests dismissed the grebe by checking off his name in the 
bird list, and jotting down a syllabic paraphrase of the tinkling bell: 'crick-crick,' 
or some such inanity. The man failed to sense that here was something more than 
a bird-call, that here was a secret message, calling not for rendition in counterfeit 
syllables, but for translation and understanding. Alas, I was, and still am, as 
helpless to translate it or to understand it as he. (Leopold 170) 
The nature writer can interpret and translate the voice of the wild, suggests Leopold, 
but those translations are always going to be removed from the "secret" meaning 
behind the language. The idea used to identify a thing's essence or substance remains 
outside what it "is." 
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The advocates are caught between their desire to know nature unmediated and their 
recognition that they must always return to language to give aesthetic, spiritual, or 
logical significance to their experiences. "Seeing," admits Dillard, "is of course very 
much a matter of verbalization. Unless I call attention to what passes before my eyes. 
I simply won't see it" (Pilgrim at Tinker Creek 30). Language, then, does not make 
the world, but makes the difference between passive sensation and an active awareness 
of the world. By giving us a method of symbolizing experience, language allows us 
the reflect, associate, and evaluate. The ability to see, as Dillard and other advocates 
can attest, is intensified and improved by the ability to describe what's seen. When 
considering the relationship between the nature experience and verbalization, Scott 
Slavic notes that "The poet's craft enables him to control and encapsulate experience" 
(174). From this perspective, the crucial factor which gives the nature experience its 
special quality is the observer's language. 
The advocates do not harbor a naive belief that their interpretation of nature's 
language constitutes some ideal strategy for apprehending the absolute essence of 
nature (though they might wish it were possible), but they suggest that their approach 
is a better way to apprehend nature. Leopold, Abbey, and Dillard and other advocates 
share the belief that, as with human communication, it is possible to achieve an 
imperfect though effective understanding of nature's language. However, those like 
Leopold's friend who hear in bird song only a meaningless "tinkling bell" act under 
the assumption that no understanding is possible because there is nothing to be 
understood. There is, to those who reject the possibility that nature possesses a 
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language, only stimulus and response, only mechanical mouthings. The consequences 
of perceiving nature as dead matter and disregarding its language and signs as 
meaningless have been devastating, as human conduct towards nature has largely been 
guided by what is expedient for human life rather than what is good for all life. For 
the writers discussed here, perceiving nature as animate and expressive seems 
correspond more closely with their experiences and, thus, has greater explanatory 
power. Attributing language to nature, then, is offered both as a more faithful 
representation of the natural world and an improved perspective for guiding human 
actions within the biotic community. 
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CHAPTER V 
TRANSLATING THE LANGUAGE OF NATURE 
The second characteristic of advocacy to be discussed here is the tendency among 
the nature writers examined to act as mediators or intercessors for nature. Once the 
advocate has, through the nature experience or some similar route to insight, 
interpreted nature's language, he or she must translate that understanding into 
intelligible discourse. Translations of nature's language into human language generally 
take one of two forms: direct and indirect discourse. In what I am going to term 
"direct discourse," the nature writer sets out to convey nature's interests by 
representing nature as speaking directly to a human audience. This approach, which is 
often a component of (though by no means limited to) poetry or fiction, usually 
involves a didactic address from a non-human character such as a coyote, raven, or 
mountain. On the other hand, in what may best be described as "indirect discourse," 
nature's voice or intent is expressed through the advocate. In this case, the nature 
writer speaks in her own voice, but in such a way that her speech simultaneously 
conveys nature's meaning. 
5.1 Advocacy's Double-Voiced Discourse 
At this point, the theories of Mikhail M. Bakhtin can provide some valuable 
insight towards understanding the dynamics of "double-voiced" or refracted language. 
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In his essay "Discourse in the Novel," Bakhtin describes how traditional stylistic or 
ideological analyses often ignored or suppressed the multifaceted quality of discourse 
in the novel. When confronted with a genre like the novel which involves authentic 
depiction of the "language of everyday life," traditional literary criticism could only 
reduce the great variety of language to an abstract linguistic monolith. Too often, says 
Bakhtin, 
the discourse of artistic prose was either understood as being poetic in the narrow 
sense, and had the categories of traditional stylistics (based on the study of tropes) 
uncritically applied to it, or else such questions were limited to empty, valuative 
terms for the characterization of language, such as "expressiveness," "imagery," 
"force," "clarity" and so on. (260) 
Scholars of the novel who applied the rules of poetic stylistics, which assume "the 
unity of the language system and the unity (and uniqueness) of the poet's 
individuality," inevitably "select[ed] from the novel ... only those elements that 
[could] be fitted within the frame of a single language system and that express, 
directly and without mediation, an authorial individuality in language" (Bakhtin 265). 
But as Bakhtin points out in his essay, the novel is comprised of "a diversity of social 
speech types (sometimes even diversity of languages) and a diversity of individual 
voices, artistically organized" (262). 
The diversity of language and the subsequent internal stratification of discourse 
within the novel are evidence of what Bakhtin characterizes as the "heteroglot" nature 
of language. Heteroglossia is the condition of contextuality which informs the 
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meaning of every utterance. For every word there is what Michael Holquist (Bakhtin's 
translator) describes as a "matrix of forces"--be they social, political, physiological. 
etc.--which inform the meaning of that word in any particular instance (Bakhtin 428). 
The contextual or "centripal" component of language opposes the unitary or 
"centrifugal" pressures to homogenize and unify language. Within the genre of the 
novel, the author is able to make use of heteroglossia through "a combining of 
languages and styles" which results in "a distinctive social dialogue among languages" 
(Bakhtin 263). 
In much the same way, the nature writer draws upon the heteroglot nature of 
language in constructing a rhetoric of advocacy. The act of speaking for nature, in 
which the voice of one is mediated through another, necessarily involves parody, 
stratification, and diversity. "Heteroglossia," observes Bakhtin, "once incorporated into 
the novel (whatever the forms for its incorporation), is another's speech in another's 
language, serving to express authorial intentions but in a refracted way. Such speech 
constitutes a special type of double-voiced discourse. It serves two speakers at the 
same time and expresses simultaneously two different intentions: the direct intention of 
the character who is speaking, and the refracted intention of the author" (324). Like 
the novelist who creates the voice of a fictional character, the advocate is also 
employing double-voiced discourse in creating a voice for nature. Nature's direct 
address to a human audience carries the refracted intention of the nature writer. For 
instance, in Ursula Le Guin's short story "Buffalo Gals," Chickadee, worried about 
human encroachment on the wilderness, tells the young girl "They [humans] weigh 
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down our place, they press on it, draw it, suck it, eat it, eat holes in it, crowd it out ... 
Maybe after a while longer there'll only be one place again, their place. And none of 
us here" (43). The animal speaker articulates its fear of humanity's destructive power. 
but it also carries with it Le Guin's admonition to her readers against willful 
ecological destruction. Likewise, the advocate's indirect representation of nature in his 
or her own voice serves the interests (albeit purported interests) of nature. Thus, when 
Leopold describes his guilt and complicity at seeing "a fierce green fire" die in the 
eyes of a wounded wolf. he simultaneously expresses nature's basic desire for self-
preservation. 
5.2 Representing Nature's Voice: Direct Discourse 
Of the two methods of translating nature's meaning--direct and indirect--, both 
involve a degree of double-voicedness. When representing nature's voice through 
direct discourse, the nature advocate depicts nature as speaking unmediated to a 
particular audience, much in the way that a novelist might depict a character engaged 
in what Bakhtin calls "direct dialogue." Direct dialogues, explains Bakhtin, occur in 
instances where the author professes to register "the direct speeches of his characters" 
(316). In instances of direct discourse in nature writing, the advocates attempt to 
textually remove themselves from the intermediary position, suggesting that the voice 
comes directly from nature. In these cases, it is nature's voice that is primary and the 
author's interests that are implied. The author may participate in the communication 
as a detached narrator, but the appeals from nature are made directly to a human 
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character or to the reader. 
Direct discourse in which the character appears to speak unmediated is, by 
necessity, mediated in that a human translator is always the mouthpiece. Similarly, 
"The speaking person and his discourse in the novel," notes Bakhtin, "is an object of 
verbal artistic representation. A speaking person's discourse in the novel is not merely 
transmitted and reproduced, it is, precisely, artistically represented and thus--in 
contrast to drama--it is represented by means of(authorial) discourse" (332). In the 
rhetoric of advocacy, the character speaks directly to a human audience, but its 
language is artistically represented using the grammar, syntax, or vocabulary of human 
language. Like the author in the novel, the advocate stands outside the text, and 
nature is depicted as an autonomous speaking subject. As in the case of translation, 
the audience realizes that the language they are hearing is not the authentic language 
of the speaker, but a fair representation of the speaker's intentions in an entirely new 
medium. The advocate who uses direct discourse attempts to present at least the 
appearance of conveying nature's meaning, unadulterated, to the audience. 
Many American nature writers have represented the speech of non-human nature in 
poetry and prose as if it were a direct rendering of nature's voice. In this tradition, the 
writer often creates a character or chorus that embodies the qualities of a sentient and 
self-conscious Nature. In cases of advocacy, the animal or natural entity then speaks 
to the reader or to other characters about its emotional or physical state in an effort to 
secure some human consideration. Thomas Cole, a painter and poet associated with 
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the Knickerbocker Group, 1 was one of the earliest American writers to advocate for 
nature by attributing language to the natural world. In the 1830s, he became greatly 
alarmed by the rapid pace of deforestation of New England's majestic coniferous and 
hardwood forests. Cole, like other American romantics, saw the American wilderness 
as a unique national treasure, in large part because the grandeur and scale of the 
wilderness was capable of eliciting an experience of the sublime. For Cole and others 
in the Knickerbocker Group, this experience of beauty tinged with terror had the effect 
of sharpening one's aesthetic and moral constitution. Nature was not merely an 
aggregate of form and color; in Cole's opinion it was an entity pervaded by spirit. and 
as such it was worthy of our moral consideration. Believing the very integrity of the 
American wilderness--and, by association, American morality--to be at stake, Cole 
wrote the "Lament of the Forest" to thrust nature's interests upon an indifferent public. 
The poem begins with an ode to the incomparable majesty of Hudson's "beauteous 
mountains," clothed in "Forests of shadowy pine, hemlock and beech, I And oak and 
maple" (26-27). These green ranks stand "Peaceful and calm" like "A silent people 
through the lapsing years" (31-32). The speaker, overwhelmed by the lush trees, the 
sparkling waters, and the perfumed air is "Entranced in thoughts" (35) and lapses into 
1The Knickerbocker Group got its name from Diedrich Knickerbocker, Washington 
Irving's fictional author of A History of New York From the Beginning of the World to 
the End of the Dutch Dynasty. James Fenimore Cooper, William Cullen Bryant, and 
Thomas Cole are most closely associated with the group, which was constituted mainly 
as a result of their close friendships. The K.nickerbockers did not espouse any 
particular ideology, but they shared similar romantic sentiments regarding the sublimity 
and nobility of the American wilderness. 
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a "sweet repose" (50). In this heightened state, the barriers to perception that separate 
the speaker from nature dissolve, and he is able to hear "the voice of the great Forest." 
The speaker describes the language of nature as an entirely different communicative 
medium, closer to music than speech: 
Twas wild and strange; a voice 
As of ten thousand! Musical it was--
A gush of richest concord, deep and slow; 
A song that filled the universal air! (53-56) 
It is a compound voice, composed of the collective will of thousands of trees. Despite 
the alien mode of expression, the advocate feels an affinity for nature and is able to 
interpret the strange voice and translate it into human language. 
Presented in quotation marks, the lament that follows is rendered as the forest's 
direct discourse to the speaker. The forest breaks its silence to the advocate 
specifically because of his unique powers of perception and sympathy: 
Mortal, whose love for our umbrageous realms 
Exceeds the love of all the race of man; 
Whom we have loved; for who have opened wide 
With welcome our innumerable arms; 
Open thine ears! The voice that ne'r before 
Was heard by living man, is lifted up, 
And fills the air--the voice of our complaint. (60-68) 
The linguistic distance between advocate and nature is bridged by an emotional 
intimacy born of familiarity and experience. As is characteristic of the role of 
advocate, the speaker suggests that he is able to interpret the language of nature 
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because "love" or a qualitative view of nature heightens his awareness. The speaker's 
care and concern for the forest makes him the ideal advocate above most of his 
countrymen who tend to see the woods as either an asset to commerce or an 
impediment to settlement. In the "Lament of the Forest," the speaker purports to 
render a direct translation of nature's speech. 
In cases of direct discourse, the work of advocacy is carried out by nature itself. 
which offers up a representative voice from its own ranks--a forest, a spider. a 
mountain--to redress human offenses against the entire non-human community. In 
Cole's poem, the narrator introduces the lament, but the forest itself directs its 
"complaint" towards the speaker and humanity in general, enumerating the injustices 
that nature has suffered at the hands of the greedy and the ignorant since the beginning 
of human history: 
[For thousands of years] all was harmony and peace; but Man 
Arose--he who now vaunts antiquity--
He the destroyer--and in the sacred shades 
Of the far East began destruction's work. 
Echo, whose voice had answered to the call 
Of thunder or of winds, or to the cry 
Of cataracts--sound of sylvan habitants 
Or song of birds--uttered responses sharp 
And dissonant; the axe unresting smote 
Our revered ranks, and crashing branches lashed 
The ground, the mighty trunks, the pride of years, 
Rolled on the groaning earth with all their umbrage. (84-95) 
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The voice of the forest is distinctly different from the reverent awe expressed by the 
human narrator. Besieged by a voracious army of woodsmen and settlers, the trees 
deliver a message imbued with tragic resignation. As if composing an elegy to mark 
its own passing, the forest catalogues the history of its rapid decline at the hands of 
uncaring humanity. The dialogue is distinctly double-voiced, presenting the forest's 
interests in self-preservation in the "artistically represented" (authorial) discourse of 
verse. 
Direct discourse is also double-voiced in the sense that it presents, simultaneously, 
a human and a distinctively non-human point of view. In Cole's poem, the work of 
the axe brings prosperity and happiness to humanity, but pain and suffering to the non-
human community. Even the birds and the wind feel sympathy for the toppled and 
"groaning" trees. As the poem progresses, human history is re-told from the 
perspective of the embattled forest, and what constitutes "progress" for humanity is 
perceived as a tragedy for the wilderness. While the forests of Europe fell, North 
America remained the "bright, virgin continent," says the voice, protected from the 
"roving race of Europe" by the wild Atlantic. Fearing their ranks would suffer swift 
destruction at the hands of the invading settlers, the trees appeal to hostile Winter to 
keep humanity at bay: 
But impotent was the voice of our complaint: 
He came! Few were his numbers at first, but soon 
The work of desolation was begun 
Close by the heaving main; then on the banks 
Of rivers inland far, our strength was shorn, 
And fue and stc~l performed their office well. 
No stay was there--no rest. (172-77) 
Even the great physical barrier imposed by sea and storm could not spare the 
American wilderness, and while the discovery was greeted with enthusiasm by Western 
civilization, it was dreaded by the forest which perceived the new human invaders as 
"crafty conquerors." Indeed, the settlers in the New World wasted no time in cutting 
the New England woods with maniacal vigor. 
Direct discourse frequently involves ethical and emotional appeals since nature 
takes on greater moral significance as a speaking entity. The voice concludes by 
suggesting that protecting the remaining American forests constitutes not only a 
physical challenge for the nation, but a moral imperative. The immediate address 
facilitates a more intimate exchange, and the chorus of trees describes the various 
injustices that nature has suffered under human domination. The forest portrays itself 
as helpless victim before irreverent and merciless "human hurricane." As if pleading 
for mercy, the forest acknowledges that its precarious survival is now largely in the 
hands of humanity: 
Our doom is near: behold from east to west 
The skies are darkened by ascending smoke; 
Each hill and every valley is become 
An alter unto Mammon, and the gods 
Of man's idolatry--the victims we. (190-94) 
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Rhetorically, direct discourse arranges an immediate exchange between persecuted and 
persecutor, making the audience feel more accountable to nature than had the address 
been given by a third party advocate. Claiming that the forest's destruction is 
immanent, the voice creates a disturbing vision of a world smoldering in the ruins of 
human greed. As presented by the persecuted trees, the forests' demise is depicted as 
a moral battle in which humanity must choose between despoiling nature's sacred 
temple and, in doing so, giving themselves over to "idolatry," or preserving the last 
remnants of a fragile and noble race. 
While personification was a technique common to nineteenth-century romantics. in 
the hands of advocates the trope was employed with the specific intent of representing 
nature's interests as opposed to merely mirroring humanity. Thus, as the romantic 
movement gave way to realism, naturalism, and other modes of representing nature, 
personification persisted among advocates because it remained a useful means for 
communicating nature's needs. Within the twentieth century, writers like May Sarton. 
Michael McClure, James Welch, John Collins, Rudy Wiebe, Timothy Findley and Jack 
Schaefer continue the tradition of challenging humanity's mechanistic view of nature 
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through the discourse of the speaking animal.2 
Even today, advocates like Ursula Le Guin continue to defend the environment by 
presenting nature's voice as a direct address to the reader. [n Le Guin's short story 
"Direction of the Road," the author gives voice to an oak tree growing near a busy 
roadway. Written as an autobiography, the oak describes how in its early life as a 
sapling there were no cars or highways. But at the age of 132, the oak saw its first 
motorcar, and the tree disliked the "wretched little monster" because it made such a 
noise and fouled the air. More disturbing to the tree, the industrial age seemed to 
change humanity, making people short-sighted, rushed, and anxious. Now, humanity's 
existence is largely confmed to the limits of the asphalt, observes the tree, as people 
rush along its artificial course with the "illusion that they are 'going somewhere"' (Le 
Guin 89). With its focus on "progress" and the pursuit of material well being, 
humanity has become alienated from the natural world, observes the old oak, wreaking 
havoc for all nature in its path: 
Very few of the drivers bothered to look at me, not even a seeing glance. They 
seemed, indeed, not to see any more. They merely stared ahead. They seemed to 
2In Not Wanted on the Ark, by Timothy Findley, animals on the Biblical ark 
converse about their lot in the scheme of the universe and their relationships to 
humans but, mysteriously, they are silenced. [n John Collins's His Monkey Wife, the 
heroine is a chimp named Emily who falls in love with a British missionary, offering a 
compelling look at the ways in which humanity professes to differ from nature. James 
Welch's Fool's Crow includes the antics of a trickster raven, and in Rudy Wiebe's A 
Discovery of Strangers, the world is described from the perspective of wolves, caribou, 
deer and other animals. All of these writers challenge the notion of humanity's 
exclusive hold on language as a means to recontextualize humanity's relationship to 
the natural world. 
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believe that they were "going somewhere." Little mirrors were affixed to the front 
of their cars, at which they glanced to see where they had been; then they stared 
ahead again. I had thought that only beetles had this delusion of Progress. Beetles 
are always rushing about, never looking up. I had always had a pretty low opinion 
of beetles. But at least they let me be. (Le Guin 89) 
The title of the story, "Direction of the Road," serves as a refrain throughout the story 
to underscore the notion that the one-track thought process common to modem society-
-our self-absorbed anthropocentrism--prevents us from comprehending nature outside 
the human universe. The image of the one-track road simultaneously conveys the 
author's criticism of humanity's limited concept of nature and language. By defining 
language strictly in human terms, our investigations of the physical world run the same 
predictable course and reach the same inevitable conclusion: nature has nothing to say. 
The story ends with a frantic driver crashing head-on into the tree. The seventy-
two foot tree receives some damage to its trunk, and the driver is killed instantly. 
Symbolically, the human drive for mastery of the world puts the species on a collision 
course with nature with catastrophic results. Humanity has the most to lose, the oak 
seems to say, as nature will ultimately go on. The tragedy was largely the result of 
misperception. In its rush to construct an increasingly convenient and artificial world, 
humanity has neglected to see the impact of its actions on the organic, living world. 
In "Direction of the Road," the oak, like the human advocate, argues for a new 
way of seeing that will allow the beetle-like drivers on the human road to Progress to 
"understand Relatedness" (Le Guin 91). The disappointment of the oak in Le Guin's 
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story, carries with it refracted condemnation from the author. In the rhetoric of 
advocacy, the transparency of the human advocate is never total, and his or her 
subjective impressions are always linguistically present in the double-voiced discourse 
of representation. The language of advocacy is, after all, human, and the interests of 
nature take form only within the text of the author. The very format of a dialogue 
necessitates that nature be anthropomorphized, and the expressions of nature are 
overlaid with the emotional sentiments of the human advocate. The drive for self-
preservation articulated by the oak (a trait exhibited by organisms throughout nature) 
may be the core contribution of the "speaker," but the emotion belongs primarily to the 
textually absent narrator/author. 
From Bakhtin' s perspective, the voice of the speaking character is the result of 
arbitration between author and character: 
The area occupied by an important character's voice must in any event be broader 
than his direct and actual words. This zone surrounding the important characters 
of the novel is stylistically profoundly idiosyncratic: the most varied hybrid 
constructions hold sway in it, and it is always, to one degree or another, 
dialogized; inside this area a dialogue is played out between the author and his 
characters--not a dramatic dialogue broken up into statement and response, but that 
special type of novelistic dialogue that realizes itself within the boundaries of 
constructions that externally resemble monologues. (320) 
Whatever intent or meaning the advocate gleans from intimate contact with nature 
inevitably becomes imbued with her own beliefs and desires when translated into the 
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highly dialogized format of character discourse. While different organisms exhibit 
characteristics of fear, pleasure, and aggression which correspond to human emotions, 
it is no more possible to determine the internal state of, say, a dolphin than it is to 
determine with certainty the emotions of another human. An interpretation of the 
interests of others will always carry with it the subjective impress of the interpreter. 
Thus, much in the way that character zones are highly dialogized in the novel, direct 
discourse in the rhetoric of advocacy is a hybrid construction which reflects the 
inclinations of nature and the judgements of the advocate. 
5.3 Nature's Meaning Mediated: Indirect Discourse 
Indirect discourse is double-voiced in much the same way as direct discourse, but 
with this approach the author's voice is primary and nature's interests are implied. In 
most cases of advocacy, nature writers represent the language of non-human nature in 
this more subtle, indirect manner. Rather than depicting a forest, bird, or some facet 
of nature directly addressing a human audience, in indirect discourse the advocate 
speaks with his own voice while paraphrasing the language of nature. Nature is not 
depicted as its own advocate here, but the nature writer acts as surrogate or intercessor. 
And, as Bakhtin has demonstrated, the voice that a particular author or character 
adopts may indirectly convey the "hidden voice" of another character. In indirect 
discourse, the voice of nature is contained within the language of the advocate. Under 
these conditions, the language of the advocate resembles the parodic stylization of the 
novelist in which "the speech of another is introduced into the author's discourse (the 
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story) in concealed form, that is, without any of the formal markers usually 
accompanying such speech, whether direct or indirect. But this is not just another's 
speech in the same 'language'--it is another's utterance in a language that is itself 
'other' to the author as well" (Bakhtin 303). While it is the advocate's voice we hear, 
contained within that human voice is the "other" language of nature, as non-human 
perspectives and interests find expression through the advocate. 
In many cases, the advocates identify so strongly with nature that their own 
experiences seem to double for nature's, and their responses to human exploitation 
convey both their own and nature's protests. These empathetic advocates address 
environmental degradation as if it were a very real threat to themselves. By being so 
intimately linked to the community of nature, their objections and concerns are 
intended to reflect nature's own distress. Implicit in the advocate's condemnation of 
the wasteful ways of human society is an injunction on behalf of nature against its 
continued exploitation. 
Natty Bumppo, James Fenimore Cooper's wilderness hero, is a good example of 
the empathetic advocate. His affinity with the wilderness causes him to feel great 
distress at the senseless destruction of nature. Like real-life advocates, the fictional 
advocate, Natty, gives voice to nature by expressing his dismay and anger at 
humanity's careless destruction of nature. A lifelong frontiersman, Natty lives in 
intimate contact with the wilderness. Being free from the corruptive influences of 
society has sharpened his innate sense of good and evil and endowed him with rustic 
intelligence. In effect, Natty's relationship to nature is more like that of an animal. 
living simply, moving freely, accumulating little. The frontiersman's simple and 
unfettered lifestyle stands in stark opposition to the settlers' avarice and violence. 
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Leatherstocking derives his morals from observing the simple order exhibited by 
nature. After watching the dull-witted settlers chop down the lone tree on the vast 
prairie to feed their fire, Natty surmises that the human race in general is attuned only 
to its own selfish needs. Later, he speculates that the whole treeless region may have 
been denuded by humanity. Leatherstocking explains to the skeptical Doctor Obed Bat 
that the pride and waste of wicked empires ultimately could have reduced the land to 
desert. "This very spot of reeds and grass, on which you now sit," says Natty, "may 
once have been the garden of some mighty king" (The Prairie 279). 
Considering that humanity tended to shape the world in its own image. Natty 
concludes that the treeless plains may bear the scars of humanity's moral failings. To 
one so skilled in reading natural phenomena, the whole of nature becomes an indicator 
of the relationship between humanity and nature. By its very health or demise, 
speculates Natty, nature is capable of expressing a sort of valuative commentary on 
human conduct. The environment responds with approval to Natty's simple. 
harmonious living by meeting all his material needs. By contrast, declining animal 
populations, decimated forests, barren plains, and the atrophy of the wilderness. on the 
other hand, are physical testament of nature's disapproval of settlers' "wasty ways." 
Part of Natty's diatribe's against the destructive settlers stems from Cooper's 
nostalgia for the American wilderness. When Cooper began the Leatherstocking series 
in 1823 with The Pioneers, the American frontier was being settled at an incredible 
pace. For Cooper and others, the American vast wilderness represented a source of 
intense national pride. Where Europe had the accoutrements of civilization, 
architecture, arts, urbanity, etc., America had its wilderness. For Cooper. the sublime 
majesty of the wilderness had an ennobling force which could purify the young nation 
of all the artifice and vanity of the Old World and give Americans, if they were 
attuned to the lessons of nature, moral lessons with which to guide individual and 
social conduct. Hence, the destruction of the wilderness was perceived by Cooper as 
the outward manifestation of moral deficiencies among the public that threatened to 
undermine the realization of a new Golden Age in America. Cooper saw society's 
moral destiny intimately interconnected with the fate of the wilderness, and speculated 
that throughout human history the destruction of nature had precipitated the fall of 
nations. 
In The Pioneers, Leatherstocking condemns the townspeople for their ruthless 
destruction of helpless passenger pigeons. As with other real life advocates, this 
fictional character indirectly represents the interests of nature, seeking its preservation 
and well-being against the selfish pursuits of humanity. When migrating flocks of the 
birds pass over the area, settlers pull every firearm and projectile from the family 
arsenals to slaughter the birds. At one point, Mr. Jones fills a canon with birdshot and 
blows hundreds from the air with every shot. Appalled, Natty speaks for the 
decimated flock: 
This comes of settling a country!; ... here have I known the pigeons to fly for 
forty long years, and till you made your clearings, there was nobody to skear or to 
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hurt them. I loved to see them in the woods, for they were company to a body; 
hurting nothing; being, as it was, as harmless as a gartersnake. But now it gives 
me sore thoughts when I hear the frighty things whizzing through the air, for I 
know it's only a motion to bring out all the brats in the village. Well! the Lord 
won't see the waste of his creatures for nothing, and right will be done to the 
pigeons, as well as others, by and by. (The Pioneers 341) 
The settlers inject chaos and disharmony into a world that, for forty years, had been a 
peaceful haven for both Leatherstocking and the pigeons. The harmony that both the 
frontiersman and the birds enjoy is shattered by the pointless violence of the 
disrespectful townspeople. Living so closely to nature and enjoying the fellowship of 
other creatures, Natty experiences the slaughter of the helpless birds as an act of 
hostility towards himself. 
No longer transparent (as in direct discourse), the advocate who represents nature's 
language through indirect discourse is overt about the role of spokesperson. Natty 
condemns the settlers for "firing into God's creatures in this wicked manner" and he 
gives Judge Marmaduke a lesson in the ethical obligations that humanity owes to 
nature. Framed within the context of Christian notions of stewardship, Natty's defense 
of the wilderness is founded on the assumption that nature possesses dignity and value 
as a component of creation: 
Put an ind, Judge, to your clearings. Aint the woods His work as well as the 
pigeons? Use, but don't waste. Wasn't the woods made for the beasts and birds to 
harbor in? and when man wanted their flesh, their skins, or their feathers, there's 
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the place to seek them. But I'll go to the hut with my own game, for I wouldn't 
touch one of the harmless things that cover the ground here, looking up with their 
eyes on me, as if they only wanted tongues to say their thoughts. (Pioneers 343-
44) 
Natty turns his back on the slaughter and retreats into the sheltering woods. Like the 
harried pigeons, the rustic frontiersman feels acutely persecuted by the incursions of 
the unprincipled settlers. Declaring his allegiance to the wilderness and its creatures. 
Natty speaks for the dead and scattered birds and all those who "only wanted tongues 
to say their thoughts." Here, Natty announces that his speech is double-voiced. 
Gazing into the eyes of the wounded birds, Natty perceives terror, desperation, and 
confusion, and those sentiments clearly motivate every word of his rebuke of the cruel 
mob. 
Natty espouses an ethic of reverence, frugality, and fairness which favors 
humanity's integration into the natural world over its conquest and manipulation of 
nature. Whereas the actions of the settlers are "wicked" and "wasty," the old hunter is 
motivated to sustain himself without devastating the environment that provides his 
living. Sounding like the representative for wolf in the Oneida legend, Natty weighs 
his desires against the needs of nature in order to discern an ethical course of action. 
"When I want such a thing," says Natty, "I go into the woods till I find one to my 
liking, and then I shoot him off the branches, without touching the feather of another" 
(Pioneers 342). The villains in Cooper's frontier tales are often the most ruthless 
towards nature. "Pioneers who wastefully slash the forest and its creatures," observes 
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environmental historian Roderick Nash, " ... occupied the lowest position in Cooper's 
elaborate social scale. Leather-stocking, on the other hand, was the ideal pioneer 
because he honored the wilderness and used it respectfully" (Nash 76-77). 
Cooper was eerily prophetic in projecting the demise of the passenger pigeon. 
Whereas the fictional Natty spoke in defense of the endangered birds, it falls to the 
real-life advocate, Aldo Leopold, to write the species's obituary. Acting as a self-
appointed representative, Leopold relays the significance of the loss to nature in 
common terms to an audience who, in general, saw nature's workings as alien and 
inscrutable. In A Sand County Almanac, Leopold demonstrates how humanity's 
careless indifference impacts nature using the extreme example of the extinct passenger 
pigeon. Based on his experience of nature's general drive for survival, Leopold 
explains how humanity frustrated those desires, emphasizing how the pigeons, like 
human beings, "loved" life: 
The pigeon loved his land: he lived by the intensity of his desire for clustered 
grape and bursting beechnut, and by his contempt of miles and seasons. Whatever 
Wisconsin did not offer him gratis today, he sought and found tomorrow in 
Michigan, or Labrador, or Tennessee. His love was for present things, and these 
things were present somewhere; to fmd them required only the free sky, and the 
will to ply his wings. (119) 
In authorial speech which is double-voiced, observes Bakhtin, it is common to discern 
"an intrusion of the emotional aspects of someone else's speech into the syntactic 
system of authorial speech" (319). Similarly, in indirect discourse the appeals of the 
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advocate are often shaped by perspectives and sentiments not their own. The 
"intensity of [the pigeon's] desire for clustered grape" and its perseverance to pursue 
those pleasures across a continent signal to Leopold a clear expression of "will" and 
passion. Speaking in his own voice, Leopold expresses this basic impulse of all life 
forms towards self-preservation with a metaphor which his audience could appreciate--
"love." In this way, the interests of nature, as conveyed to the advocate through 
various non-linguistic means, are represented in human speech to a human audience. 
At the most fundamental level, indirect discourse allows the advocate to promote 
the perceived interests of nature, representing in his own voice everything which he 
apprehends through experience and intuition. On one excursion, Leopold's 
impressions of the busy animal inhabitants of a local marsh compel him to defend this 
under-appreciated ecosystem against increasing human incursions. Lying on his 
stomach, "prone, in the muck of a muskrat house," Leopold sees a redhead duck and 
her "convoy of ducklings," a Virginia rail, a pelican, a mink, and female grebe bearing 
"two pearly-silver young" upon her back. This thriving community and many like it 
are destroyed on a regular basis to make room for more "productive" farmland: 
The marshlands that once sprawled over the prairie from Illinois to the 
Athabasca are shrinking northward. Man cannot live by marsh alone, therefore he 
must needs live marshless. Progress cannot abide that farmland and marshland, 
wild and tame, exist in mutual toleration and harmony. 
So with dredge and dyke, tile and torch, we sucked the combelt dry, and now 
the wheatbelt. Blue lake becomes green bog, green bog becomes caked mud, 
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caked mud becomes a wheatfield. (Leopold 172) 
Recognizing that development of such areas would deny him the enjoyment of hunting 
and experiencing the wildlife, Leopold seeks to curb destructive agricultural practices. 
More importantly, he realizes that the creatures that depend on the marsh--the mothers 
nurturing their young, the muskrat and mink who make their homes there--are 
displaced or eradicated with the destruction of the wetlands. Suggesting that a 
compromise is possible between humanity and nature, Leopold puts forth the idea that 
we reject the imperative for "progress" and allow wild and tame "exist in mutual 
toleration and harmony." In condemning the developers' impulse to "dredge and dyke. 
tile and torch" every wetland, Leopold serves his own needs as a wildlife enthusiast 
and, indirectly, voices the interests the wetland creatures have in maintaining their own 
existence. 
Like Leopold, Edward Abbey opposed rampant development, and he often spoke 
out against human activities which would jeopardize the integrity of the fragile desert 
environments of the American West. In Desert Solitaire, Abbey's observations of 
nature frequently harbor the implied voice of the wilderness. In one case, the writer 
describes his impressions upon leaving his beloved desert in such a way that gives 
voice to both his own and nature's impressions of the event. Abbey begins in his own 
point of view, examining the feelings and associated images he experiences as a result 
of his departure. Describing the beauty of the landscape with unveiled sentiment, 
Abbey bids a sad goodbye to Moab: 
In the government truck I make a fmal tour of the park. East past the Balanced 
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Rock to Double Arch and the Window .... My own, my children, mine by right 
of possession, possession by right of love, by divine right, I now surrender them 
ali to the winds of winter and the snow and the starving deer and the pinyon jays 
and the emptiness and the silence unbroken by even a thought. (Desert Solitaire 
300) 
Under the influence of his own emotions, Abbey recognizes that it would be easy to 
attribute human desires to nature: 
I am almost prepared to believe that this sweet virginal primitive land will be 
grateful for my departure and the absence of tourists, will breathe metaphorically a 
collective sigh of relief--like a whisper of wind--when we are all and finally gone 
and the place and its creations can return to their ancient procedures unobserved 
and undisturbed by the busy, anxious, brooding consciousness of man. 
Grateful for our departure? One more expression of human vanity. (Desert 
Solitaire 300) 
Making a conscious effort to suppress his own perspective, that "human vanity" 
which anthropomorphizes all, Abbey speaks for nature, offering its distinctively 
different perspective on his departure: 
The finest quality of this stone, these plants and animals, this desert landscape is 
the indifference manifest to our presence, our absence, our coming, our staying or 
our going. Whether we live or die is a matter of absolutely no concern whatsoever 
to the desert. (Desert Solitaire 300-301) 
No longer presented from his own biased frame of reference, human actions lose all 
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the monumental emotional and moral import we ascribe to them. It is a human 
tendency, Abbey notes throughout his writings, to see the entire universe as revolving 
around and dependent upon human endeavors. Nature's perspective, he suggests, is 
distinctly free of such assumptions. The alternative and external perspective of 
Abbey's departure provides a marked contrast to his own: nature feels "indifference" 
instead of "relief," and rather than being "grateful" for the absence of humanity nature 
feels "absolutely no concern" for our existence. 
The presence of nature's voice can be marked both by a shift in perspective and a 
shift in language. As Abbey continues his description of the desert's view of 
humanity, nature's perspective is rendered as stylistically distinct from his own 
sentiments. While the speaker is at all times Abbey, the language changes to 
accommodate the implied voice of nature. 
Whether we live or die is a matter of absolutely no concern whatsoever to the 
desert. Let men in their madness blast every city on earth into black rubble and 
envelope the entire planet in a cloud of lethal gas--the canyons and hills, the 
springs and rocks will still be here, the sunlight will filter through ... [and] living 
things will emerge and join and stand once again. (Desert Solitaire 301) 
The emotionally charged tone of the advocate co-exists with the indifferent 
perseverance attributed to nature. To Abbey, humanity's conduct towards nature is 
reprehensible. Human destruction of the environment is "madness" in which we 
stupidly and rashly propel civilization to a pile of "rubble." But framing this bitter 
outburst--which is distinctly Abbey's voice--is the emotionless tone of an indifferent 
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nature. The desert "will still be here," says Abbey, and, unfazed even by annihilation. 
it will go about its business and quietly "emerge and join and stand once again." 
There may be no formal distinction like quotation marks to set the voices off from one 
another; nevertheless, in the rhetoric of advocacy it is possible to discern the voice of 
nature--demarcated by a distinct point of view, set of interests, or rhetorical traits--
within the speech of the advocate. Like the "double-voicedness" Bakhtin identifies in 
authorial discourse where multiple languages can be present in one, Abbey's speech is 
a hybrid, composed of two distinctive voices. Such a "double-accented, double-styled 
hybrid construction" consists of "an utterance that belongs, by its grammatical 
(syntactic) and compositional markers, to a single speaker, but that actually contains 
mixed within it two utterances, two speech manners, two styles, two 'languages: two 
semantic and axiological belief systems" (Bakhtin 304). [n the broadest interpretation 
of Bakhtin's axiom, "two 'languages"'--nature's and humanity's--become "mixed" 
within the utterance of a single speaker, the advocate. 
[n both direct and indirect representations of nature's language, the advocate is 
stretching the capacity of language to the point of redefining it. [n blending their own 
perspectives with that of external nature and by merging their own voices with 
languages entirely other than their own, nature advocates simultaneously challenge 
linguistic egocentrism while re-drawing the boundaries of language altogether. Just as 
the parodic stylization of the novel represents a challenge to the myth of a unified 
language, the duel-accented rhetoric of advocacy interjects multiplicity, stratification, 
and paradox into our notion of our linguistic uniqueness: 
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A comic playing with languages, a story 'not from the author' (but from a 
narrator, posited author or character), character speech, character zones and lastly 
various introductory or framing genres are the basic forms for incorporating and 
organizing heteroglossia in the novel. All these forms permit languages to be used 
in ways that are indirect, conditional, distanced. They all signify a relativizing of 
linguistic consciousness in the perception of language borders--borders created by 
history and society, and even the most fundamental borders (i.e., those between the 
languages as such)--and permit expression of a feeling for the materiality of 
language that defmes such a relativized consciousness. . . . Prose consciousness 
feels cramped when it is confined to only one out of a multitude of heteroglot 
languages, for one linguistic timbre is inadequate to it. (Bakhtin 323-24) 
The dominant scientific paradigm refuses to admit intuition and experience as valid 
forms of interpretation and rejects nature's non-linguistic expression as valid language. 
In giving voice to nature, the advocate subverts our rigid definitions of language and 
insists on peopling the text of human discourse with talking forests, indifferent deserts, 
and doleful pigeons. Like the disruptive discourse of the novel, the rhetoric of 
advocacy ignores--erases even--the "fundamental borders" of language in order to re-
draw them. This, to borrow a concept from Bakhtin, is the "relativizing of linguistic 
consciousness" that advocates accomplish by speaking for nature. By appending 
nature's language to their own, or by suggesting that the two disparate modes of 
expression are compatible, the advocate asserts that human discourse is essentially no 
different from the language of bird, the trees, or the mountains. Or, conversely (and 
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simultaneously), that language itself is so various and multiform as to resist unifying, 
homogenizing, and exclusionary impulses. 
CHAPTER VI 
BROKEruNGPOWCRTONAnTiffi 
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Up to this point I have discussed how the advocate interprets nature's language and 
how those impressions are translated into intelligible discourse. But one could argue 
that poets, scientists, theologians, and others have also concerned themselves with 
interpreting nature. Does this, therefor, make all who translate the phenomena of the 
physical world advocates for nature? The act of interpretation alone does not 
sufficiently distinguish advocacy from other forms of rhetoric which involve 
mediation. We need a way to discern between speaking about nature and speaking/or 
nature. One of the most striking characteristics of this rhetorical strategy is that, 
unlike other forms of nature writing, advocacy facilitates a transfer of power to nature. 
Rather than merely using nature to mirror human concepts, the advocate seeks to 
arbitrate between competing values and influence the conduct of human affairs for the 
benefit of nature. To accomplish these goals, the advocate alters the relations of 
power between speaker, audience, and subject, re-constituting nature as a partner in 
human discourse rather than the object of linguistic and physical manipulations. 
6.1 The Rhetoric of Advocacy: Brokering Power 
Defming advocacy simply as rhetoric which gives voice to voiceless nature admits 
a whole spectrum of discourses which are not acts of nature advocacy. For example, 
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talking animals are quite common in the world of literature and myth. While most 
people generally believe that nature is, in reality, incapable of language, that does not 
prevent various writers from using animals or nature as a symbol for concepts, people, 
or human attributes. In myths, animal fables, folk tales, and a variety of other literary 
genres animals have been talking for centuries. In Aesop's fables, dogs, lambs. lions 
and a whole community of animals talk to one another; the creation myths of the 
Maidu of northern California incorporate the antics of a witty coyote and a thoughtful 
turtle; Chaucer's Chauntecleer talked his way out of becoming the fox's dinner; 
Swift's Houynyms held great intellectual discussions that far exceeded Gulliver's 
capabilities; and Orwell's farm animals plan and implement a political revolt. The list 
could go on and on. 
Neither is the practice of "reading" nature's signs all that new. Many observers of 
natural phenomenon throughout the ages have claimed to have special powers to 
discern the "language" of nature. In America alone, interpreters and translators of 
natural phenomena have been "reading" from the book of nature from the first days of 
settlement. The Puritans believed that events in nature were never superfluous, and 
that the workings of the physical universe were an extension of God's will. For 
instance, Winthrop interpreted the death of a neighbor's cow as an expression of 
divine displeasure, storms and natural disasters were seen by clergy as the Lord's 
retribution, and still births or deformities were regularly interpreted as signs of 
condemnation or punishment. Sailors, hunters, farmers, and a host of Americans who 
made their living close to nature have claimed to possess special ability to read the 
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mysterious signs of nature. And there is no shortage of scientists, mathematicians. and 
astronomers who boast about their abilities to unlock the secrets of the universe 
through observation and interpretation. 
Under the impression that advocacy is merely an act of translation, one might be 
tempted to argue, for example, that natural theology constitutes advocacy. Natural 
theology and advocacy do share some characteristics. After all, the Puritans often 
interpreted and translated the language of nature, incorporating those impressions of 
the wilderness in sermons which were expressly rhetorical in their aims. The goal of 
so many of the Puritan clergy is to change the actions or attitudes of their audience by 
relaying signs from nature. In his Personal Narrative, Jonathan Edwards1 describes 
how contemplation of nature facilitates his experience of "the glorious majesty and 
grace of God": 
God's excellency, His wisdom, His purity and love, seemed to appear in 
everything in the sun, moon and stars; in the clouds, and blue sky; in the grass. 
flowers, trees; in the water, and all nature; which used greatly to affix my mind. I 
often used to sit and view the moon for a long time, and so in the daytime spent 
much time in viewing the clouds and sky to behold the sweet glory of God in 
these things. (60) 
1In Chapter II, I focused mainly on discussing the ways in which the Puritans 
described nature as a hostile frontier. But, as noted in that chapter, the wilderness was 
also perceived as the promised land, and some Puritan literature exhibits aspects of the 
pastoral tradition. Edwards is a good example of a Puritan who represented nature as 
a bountiful garden, and, in keeping with his natural theology, he believed nature to be 
a conduit of God. 
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The physical world is, for Edwards, an extension of the Creator, and as such can be a 
catalyst for religious experience. In his formative years and thereafter, nature provided 
Edwards with moral and spiritual guidance, and the minister presents the glories of 
nature to his congregation as evidence of the power and beauty of God. Like 
advocacy, such rhetoric involves an interpretation of the language of nature with the 
explicit intent to persuade. 
But reading nature as a sign from God is not an act of advocacy. The interpreter, 
in this case, sees nature as a symbol of something else and looks past the natural world 
to a transcendent signifier. Advocates differ from other translators of nature in that 
they are motivated by a desire to empower the natural world through language in 
circumstances where they feel that wildlife or an ecological community is threatened 
by humanity. Whereas some writers working in the disciplines of science, religion, or 
literature are concerned primarily with describing nature, the advocate seeks to 
promote the perceived interests of nature. These different rhetorical goals manifest 
themselves in two distinct acts of representation. In most instances of religious, 
literary, or scientific discourse, representation can be defined as an act of substitution, 
where a particular referent is symbolized by a dissimilar signifier. In this sense, the 
term is used to mean "The fact of expressing or denoting by means of a figure or 
symbol; symbolic action or exhibition" (OED 2498 2d). But in other contexts, 
representation is defined as a mediation of power. In this sense, representation denotes 
"The fact of standing for, or in place of, some other thing or person, esp. with a right 
or authority to act on their account" [emphasis added] (OED 2499 7a). It is this 
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second form of representation, or, more properly, the act of representing that 
distinguishes the rhetoric of advocacy from other depictions of nature. The advocate 
does not merely use nature as a placeholder for some other concept. but acts as an 
intercessor on behalf of nature. 
Representation of nature as it occurs in numerous literary conventions within 
almost every culture is not an act of advocacy, but of substitution. In most 
representations of nature, the animals, plants, or physical features of the natural world 
serve as figures of comparison within various forms of tropes. A lion, for instance. in 
Western literature is often a symbol of royalty or fierceness. The cat is merely what 
theorist I. A. Richards would call the "vehicle" for communicating the "tenor" or idea 
expressed within the metaphor.2 The trope operates by finding resemblances between 
the symbol and the referent, and within the figure of speech, two dissimilar items are 
linked to each other through close association. The meaning of the symbol is largely 
emptied to make way for the concept or idea of the symbolized. The symbol (for 
example, a lion) then becomes a host to the referent (i.e. courage) and carries its 
meaning. 
For instance, in the world of literature, nature occupies a central role in 
symbolizing basic human emotions, attributes, or concepts. In most cases, 
representations of nature constitute a sign system, where nature takes the place of a 
human sentiment or concept. The British Romantics, for example, were fond of 
2See I. A. Richards. Philosophy of Rhetoric. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. 1936. 
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writing nature poetry, but they primarily used nature as a means to represent some 
ideal which transcended the physical world. In their odes, plays, or prose the natural 
world was either a backdrop for the human drama or it might serve to illustrate some 
facet of the individual or social psyche. Writers like Wordsworth, Coleridge, and 
Keats valued nature as a medium for spiritual awakening, and their praise of 
mountains or meadowlarks is often inspired by the aesthetic or emotional responses 
that the natural element evokes. 
Wordsworth's excursion to the peak of Mount Snowdon in the fourteenth book of 
The Prelude is a metaphorical journey through the mind. As the speaker makes his 
way up the slope, his experience suggests the stages one might expect to go through in 
seeking higher awareness or spiritual revelation. The lower regions are enshrouded in 
mist and the hiker's progress is hampered by darkness and obstacles. Determined to 
gain some higher vantage point, the speaker pushes through the "dripping fog" and 
breaks through into a brilliant celestial moonlight. Here in the rarified atmosphere of 
the mountaintop, the speaker's efforts are rewarded, and he surveys the world below 
him "as far as the sight could reach": 
When into air had partially dissolved 
That Vision, given to Spirits of the night, 
And three chance human Wanderers, in calm thought 
Reflected, it appeared to me the type 
Of a majestic Intellect, its acts 
And its possessions, what it has and craves, 
What in itself it is, and would become. 
There I beheld the emblem of a Mind 
That feeds upon infinity, that broods 
Over the dark abyss, intent to hear 
Its voices issuing forth to silent light 
In one continuous stream. (63-74) 
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In this example, the mountain is "an emblem of a Mind" in which the foggy base 
represents a distracted and dulled intellect while the summit serves as a symbol of the 
perceptive and transcending imagination that facilitates human creative insight or 
spiritual enlightenment. For Wordsworth and the Romantics in general, nature was 
primarily a catalyst for self-introspection or metaphysical experience. 
By contrast, in the rhetoric of advocacy nature is not a substitute for some other 
human construct, but an agent within the discursive relationship. While the advocate 
is the active speaker, he or she is "standing for, or in place of, [nature], ... with a 
right or authority to act on [its] account" (OED 2499 7a). The purpose of nature 
advocacy is to protect the perceived interests of non-human nature and to win for 
nature a greater degree of moral consideration within the realm of human affairs. On 
a very basic level, the rhetoric of advocacy is motivated by a desire to prevent human 
activities from destroying the environment and to promote the physical well-being of 
all life. In situations where human conduct towards the environment is guided by 
language, the interests of non-linguistic nature are often lost amid competing human 
claims. The advocate acts the role of Wolfs Brother in the Oneida legend (see 
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Chapter IV), interpreting the needs of other members of the living community and 
injecting those interests into the human political sphere. Thus, advocacy can be 
distinguished from other interpretations of nature in that the discourse is motivated by 
the desire to transfer power to an otherwise powerless nature through the medium of 
language. 
Those who speak for nature do so because they recognize the power of language to 
shape the physical world. As a general rule, all manipulation of our external 
environment that is not merely reflexive is set in motion by language. Describing, 
defining, categorizing, and interpreting the world through language are attempts to 
manipulate nature linguistically in order to gain some degree of control over it. In 
most instances, nature is transformed conceptually first, and then the physical work 
begins. Equations, charts, and writs of law dam the river before the first stone is laid 
in the stream; the wetlands are drained and planted in discourse before they are 
transformed physically into farmland; before radioactive waste can be buried in a salt 
mine beneath a mountain we employ language to predict the motion of the earth's 
crust and weigh our needs against those of unborn generations. 
The nature advocates examined in this study comment in one way or another on 
the fact that the power to manipulate nature usually lies in the hands of those who 
defme, describe, and name the landscape. The act of capturing and construing nature 
with words, agree most advocates, constitutes an exercise of force. Nowhere is this 
more evident than in America's environmental history. The various factions of settlers 
appreciated the appropriative power in language, and they went about applying their 
own idiosyncratic appellations to the "New World" (Glouster, Baton Rouge, San Jose) 
to impress their identify upon the land and, more significantly, to secure their territory 
against the Indians and other immigrants (and their appellations). 
In Daniel Shea's '"Our Professed Old Adversary': Thomas Morton and the Naming 
of New England," Shea describes how the contest between the Puritans and Morton 
was largely fought on linguistic grounds. Intent upon establishing their respective 
authorities, Shea asserts that Morton and the Puritans vied for the naming of (and thus 
the definition of) the New World. By describing the land in pastoral and native 
American terms, Morton tried to disrupt the nominations of the Separatists and 
transform the scriptural Promised Land into a more sensual pre-Christian paradise. 
Shea claims that Morton represented primarily a "literary threat" to the Puritans in that 
his loyalist/Renaissance vision of New England challenged the authority of the 
separatist/Reformation world view offered by the Puritans. Morton's text, New 
English Canaan, "translates" New England into a masque which, by its "lavishness" 
and as a royally sanctioned art form, "exclude[s] the Separatists, making them exiles in 
their own kingdom, and forbid[s] them entry to Canaan" (Shea 58). Morton's 
propensity for designating prominent geographic features with Indian or Arcadian 
names challenged the Puritans' hegemony and undermined their power to define the 
new continent as the site of a Christian theocracy. Consequently, the Separatist 
violently opposed Morton's language and world view, and, eventually, they seized him 
and banished him from the country. Language, as Shea points out, facilitates one's 
power over the environment and serves to exclude competing claims. 
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Those who name a territory, an animal, or a phenomenon claim it as their own 
and, as property, the natural world is manipulated by the conquering namer. Today, 
zoning laws and ordinances are a good example of this. At the behest of various 
commercial interests, certain territories under the jurisdiction of towns or counties may 
be declared "industrial cites," "residential districts," or "business zones." Simply 
because of nomenclature, the fate of these "properties" is determined and a vision of 
their transformation is set in motion. Those areas which are named "industrial" will be 
transformed in keeping with that designation, while "wilderness areas" or "parks" are 
protected (ostensibly) by the sanctuary afforded by mere words. 
To advocates, speaking for nature is a way to give the non-human world, in effect, 
the power of self-definition. For those who observe the phenomenon of the natural 
world, nature is always defining itself simply by being. In other words, the cycle of 
life, the balanced interaction of species, and the predictable behaviors of individual 
organisms exhibit aspects of continuity, purpose, and order that constitute identity. 
Relaying these impressions through discourse, the advocate attempts to approximate in 
words what nature exhibits in being. To Thoreau, the qualities of dignity and beauty 
possessed of living nature suggested that it was infused with "spirit," and to Muir, the 
harmony and sublimity of the wilderness suggested that it was "sacred." For Leopold, 
the cyclical and never-ending exchange of energy in nature could best be described as 
a "round river." And to Carson, the intense bonds of dependence between all life and 
inanimate matter implied that nature expressed itself as a "web of life." These 
advocates employ a new vocabulary or nomenclature, suggested by nature, whose 
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force is conservative rather than transformative. In other words, the propensity of 
nature to reproduce and perpetuate itself leads advocates to select metaphors which 
connote balance, temperance, and harmony. Sacred spaces, round rivers, and webs of 
life are all definitions which communicate a sense of wholeness, integrity, 
sustainability, and which, as a result, resist partition and destruction. The advocate 
offers nature's conservative "self-definition" as a remedy to violent metaphors such as 
"resource" or "wasteland" that encourage society to control, transform, or appropriate. 
But the rhetoric of advocacy is not just a means of empowering nature by 
changing our vocabulary; advocates are intent on changing the way that discourse on 
nature is conducted altogether. For instance, in Silent Spring, Carson demonstrates 
that long-term environmental health requires that nature be made a contributing 
participant in human discourse. The development and implementation of 
environmental technology and science is relatively ineffectual, even dangerous, if it 
fails to consider nature's interests. To illustrate this point, Carson shows throughout 
her book that human interests are inextricably intertwined with the interests of non-
human nature: "Water, soil, and the earth's green mantle of plants make up the world 
that supports the animal life of the earth. Although modern man seldom remembers 
the fact, he could not exist without the plants that harness the sun's energy and 
manufacture the basic foodstuffs he depends upon for life" (Silent Spring 63). Our 
physical connection to non-human nature should be reflected, suggests Carson, in the 
discourse we use to shape the world. 
Carson and other advocates would admit that in order to survive we must 
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manipulate the natural world. However, when we do alter nature, observes Carson. we 
"should do so thoughtfully, with full awareness that what we do may have 
consequences remote in time and place" (Silent Spring 64). At this point, Carson 
concerns herself with promoting a method of discourse that includes, as a regular 
component, a means for eliciting the voice of the "other." Because nature lacks human 
language, its interests must be inserted into discourse on those human affairs which 
impact it directly or indirectly. In speaking for nature, advocates protect the 
wilderness, and, simultaneously, they model the discursive behavior which they hope 
to establish within society. In essence, these writers offer advocacy as a method of 
discourse necessary for the long-term preservation of human and non-human life. In 
the case of the environment, the act of advocacy must be continuous, since it will 
always be necessary to articulate the interests of non-linguistic nature in the human 
political sphere.3 Thus, to be effective, the project of advocacy must extend beyond a 
few scattered voices, requiring a fundamental restructuring of discourse in the political. 
economic, and social institutions that impact the environment. 
The work of the advocates to win greater consideration for nature threatens the 
3The ultimate goal of advocacy, in most cases, is to make itself superfluous or 
redundant. Advocates for ethnic minorities, for example, hope to win for their 
constituents the power of self-representation in a society of equals. At such a point, 
there would be no reason for advocacy for that group. But with nature, where 
animals, plants, and eco-systems will never speak directly for themselves, the role of 
the advocate must be a permanent fixture in human discourse. Advocacy addresses 
itself to the problem of inequality in general. As long as a disparity of power exists 
among members in a community, say the nature representatives, advocacy must be a 
regular component of discourse. 
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established ideology, and, as a result, advocacy has always sparked aggressive 
opposition. Especially in the twentieth century, when concerns about the environment 
have gained wide-spread public attention, representatives of industry and the 
government have worked diligently to challenge, discredit, and stifle environmental 
advocates. Many advocates point out that the environmental crises created by modem 
society are largely the result of a tendency of the dominant economic discourse to 
silence nature's voice. In Silent Spring, Carson illustrates that our successful efforts to 
suppress or exclude the interests of nature have resulted in the general deterioration of 
the biotic community that supports all life. One of the most persistent metaphors 
Carson uses in her book, the metaphor of war, describes the adversarial relationship 
that humanity maintains towards nature. Carson describes mankind as engaged in a 
conscious "assault on the environment." Particularly guilty of this aggression are the 
industry scientists who, in total disregard of the interests of nature, create chemical 
pesticides or herbicides with the singular aim of eradicating entire species of "pests." 
"These sprays, dusts, and aerosols are now applied almost universally to farms, 
gardens, forests, and homes--nonselective chemicals that have the power to kill every 
insect, the 'good' and the 'bad,' to still the song of birds" (Silent Spring 7). The war 
metaphor serves to underscore the fact that Carson's role as advocate is necessitated by 
a fundamental disparity of power between oppressive humanity and persecuted nature 
in which nature lacks the necessary means--language--for representing itself. 
Appropriately, within this battle metaphor humanity's dominance over non-human 
is described as a linguistic act, and "the power to kill" is equated with the power to 
157 
suppress the voice of nature or "still the song of birds." Carson extends this 
connection between language and power within her battle metaphor, describing 
humanity's "conquest" of nature as an act of writing: "As man proceeds toward his 
announced goal of the conquest of nature, he has written a depressing record of 
destruction, directed not only against the earth he inhabits but against the life that 
shares it with him" (Silent Spring 85). The success of humanity's war with nature is 
measured by nature's diminished voice. The title of Carson's book, Silent Spring, 
suggests that nature's silence is at once cause and consequence of its atrophy and its 
powerlessness. On one hand, the phrase suggests that nature's voice--the sign of its 
vitality--is silent as a result of destructive human manipulations of the environment. 
On the other hand, the title implies that the fact that nature is non-linguistic may be 
the cause of its demise, since it has no means of altering the discourse which dictates 
its fate. Either way, as the variety and vitality of non-human life is diminished, its 
"voice" grows fainter and fainter, compounding the problems arising from its 
inscrutability and obscurity. Consequently, it falls to the advocate to both interpret 
nature's interests and to invest those interests with the political force of language. 
Carson offers her own language as the most expedient antidote to nature's 
deterioration. As the voice of spring song birds falters and society's ears are closed 
shut with indifference, Carson's voice becomes stronger and her rhetoric, in effect, 
serves as nature's plea for restraint. Although more inclined to write reserved, 
descriptive accounts of marine ecosystems, Carson met the aggressive physical assault 
on nature with a rhetorical counter-attack on both irresponsible producers and 
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indifferent consumers. In the early 1960s when industrialism was proceeding with 
little concern for the environment, inciting fear seems to have been one of the only 
ways to shock the American public out of its lethargy. Jimmie Killingsworth and 
Jacqueline Palmer, authors of Ecospeak, note that Carson relied heavily on alarmist 
rhetoric, constructing an "apocalyptic narrative" intent on exposing the "dark side of 
technological progress" (65). "Can anyone believe it is possible," asks Carson. "to lay 
down such a barrage of poisons on the surface of the earth without making it unfit for 
all life? They should not be called 'insecticides,' but 'biocides"' (Silent Spring 7-8). 
Killingsworth and Palmer point out that Carson's hyperbolic tone was shaped within 
the context of an ecological crisis, and, under the circumstances, was particularly 
effective at swaying the balance of power in nature's favor: "For an author who 
believes in the need for immediate action, present action that is required to forestall a 
human disaster in the future, this rhetorical tactic has great power" (67):' Silent 
Spring raised a furor among the general public, prompting President Kennedy to 
appoint a commission to study the problems associated with chemical pollution and 
inspiring the Congress to consider a number of bills in the 1960s and 70s aimed at 
protecting human health and the environment. 
4The authors note that hyperbole as a rhetorical strategy also has some drawbacks: 
"The appeal to emotion in the rhetoric of public debate is always risky. A writer who 
seeks one response may elicit a contrary one. Fear can cause readers to open their 
eyes wide or shut them tightly" (Ecospeak 71). However, in the context of the 
existing rhetorical setting, where the public was uninformed and, thus, indifferent 
regarding the implications of chemical pollutants, Carson's pathos proved to be an 
effective strategy for initiating social change. 
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The attempts of concerned citizens like Carson to empower nature through 
language have inspired a concerted effort among developers and corporations to check 
the role of advocacy in the public forum. Despite the success of advocates like Carson 
to raise public awareness concerning pollution, industrial capitalism has been able to 
resist demands for environmental reform by, among other things, denying advocates a 
role in shaping public policy. The voice of the advocates and, hence, the interests of 
nature are marginalized in a political process that disproportionately favors resource 
industries and economic expansion over environmentalists and sustainability. In many 
instances, the American legal system, with its emphasis of protecting "private 
property," contains provisions for silencing advocates' opposition to environmental 
exploitation. Many resource industries have made use of strategic lawsuits against 
public participation (commonly known as SLAPPs) to silence under-financed, grass 
roots protests. For instance, in 1984, when confronted with public protests concerning 
its plans to construct a sprawling resort in the alpine town of Squaw Valley, Perini 
Land Development Company sued one vocal resident for $75 million, falsely accusing 
him of trying to invalidate a prior land-use agreement (Manes 203-4). Because of the 
expenses involved in defending against such SLAPPs, this tactic has proven successful 
in curtailing public participation, even when most suits are ultimately dismissed. 
Much of the environmental legislation that has been written since Carson's day 
bears the impress of corporate interests and adheres closely to the utilitarian 
perspective. For instance, the regulatory approach of the United States regarding air 
and water pollution is based upon a system of "pollution permits." Under this plan, 
160 
the government allows utility companies, heavy industries, and waste incinerators to 
buy their way out of compliance. Rather than reduce the toxicity of their effluent, 
companies purchase a permit or "a property right to emit a maximum quantity of 
pollutants" (Siebert 116). Legislative reform, if it comes at all, is very slow in 
coming--120 years and counting in the case of the American mining industry. Bound 
only by the antiquated General Mining Law of 1872, hardrock miners continue to 
enjoy access to more than 400 million acres of public lands, and the government deeds 
over the title to the mineral rights for an absurd $5.00 an acre (Hamilton 50). Even 
today, environmental legislation produced by the l04th Congress was written, word for 
word in some instances, by industry representatives. 5 Environmental "reforms" are 
often a corporate-sanctioned alternative to real change that offers appeasement and 
incremental adjustments in place of real environmental progress. Any changes that do 
5The Congress has consistently passed legislation that allows corporations to avoid 
environmental legislation when it interfered with profits. The North American Free 
Trade Agreement, which Clinton and Gore endorsed, is designed to facilitate 
international commerce by eliminating a variety of tariffs, duties, and other restrictions 
that deter U.S. companies from investing in Mexico, while simultaneously dismantling 
environmental, health, and labor regulations. Maquiladora industries have created 
atrocious conditions for the Mexican workers in the name of profit. Toxic industrial 
wastes and raw sewage are dumped into canals and streams causing increased rates of 
hepatitis, gastro-intestinal illnesses, infant mortality, and certain forms of cancer. In 
the border town of Matamores alone, discharges of toxic fumes have forced major 
evacuations seven times since 1986. Similarly, rules set forth in the final draft of the 
GATT agreement require the United States to "harmonize" its regulations with less 
stringent international codes. Under GAIT and NAFT A, any health or environmental 
standard deemed to pose an "unnecessary" trade barrier will be condemned as illegal. 
In 1988, Canada used the Free Trade Agreement to challenge the U.S. ban on asbestos, 
winning an appeal in American courts to import the carcinogen into the country. In 
hearings on these polluter bills, the environmentalist community was consistently 
under-represented and their concerns marginalized. 
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come about as the result of demands by environmental groups are, in a sense. tactical 
retreats by big business, intended to prevent environmental advocacy from becoming 
an established and permanent component of economic decision-making. 
In the face of concerted efforts on the part of political and commercial interests to 
marginalize and suppress the interests of nature, the rhetoric of advocacy expanded in 
the latter-twentieth century to include more subversive tactics. Up against an 
increasingly intransigent coalition of federal authorities and developers, Edward 
Abbey's advocacy takes on an edge of urgency in his later works. In the novel The 
Monkey Wrench Gang (1975), advocacy incorporates activism, and Abbey describes 
the antics of a group of environmentalists who thwart the efforts of developers in an 
escalating series of subversive acts. In the novel, four friends living in the desert 
Southwest look on with anger and frustration as the Bureau of Land Management, 
mining companies, the nuclear industry, utilities, and ranchers carve up the Utah and 
Arizona desert for development. Bonnie, a member of this "monkey wrench gang," 
expresses the group's feelings of helplessness in the face of a political process geared 
to protect the interests of industrial capitalism: 
But they have everything. They have the organization and the control and the 
communications and the army and the police and the secret police. They have the 
big machines. They have the law and drugs and jails and courts and judges and 
prisons. They are so huge. We are so small. (Monkey Wrench Gang 169) 
Excluded from the sanctioned discourse (and believing it to be a futile route anyway), 
these fictional characters resort to physical acts of protest, pulling up surveying stakes, 
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sabotaging construction equipment, and generally blocking industrial expansion into 
the wilderness at every turn: "One way or another, they were going to slow if not halt 
the advance of Technology, the growth of Growth. the spread of the ideology of the 
cancer cell" (Monkey Wrench Gang 207). 
The story culminates with an extended chase, where developers and federal agents 
attempt to put an end to the advocates' protests--and thus effectively silence nature's 
voice--by arresting them. After a campaign of "sophisticated harassment techniques" 
that included cutting down billboards, derailing a coal train, and destroying earth 
moving equipment, three of the four members of the gang are finally apprehended. 
However, the most committed member, George Heyduke, refuses to surrender and a 
posse of law enforcement officers and hired guns for local industries track the activist 
down and attempt to kill him. After pursuing their quarry to the edge of a cliff, the 
posse flres a barrage of bullet at the rebel, hurling his body into the river below.6 
Symbolically, the climax plays out the power struggle between the language of the 
advocate and the language of the dominant culture which, when confronted with a 
challenge to its hegemony, moves to suppress the other discourse. The man 
responsible for orchestrating the capture of the Monkey Wrench Gang, a gubernatorial 
candidate, reminds the group of its ideological defeat after the melee: "Industry," 
gloats the politician to the subdued advocates, "that's our state motto, 'industry.' .... 
6Later it is revealed that the posse had shot at a dummy--Heyduke's clothes stuffed 
and propped obscurely at the cliffs edge. Heyduke returns in a subsequent novel to 
fight again. 
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We're gonna transfer this whole goddamned so-called national park to state ownership 
soon as I'm in, mark my words" (Monkey Wrench Gang 350). The violent opposition 
Abbey's characters face reflects the growing animosity advocates experience in the 
latter twentieth century as their pleas for greater consideration of nature in human 
affairs threaten the profit margins of resource industries. 
The resistance of industry and government to popular demands for environmental 
reform led to the inception of a variety of real advocacy groups like EarthFirst! that 
have dedicated themselves to environmental activism. Since the 1960s, new ranks of 
advocates have expanded the repertoire of environmental rhetoric to include a more 
militant approach. In addition to protests, speeches and letter-writing campaigns, 
symbolic acts have become a regular component of advocacy. In 1981, a group of 
radical environmentalists, inspired by Abbey, protested the existence of the Glen 
Canyon Darn in Arizona and the policies which led to the construction of that and 
many other dams. To express their contention that the dam be removed, a small band 
of demonstrators unfurled a huge banner representing a gaping crack down the front of 
the edifice. The move brought national attention to the plight of riparian habitats and 
contributed to discussion on regulating darn construction. 
Dave Foreman, who participated in the Glen Canyon demonstration, is an advocate 
who has promoted the symbolic act as an effective rhetorical strategy. In Confessions 
of an £co-Warrior. Foreman argues that the time for polite negotiations is over.7 The 
7Since writing Confessions, Foreman has altered his approach to advocacy 
somewhat. Rather than working for nature's defense through personal acts of eco-tage, 
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traditional methods of state-sanctioned argumentation and compromise have always 
favored the powerful interests of private and public developers. Furthermore. says 
Foreman. those environmental advocates who promote nature's interests through 
approved forums of debate are often misled into representing human interests 
exclusively. "Radicals are effectively dealt with," observes Foreman. "by giving them 
a place in the structure, where they are co-opted" (Foreman 215): 
Efforts by conservationists to preserve viable old-growth ecosystems by working 
within the system are failing .... Therefore, responsible tree spiking (done as a 
last resort after legal means, civil disobedience, and lesser forms of 
monkeywrenching have failed; and only with full warning to the land-managing 
agency and timber harvesters) is justified and ethical. (Foreman 156) 
Foreman frequently compares environmental activism to methods of "civil 
disobedience" adopted by the likes of Ghandi and King. Like the political protests that 
seek social justice, Foreman contends that the subversive demonstrations and symbolic 
actions of radical environmentalists are acts of advocacy intended to empower the 
disenfranchised. 
In a study on confrontational rhetoric, Robert Cathecart analyzed the practices of 
radical groups like Earthfirst! in order to assess the impact such organizations have on 
Foreman now feels that the best results may be obtained by collective political action. 
He is now a member of Sierra Club and regularly contributes to their magazine. 
Nevertheless, the philosophies he outlines in Confessions reflect the beliefs of many 
environmentalists, and nature advocates continue to incorporate rhetorical acts into 
their repertoire. 
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public discourse. To Cathecart, the "ritual conflict" employed by activists provides the 
disenfranchised access to the public debate while resisting the dominant cultures's 
efforts of appropriation. Confrontation, says Cathecart, "is not anti-communication but 
rather is an extension of communication in situations where confronters have exhausted 
the normal (i.e. accepted) means of communication with those in power" (236). In 
these contexts, confrontation is yet another form of advocacy which seeks to broker 
power to nature, but in a way which goes outside the confines of sanctioned discourse. 
The rhetorical acts of groups like EarthFirst! have the added benefit of exposing and 
debilitating the oppressive force exercised by established institutions: 
It is the act of confrontation that causes the establishment to reveal itself for what 
it is. The establishment, when confronted, must respond not to the particular 
enactment but to the challenge to its legitimacy. If it responds with full fury and 
might to crush the confronters, it violates the mystery and reveals the secret that it 
maintains power, not through moral righteousness but through its power to kill, 
actually or symbolically, those who challenge it. (Cathecart 246) 
In the act of confrontation, radical advocates offer themselves as martyrs for non-
human nature, taking the wrath of an unjust oppressor for the sake of galvanizing 
resistance to that force. 
This more radical strain of advocacy goes beyond a simple expression of nature's 
interests. Advocacy that involves confrontation can also be seen as a ritualized 
expression of nature's tendency to act in self-defense. The radical advocate interprets 
the degradation of nature and the resulting ill-effects on human health as if the 
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environment were reacting to human threats with aggression (the fight component of 
the "flight or fight" response of a cornered animal). Declining soil fertility, polluted 
air, toxic water, and increased UV radiation represent instances where the environment 
has seemed to tum on humanity. The physical "defense" nature exhibits in response to 
human exploitation is expressed rhetorically by radical advocates in the form of acts of 
sabotage, intervention, and protest. 
Treating the Earth as an organism, some describe environmental degradation 
metaphorically as nature's way of trying to purge itself of the human "virus" that 
infects it. Extending the metaphor, Foreman likens the advocates to antibodies, and 
suggests that they, as the wilderness's "warrior society," are a natural component of 
nature's self-defense: 
In our decimation of biological diversity, in our production of toxins, in our attack 
on the basic life-support system of Earth, in our explosive population growth. we 
humans have become a disease--the Humanpox .... Antibodies need no 
justification. Their job is merely to fight and destroy that which would destroy the 
greater body of which they are a part, for which they form the warrior society. 
(Foreman 57-58). 
From this perspective, the symbolic act is nature's own gesture; the advocate is, in 
effect, nature's language. By acting passionately, impulsively, swiftly--much in the 
way that nature would, Foreman suggests that the advocate "speaks" in nature's non-
linguistic language, not as mediator or intercessor, but as an extension of nature. "Our 
most fundamental duty is that of self-defense," says Foreman in Confossions. "We are 
167 
the wilderness defending itself' (50). 
6.2 Nature Speaks: Re-Aligning Rhetorical Power 
While these acts of advocacy change the balance of physical power, speaking for 
nature also effects a conceptual realignment of power. The advocate mounts a 
rhetorical challenge to human dominance by reconstituting nature as a political entity. 
By speaking for nature, the advocate alters the lines of power between the rhetorical 
components of speaker, message, and audience. No longer the subject of discourse. 
nature becomes an agent of discourse, possessing the same rhetorical stature as its 
audience. At the same time, the human participants--advocate and audience--relinquish 
some of the power they would normally exercise when nature is in the conventional 
position of subject. Ultimately, giving voice to nature modifies the structure of our 
discourse, initiating the rhetorical conditions necessary for a fundamental revision of 
our relationship to nature. 
First of all, speaking for nature changes the role of the advocate relative to the 
other rhetorical components. Acting as a mouthpiece for the "other," the advocate is 
not so much a speaker as a medium for the speaker. Interpreting and translating the 
language of nature, the advocates are facilitators who convey intentions and designs 
not (entirely) their own. For instance, Wolfs Brother relates the needs of Wolf, Cole 
conveys the dismay of the forest, and Le Guin represents the sentiments of a whole 
community of animals. In cases of both direct and indirect representation, nature's 
interests provide the motivating force for the discourse. In relation to the audience, 
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the advocate seeks to deflect attention away from herself and onto nature, facilitating 
the relationship between audience and nature in much the same way that a translator 
fosters the relationship between speaker and audience. 
By adopting the role of intercessor or medium, the advocate is transformed 
rhetorically from speaker into a component of the message. In this sense, the advocate 
serves as the text or voice necessary to give conceptual form to nature's needs or 
desires. Much in the way that language makes meaning of experience, the speaking 
advocate gives shape and meaning to the non-linguistic phenomenon of nature. And. 
like language, the advocate operates essentially by metaphor. Emptying themselves (as 
much as possible) of their own interests and desires, the nature representatives make 
way for the meaning of nature. Like a metaphor, the advocate is not the thing he or 
she represents (a forest, whales, the Earth), but--to borrow the terminology of 
linguistics--a signifier of the absent signified. In this way, the representative who 
purports to give voice to nature acts out a part in the play of substitution that is at the 
heart of all language. The human speaker, who is defined as a language-using being, 
becomes, appropriately, the \Vord, standing in place of the mute object. This practice 
of acting as placeholder mimics the associative property of language which gives 
metaphor its power to make new meanings. In other words, the success of advocacy 
derives from the fact that it is essentially a metaphorical process, and, hence, the 
audience can take the voice of the advocate to mean the interests of nature. 
Combined, the voice of the advocate and silent meaning of nature form an entirely 
new trope--speaking nature. The image of nature speaking becomes the master trope 
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of advocacy in which two seemingly incompatible attributes, voice and silence. are 
linked together for the purpose of communicating a radically new idea: the notion that 
"voiceless" nature is indeed a rhetorical being. The metaphor helps to codify 
experience, suggesting an analogy between nature's expression and language. But the 
trope is more than a form of analogy, displacement, or substitution. Once established. 
the image of speaking nature informs the meaning of all subsequent experiences. In 
the case of advocacy, the original signified (nature) becomes infused with the concept 
created by the metaphor (nature as a speaking entity). In this circular pattern of 
experience and description, the metaphors created in advocacy reinforce an experience 
of nature as expressive, which in turn informs subsequent experiences and descriptions. 
In adopting the subordinate role of vehicle or medium in this subversive metaphor. 
the advocates seem to implement within rhetoric the very transference of power they 
seek to promote within the physical world. The trope of speaking nature serves to 
initiate, in a subtle yet persistent way, the power transfer that is the ultimate aim of 
advocacy. Over the course of several decades, the metaphor has becomes established, 
and there is evidence that nature is increasingly accepted as exhibiting aspects of 
sentience and "interests" that afford it certain "rights." For example, after many years 
of struggle, the issue of humanity's obligation to the environment, though 
marginalized, has become a recurrent theme in the fabric of political discourse. Such 
gaps and disruptions in the dominant discourse suggest that the advocates, and nature. 
have been heard. 
Second, the rhetoric of advocacy also transforms nature's role relative to the 
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rhetorical components of audience and message. One of the benefits of speaking for 
nature is that it gives us a way of thinking which breaks out of the tendency to 
perceive the natural world an inanimate thing. Rhetoric in which nature is the passive. 
manipulated subject of discourse reflects and reproduces the dominant discourse of 
commodification and utilization. When nature serves as a vehicle for communication. 
it is reduced--to use an economic metaphor--to a sort of conceptual resource or raw 
material. Returning to the Prelude, Wordsworth's Mount Snowdon is "an emblem of 
the mind," and nature is essentially appropriated to represent abstract themes 
concerning the human imagination. As a symbol of a human faculty, nature is 
emptied of its meaning and transformed into a conceptual product that serves the 
speaker. Mirroring exploitative behavior in the physical world, the human speaker 
manipulates nature as a conceptual commodity within a rhetorical exchange between 
himself and the audience. For instance, in using Mt. Snowdon as a symbol of the 
mind, Wordsworth divests Snowdon of its "mountainness" and invests it with the new 
value or tenor--"mind." Transformed and objectified, this new image of nature is 
presented to the audience to be analyzed, categorized, and intellectually "consumed" as 
a thing rather than a being. Employed with the sole objective of serving human 
interests, representations of nature may prove expedient or useful to humanity, but 
extremely detrimental to the well-being of nature. (Consider, for example, the fear 
and hatred incited towards snakes by using the serpent as a metaphor for Satan. 
Similarly, as eco-feminist have noted, the practice of depicting nature as mistress, 
virgin, and mother in a patriarchal society has caused many to direct their frustration 
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and anger at nature.) The power of nature is severely diminished in the position of 
subject, and, to the advocates, the rhetorical commerce in nature-as-symbol constitutes 
a form of coercive force. 
By contrast, in the rhetoric of advocacy, nature is presented as a self-motivated 
agent in the dialogue rather than the subject of discourse. By representing nature's 
"language," either directly or indirectly, the nature writer attributes expressive powers 
to the natural world, placing it in a position to actively address an audience. For 
instance, in A Sand County Almanac, the sufferings of a wounded wolf are translated 
into an indirect injunction from nature against indiscriminate slaughter: "I thought that 
because fewer wolves meant more deer, that no wolves would mean hunters' paradise. 
But after seeing the green fire die, I sensed that neither the wolf nor the mountain 
agreed with such a view" (Leopold 138-9). Here, speaking nature becomes a 
participant in shaping the relationship between humanity and the natural world and not 
the passive subject of discussion. In Leopold's account of the killing of a wolf, the 
human, utilitarian perspective is countered by the perspective of the mountain and the 
wolf--a view that provides a disruptive moral subtext to the dominant discourse. 
In the position of speaker, nature's power is greatly enhanced within the discursive 
relationship, in large part because it allows for a more powerful use of pathetic 
appeals. In Le Guin's "Buffalo Gals," Grandmother Spider asks the young girl not to 
indiscriminately kill her kind, claiming for herself, as a speaking entity, the same 
moral consideration due to any sentient being. As speaker, nature assumes the stature 
of rhetorical equal to the audience. Conceptually, the effect of this move is that non-
172 
human nature, generally perceived as alien and mysterious, evokes a greater degree of 
identification from the audience, and, hence, commands more sympathy. Because the 
advocate is in the role of mediator, the audience transfers its emotional sympathies 
directly to speaking nature. 
Finally, on a related note, advocacy changes the role of the audience relative to the 
speaker and the advocate. While installing nature in the role of speaker, the trope of 
speaking nature simultaneously displaces the human agent from that position, 
effectively revising the dominant anthropocentric model of language. Symbolically, 
linguistic ability is redistributed evenly as a universal rather than a human attribute. 
Confronted with a nature that expresses will, sentience, and language, the audience is 
obligated, rhetorically, to interact with nature as a moral being. The speaking trees of 
Cole's poem evoke concern for the disappearing forests in part because we as humans 
can sympathize with nature's drive for self-preservation. But language provides an 
even stronger force in uniting speaker and audience, and our sympathies for the forest 
are dramatically heightened because it is a speaking entity. An audience that perceives 
nature as sentient, conscious, and willful is more likely to extend non-human life 
greater moral consideration. 
The subject demands extensive discussion, and in Chapter Seven, I examine the 
philosophical implications of giving language to nature, focusing explicitly on how the 
perception of nature as speaker transforms the dynamic of power between humanity 
and nature. In the discussion that follows, I attempt to demonstrate that the idea of 
nature as possessing language represents a significant challenge to human claims of 
superiority, and, as a result, threatens to revise our notions of ourselves relative to 
nature. 
173 
174 
PART THREE 
THE IMPLICATIONS OF ADVOCACY 
CHAPTER VII 
ADVOCACY'S CHALLENGE TO HUMANISM 
The efforts of advocates to present nature as a speaking entity challenge strongly 
held assumptions about human superiority. One of the ways we have justified our 
domination of nature is that we possess distinctive attributes which entitle us to order 
the world to our liking. Some have suggested that the distinction is biological, that 
humans alone have an erect posture. Others say it is behavioral, that we cook our 
food, we use or create tools, or that we own property. But the difference between 
humanity and animals is most frequently attributed to the fact that we alone are a 
language-using animal. For a variety of reasons, thinkers from successive generations 
have asserted that the capacity for speech makes humanity superior to all other life 
forms. 
Within nearly all expressions of humanism, from antiquity to the Renaissance to 
present, language and its related faculties of reason and imagination are cited as 
justification for exalting human nature. One of the fundamental tenets of humanism is 
that personhood and all the privileges accorded to moral beings derive from the 
assumption that we are of an entirely different order than animals, lodged somewhere 
175 
between the animal and the divine. For humanists, the capacity of speech, with its 
conceptual and creative force, suggests that the greatest secrets of the universe, the 
most improbable feats of engineering, and the most sublime expressions of art are 
attainable for humanity. Animals, on the other hand, are described as an imperfect or 
primitive expression of life, incapable of thought, intention, or even 
consciousness. 
By attributing language to nature, the advocate undermines the validity of 
humanity's claims to superiority by establishing nature as a self-motivated, moral 
entity. If, as the advocate contends, nature possesses its own "language," then 
proponents of humanism lose their strongest case for asserting a strict qualitative 
difference between nature and humanity. When seen as an expression which pervades 
all of nature, language becomes a relatively insignificant category for comparison. and 
humanity can claim superiority only as a matter of degree within a narrowly defined 
set of linguistic parameters. Thus, giving voice to nature is a subversive act that 
initiates a fundamental re-ordering of human moral philosophies along biocentric lines. 
7.1 The Exclusive Prerogatives of Humanity 
In his philosophical survey of the views on animal awareness, The Difference of 
Man and the Difference it Makes, Mortimer Adler delineates how one's views 
regarding the qualitative difference between human and animal communication 
influences the confidence with which one asserts human moral superiority. According 
to Adler, we can divide commentators on this topic into two major categories: those 
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who suggest that humanity differs radically in kind from animals, and those that claim 
humanity differs superficially in kind or merely in degree from other animals (Chapter 
2). The position we take as individuals or as a society on this matter determines, to a 
large degree, the moral consequences we ascribe to our interactions with nature. 
Through much of the history of Western civilization, language has been described 
as the exclusive prerogative of humanity. Aristotle, Descartes, many Christian 
theologians, Chomsky and others have defmed humanity as essentially discontinuous 
with non-human nature. Such arguments that propose a radical difference in kind are 
based on the assumption that there exists "a factor in the constitution of man that is 
totally absent from the things with which he is being compared" (Adler 27). Under 
the influence of these humanistic1 views, contemporary ethics posit an unbridgeable 
distance between humans and animals, where all moral value resides with us and none 
can be ascribed to animals. An overview of some of the most influential 
philosophical, theological, and scientific theories on language reveals apologists for 
human superiority often identify language as a symptom of or evidence for some 
elusive human quality like spirit or reason. This Human Element, then, is seen as 
proof of a radical difference and becomes the justification for humanity's dominance 
1Throughout this chapter I will use the term humanism to designate a general view 
of humanity expressed in cultures from classical Greece to contemporary society in 
which humans are thought to be elevated and distinct from the lower creatures. 
Broadly defmed, humanism tends to exalt the human species, extolling the virtues of 
all those qualities which seem unique to humanity such as language and all the cultural 
apparatus that come with it. Classical, Renaissance, and modern humanists all share 
the common belief that people posses a special dignity, be it spiritual or psychological, 
absent in all other life forms. 
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of nature. 
To Hellenic philosophers, speech was significant not only because it constituted 
verbal communication, but because it involved persuasion. Humankind was distinct 
from the rest of the animals because we were able to communicate intentions and 
values in a way that constructs political culture. On the topic of human superiority. 
Isocrates was careful to admit that in many respects we are inferior to animals. Many 
creatures are swifter, some excel in sense of smell or hearing, and many animals are 
stronger and larger. However, in our persuasive powers, he observes, we are unique. 
Humanity has overcome these deficiencies and mastered the environment, argued 
Isocrates, because rhetorical arts have made cooperation and communication possible: 
[B]ecause there has been implanted in us the power to persuade each other, ... 
not only have we escaped the life of wild beasts, but we have come together and 
founded cities and made laws and invented arts; and, generally speaking, there is 
no institution devised by [humans] which the power of speech has not helped us to 
establish. (qtd. in Corbin 289) 
Like Isocrates, Aristotle believed that language set humans apart from animals in 
that it allowed us to be political beings. But in addition to giving human existence 
political dimensions, language, says Aristotle, gives humanity its distinctive moral 
quality. In Politics, Aristotle contends that the crowning achievement of Greek 
society, the polis, is made possible by the fact that language facilitates moral 
consensus--the foundation of any political unit: 
The reason why man is a being meant for political association, in a higher degree 
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than bees or other gregarious animals can ever associate, is evident. Nature, 
according to our theory, makes nothing in vain; and man alone of the animals is 
furnished with the faculty of language. ll. The mere making of sounds serves to 
indicate pleasure and pain, and is thus a faculty that belongs to animals in general: 
their nature enables them to attain the point at which they have perceptions of 
pleasure and pain, and can signify those perceptions to one another. But language 
serves to declare what is advantageous and what is reverse, and it therefore serves 
to declare what is just and what is unjust. 12. It is the peculiarity of man. in 
comparison with the rest of the animal world, that he alone possesses a perception 
of good and evil, of the just and unjust, and of other similar qualities; and it is 
association in [a common perception of] these things which makes a family and a 
polis. (Aristotle 5-6) 
From this perspective, the "perception of good and evil" would not be possible without 
language. Humanity sets itself apart from the rest of nature not because we use sound 
symbols to convey immediate passions or sensations, but because we assign values to 
human actions and to the universe through language. Because the faculty of speech 
allows for a level of abstraction, and hence evaluation, it enables humanity to construct 
a system of morals. 
This connection between morality and language has had far-reaching implications 
in Western culture. Ancient Greeks and Christian theologians alike have asserted that 
language was evidence of the existence of a human soul. Many medieval theologians 
tried to explain humanity's capacity for language by referring to scripture. According 
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to the Bible, man was made "in God's image." Augustine, among others, argued that 
it was the human mind, and not the physical body, that most reflected the image of the 
Creator. The capacity for speech was one characteristic that humanity seemed to share 
with God. Just as God had spoken the world into being, man, too, orders his world by 
speech. In Genesis, language gives Adam power over the rest of creation in that he 
establishes the identity of the other creatures through the act of naming: 
So out of the ground the LORD God formed every beast of the field and every 
bird of the air, and brought them to the man to see what he would call them; and 
whatever the man called every living creature, that was its name. (Genesis 2: 18) 
Since no other animals in God's creation could speak, language placed humanity 
between the angelic and the bestial. Thus, speech was not merely an intellectual feat. 
it moved humanity closer to the divine. Conversely, linguistic "confusion" was seen as 
a sign of spiritual deficiency. Augustine argued that physical attributes were evidence 
of one's spiritual condition. "As the tongue is the instrument of domination," observed 
Augustine, "in it pride was punished" (qtd. in White 16). Consequently, those who 
were deemed inarticulate or dumb had, according to Augustine, acquired these 
deficiencies through some moral fault of their own. 
Like Augustine, Saint Thomas Aquinas asserted that the human mind "reflects the 
likeness of God in a higher way than creat4res of lower degree" (Aquinas 83). One of 
the characteristics possessed of both God and humanity, says the theologian, is the 
faculty of reason. This becomes significant for Aquinas when considering the question 
of free will and intentionality. In Summa Contra Gentiles, Aquinas argues that "the 
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very condition of the rational creature" is that it has "dominion over its actions" (220). 
For Aquinas, reason was a necessary condition for free wilL Without it, all acts are 
but responses to external forces, and thus irrational creatures could not be said to 
express intent through their actions. Instead, their behavior is guided by unconscious 
passion, and "every other kind of creature [except man] is naturally under slavery" 
(Aquinas 112). 
Free will, argues Aquinas, is the prerogative of rational humans who execute 
intentional acts, and that intentionality exists only in as much as one can deliberate the 
relative virtues of one's choice. "The fact that man is master of his actions," 
concludes the theologian, "is due to his being able to deliberate about them; for since 
deliberating reason is indifferently disposed to opposites, the will can proceed to 
either" (Aquinas 229). Thus, discerning values and moral decisions requires 
argumentation, a process that inarticulate beasts cannot perform. Without the capacity 
to discriminate between various actions, animals are like "instruments" that serve some 
purpose other than their own existence. The attribute of speech and, more specifically, 
reason not only distinguished humanity from animals, but suggested to Aquinas that 
God loved humanity more than the rest of creation. "[I]ntellectual creatures are ruled 
by God as though He cared for them for their own sake," boasts Aquinas, "while other 
creatures are ruled as being directed to rational creatures" (Aquinas 220). 
By the Renaissance, an infusion of humanist thinking had redirected public 
attention on the political and social implications of the power of speech. Like 
Isocrates and Aristotle, Hobbes was convinced that language gave rise to civilization 
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and elevated humanity above brute creation: 
But the most noble and profitable invention of all other, was that of SPEECH. 
consisting of names or appellations, and their connexion; whereby men register 
their thoughts ... without which, there had been amongst men, neither 
commonwealth, nor society, nor contract, nor peace, no more than amongst lions. 
bears, and wolves. The first author of speech was God himself, that instructed 
Adam how to name such creatures as he presented to his sight. (Hobbes 18). 
In a variation on Hellenic and Christian tradition, Hobbes and other Renaissance 
thinkers (and, later, the empiricists of the Enlightenment) gradually shifted their efforts 
from describing the social implications of language to investigating how language 
functioned as a faculty of mind. From the Renaissance forward, human linguistic 
superiority is increasingly attributed to psychological attributes like reason, memory. or 
association. In the first part of The Leviathan, Hobbes explains his theory that 
language joins concepts to sounds or symbols: 
The general use of speech, is to transfer our mental discourse, into verbal; or the 
train of our thoughts, into a train of words; and that for two commodities, whereof 
one is the register of the consequences of our thoughts; which being apt to slip out 
of our memory, and put us to a new labour, may again be recalled, by such words 
as they were marked by. So that the first use of names is to serve for marks, or 
notes of remembrance. Another is, when many use the same words, to signify, by 
their connexion and order, one to another, what they conceive, or think of each 
matter; and also what they desire, fear, or have any other passion for. And for this 
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use they are called signs. (19-20) 
For Hobbes, words are signs of cognitive processes already at work, "mental 
discourses" that lack only a system of signs in order to become transferable. In this 
way, speech is an indicator of conceptual thought or intellect, and is an outward proof 
of the existence of an otherwise inscrutable mind. 
Furthermore, because words can register our thoughts, and to some extent solidify 
fleeting and fragmentary concepts, they facilitate much more complex and challenging 
mental processes such as the exercise of logic or of moral judgement. "So that 
without words," argues Hobbes, "there is no possibility of reckoning of numbers; much 
less of magnitudes, of swiftness, of force, and other things, the reckonings whereof are 
necessary to the being, or well-being of mankind" (23). From Hobbes's perspective, 
language is a necessary condition of the most sophisticated and uniquely human mental 
attributes. Whereas Hellenic philosophers and Christian theologians speculated that 
speech was a product of thought, Hobbes's argument implies the reverse, that thought 
is in part a product of language. 
Rene Descartes, a contemporary of Hobbes, was perhaps the most influential of 
rationalist thinkers to write on the uniqueness of human language. Descartes asserted 
that animals were essentially biological clockwork, while people possess spirit and 
mind, as evidenced by language. If beasts had any faculty of reason at all. he argues. 
they would strive to make themselves understood. Since they are unintelligible, they 
prove themselves to be merely animated matter, living machinery without mind or 
conscious intentions. In Discourse and Essays, Descartes asserts that the lack of 
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speech among animals is testimony to their patent inferiority: 
For it is quite remarkable that there are no men so dull-witted or stupid--and this 
includes even madmen--that they are incapable of arranging various words together 
and forming an utterance from them in order to make their thoughts understood; 
whereas there is no other animal, however perfect and well-endowed it may be. 
that can do the like. This does not happen because they lack the necessary organs. 
for we see that magpies and parrots can utter words as we do, and yet they cannot 
speak as we do; that is, they cannot show that they are thinking what they are 
saying. On the other hand, men born deaf and dumb ... invent their own signs to 
make themselves understood .... This shows not merely that the beasts have less 
reason than men, but that they have no reason at all .... And we must not 
confuse speech with the natural movements which express passions and which can 
be imitated by machines as well as by animals. (Descartes 140) 
To Descartes, it seemed that animals should require "very little reason to be able to 
speak." The fact that even the most "superior" of animals could not approximate 
human language suggested to him that they must have souls that were "completely 
different in nature from ours" (Descartes 140). Other skills--physical strength, a 
sophisticated sense of smell, heightened sense of hearing, etc.--were no indication of 
intelligence, but just the opposite. If these skills were truly born of intelligence, says 
Descartes, they would "excel us in everything" since humanity is often outmatched by 
animals in many categories of physical prowess. The fact that these skills do not 
spring from intelligence proves, says Descartes, that animals possess "no intelligence at 
184 
all," and that their actions are instead the result of the "disposition of their organs" 
(Descartes 141 ). Animal vocalizations were deemed unconscious spasms of the 
biological machinery, while human speech was evidence of intention, intelligence, free 
will, and spirit. 
Descartes's views on human language were profoundly influential, and a host of 
philosophers, anthropologists and linguists elaborated on his assertion that speech sets 
humankind apart from all other species. As science became more and more 
secularized, modem theorists continued to see speech as the exclusive prerogative of 
humanity, but based their claims increasingly in biology. The legacy of Descartes was 
that scientific rationalism replaced theology as an explanatory method. and his search 
for the source of human linguistic superiority has now shifted to the realm of 
physiology. 
Like Descartes, the renowned linguist Noam Chomsky contends that humanity has 
a species-specific capacity for language. In Cartesian Linguistics he reiterates 
Descartes's sentiments that speech represents the unique ability to express intentions. 
In this study on the influence of Cartesian linguistics, Chomsky summarizes 
Descartes's mechanistic view of language: "The essential difference between man and 
animal is exhibited most clearly by human language, in particular, by man's ability to 
form new statements which express new thoughts and which are appropriate to new 
situations" (Cartesian Linguistics 3). Similarly, Chomsky argues that the acquisition 
of language is facilitated by "cognitive structures" which are innate in humans. 
Language, according to this view, is our biological birthright. In Rules and 
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Representations, Chomsky devotes an entire chapter to justifying the "Biological Basis 
of Language Capacities." Here he argues that "we may suppose that there is a fixed, 
genetically determined initial state of the mind, common to the species with at most 
minor variation apart from pathology. The mind passes through a sequence of states 
under the boundary conditions set by experience, achieving finally a 'steady state' at a 
relatively fixed age" (Rules and Representations 187). In other words, Chomsky 
agrees with Descartes that humans are unique in their possession of language, but 
disagrees about the source of those linguistic skills. Whereas Descartes ascribes 
linguistic superiority to the existence of a soul, Chomsky asserts that our unique 
facility with language is biologically based. 
Rectifying current methodologies which, in his opinion, have overlooked Cartesian 
linguistics, Chomsky asserts that human language is based on an entirely different 
principle than animal communication, possessing its own "rules of concept formation" 
and grammar that seem to be universal to human beings. However, within these 
genetic parameters, language serves as a system for expressing free thought in a 
limitless variety of ways. One of the characteristics of human speech is that it "can 
serve for all contingencies," and thus is "free from the control of independently 
identifiable external stimuli or internal states." This stands in stark contrasts, argue 
Cartesians, to animals language which is restricted to practical communicative 
functions (Cartesian Linguistics 29). Our modes of cognition, argues Chomsky, 
predispose humans to be language-using animals, and much of the principles that guide 
our formation of grammars are embedded in our neuro-physiological inheritance. This 
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is not, in itself, enough to give us language, but the "initial state of the [human] mind" 
greatly facilitates our linguistic organization and manipulation of the world. 
Animals, on the other hand, have a much more rigid set of instincts that dictate 
their communicative capabilities. The "pseudo language of animals," as Chomsky calls 
it, is largely instinctual, repetitive, autonomous, or mimetic. Habit and instinct 
determine their behavior, limiting the degree to which free expression and creative 
thought can be achieved or articulated. For Cartesian linguists, "the perfection of 
instinct varies inversely with intellectual ability;" thus, the more an animal's 
communicative behavior is guided by instinct, the more susceptible it is to a 
mechanistic interpretation of motives. Chomsky and other linguists who defend human 
linguistic superiority on the basis of biology follow in the Cartesian tradition of seeing 
animals as biotic machines, devoid of the innate structures of the mind necessary for 
the "higher" cognitive processes of memory, self-consciousness, or free-will. 
Whether we claim that human superiority emanates from a more sophisticated 
biology or the existence of a soul, language is seen by many as proof--a physical 
manifestation--of the Human Element. However, this "evidence" of our uniqueness is 
derived from a circular form of reasoning using a purely anthropocentric set of criteria. 
Philosophers, theologians, and linguists who defend the notion of a unique human 
language defme linguistic capacity in strictly human terms, looking specifically for 
irrefutable signs of intent or consciousness. Yet because we cannot know with 
certainty what, if any, intent is exhibited in natural phenomenon, intuiting motives in. 
for instance, the vocalizations of animals is prohibited as a means of proof. 
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Commenting on the flaws in this line of reasoning, philosopher Donald Griffm notes 
that "conscious intention is ruled out a priori and then its absence is taken as evidence 
that animal communication is fundamentally different from human language" (45). In 
trying to fit observations of non-human nature to conform to expectations for human 
language, we can do little more than confirm prevailing notions of human superiority. 
For most apologists for human superiority, one can only qualify for inclusion in 
the realm of moral beings by demonstrating the possession of the quasi-divine attribute 
of language. By denying that nature possesses language (and refusing even to consider 
the possibility), apologists for human superiority relegate non-human life to the realm 
of things, making our moral obligation to them nil. This view of a real and radical 
difference between humanity and nature justifies as morally valid any use or 
manipulation of nature that contributed to human welfare. Thus, from this perspective, 
notes ethicist Mortimer Adler, "an inferior kind ought to be ordered to a superior kind 
as a means to an end; in which case there is nothing wrong about killing animals for 
the good of mankind" (266). 
7.2 Closer to Nature and Further from Language. 
In Plato's Phaedrus, the philosopher describes the human soul using an analogy of 
a chariot driven by two winged steeds, one white and the other black. The white 
steed, he explains, represents temperance, modesty, and all elements of humanity's 
higher nature. This horse is always trying to lift the soul upward towards intellectual 
pursuits and the realization of an ideal beauty. The dark horse, on the other hand, 
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represents base passions and pleasures of the body, and it is constantly trying to drag 
the chariot down, compromising the dignity of the human souL According to this 
analogy, right action is guided by the mind and spirit, and ignoble acts are rooted in 
human physicality. With reason as the soul's pilot, say Plato, the individual can rein 
in animal passions and transcend the limited material existence. Those who allow 
themselves to be ruled by the body and human animality, on the other hand, degrade 
the soul, says the philosopher, and risk forfeiting their very humanity. 
The analogy dramatizes the anxiety people feel as a result of their own animality 
and illustrates the propensity of people to try to distance themselves from "lowly" 
nature. Human affinities with nature presents humanism with a troubling paradox. 
The similarities between humans and other animals calls into question the contention 
that we are radically unique. How can humanity claim to be of a different order than 
nature if we share with animals certain behaviors and biology? To admit that human 
beings are intimately connected with nature would invalidate our claims to absolute 
moral and intellectual superiority. As a result, people have often violently opposed the 
notion of an ontological contiguity between human and non-human life by imposing 
rigid boundaries to demarcate the world of beings from the world of things. 
The conceptual territory where this tension is most pronounced is in the culture 
clash between nature-based societies and Western "civilization." The response of many 
apologists for human superiority has been to maintain the strict division between 
humans and animals by denying the humanity of those individuals or cultures who 
exhibit an intimate affinity with nature. Under the impression that one is necessarily 
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either human or animal, various observers have resorted to a sort of human litmus test 
in an effort to categorize those whose behavior or appearance presents as alien. Since 
language has been perceived as the quintessential human attribute. linguistic capacity 
has often been used to measure an individual's or a culture's humanity. 
Basing human superiority on the amorphous and mutable entity of language results 
in a rather a tenuous hold on power. Confronted with situations in which individuals 
or cultures seemed to lack language (or a "fully developed" language), defenders of 
humanism found that the line between humanity and nature became ambiguous and 
confused. For many early colonists, missionaries, and explorers, nature-based cultures 
seemed to be inarticulate and beast-like. Rather than impugn their own humanity by 
recognizing their relation these "animal-like" people, Westerners often defined 
indigenous peoples as patently non-human, pointing to their supposed incapacity with 
language as evidence of their degradation. 
The accounts of explorers, colonists, and travelers regarding nature-based cultures 
reveal that many believed that to be closer to nature was to be further from human. 
When European colonizers came into contact with indigenous cultures, they frequently 
called them "savage" or "barbarous," not only because they found their physical 
appearance alien, but because they found their language unintelligible. The historian 
Hayden White reminds us that imbedded in the term "barbaros" is an implicit link 
between wildness and incapacity for language. "The Wild Man's supposed dumbness 
reminds us that for many Greek thinkers a barbaros (a term whose English derivative, 
barbarism, we are inclined to use to indicate wildness) was anyone who did not speak 
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Greek, one who babbled, and who therefore lacked the one power by which the 
political life could be achieved and a true humanity realized" (White 19). In countless 
travel diaries, histories, and anthropological treatises. European observers go so far as 
to categorize non-whites as semi-human or non-human, villainizing with greatest zeal 
those cultures which are most intimately integrated with nature. 
The same notions of linguistic superiority that have been used to justify human 
domination of nature have, throughout history, been enlisted to justify the oppression 
of nature-based societies. Since the most prominent features of civility--writing, arts, 
law, money, technology, etc.--were often attributed to humanity's unique proficiency 
with language, the apparent absence of those features among different peoples was 
perceived as evidence that they were inferior beings. Oral cultures, especially, were 
perceived as "primitive" by Westerners who touted written language as the culmination 
of linguistic expression. Lewis Henry Morgan, a nineteenth-century pioneer in 
anthropology, believed that the Iroquois that he worked with existed in a state of 
barbarity because they had not developed a "literate" culture.2 Similarly, upon 
encountering the oral cultures of Africa, European explorers and colonizers dismissed 
their languages as undeveloped because they lacked a method for encoding speech into 
writing. But as Henry Gates, Jr. makes clear in The Signifying Atfonkey, African oral 
culture did have its own mode of inscription. The Odu, a body of two hundred fifty 
six divine lyric poems created by the god Ifa, are represented by a series of palm nut 
2See Lewis Henry Morgan's League of the Ho-De-No-Sau-Nee, Iroquois in which he 
describes how human societies progress from stages of savagery to civility. 
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cryptograms. Yet European explorers and colonizers often ignored the versatility and 
richness of the vernacular in their assessment of African language. Much in the way 
that observers assess nature's linguistic capacity, these explorers applied their own 
criteria for literacy to Y oruban culture, and, when fmding characteristics of writing 
absent, they frequently concluded that indigenous people possessed neither learning nor 
language. 
When colonizers encountered hunting and gathering cultures, nomadic tribes, or 
agrarian societies they often assumed that their nature-based lifestyles were indicative 
of their inferior intellectual capacities. Convinced that they were dealing with people 
of limited mental abilities, Westerners were inclined to dismiss the unfamiliar dialects 
as unsophisticated gibberish. [n many cases, explorers found the languages of newly 
met tribes so alien to their ears that they discounted it as being language at all. [n 
accounts of American [ndians or Africans, Western observers often described their 
speech as animal-like grunting. When traveling through Asia and Africa in 1665, 
Thomas Herbert concludes after listening to the speech of the people he encountered 
that their "language is rather more apishly than articulately sounded" (Novak 188). 
Similarly, the Earl of Clarendon, in his l'vfiscellaneous Works, denigrated non-Christian 
"savages" for their brutish language: "Their words are sounded rather like that of apes 
than men" ( qtd. in Thomas 42). The animals of choice for most of these comparisons 
are monkeys and apes, but would-be anthropologists have also likened the speech of 
non-whites to the sounds of such animals as turkeys, pigs, and dogs, just to name a 
few. 
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The linguistic link between non-whites and animals reflected the racial biases of 
many observers. Many eighteenth- and nineteenth-century writers tended to place 
indigenous peoples farther down on the Great Chain of Being: the more intimate a 
culture was with nature, the closer it was to bestial. Those whose linguistic habits 
more closely matched Western habits were accorded greater status. Those whose 
syntax, inscription, or phonetics seemed alien were characterized as non-human. 
Writing in the late sixteenth century, Richard Hakluyt (Divers Voyages Touching the 
Discoveries of America) describes American natives as primitives who "spake such 
speech that no man could understand them, and their demeanor like to bruite beastes" 
( qtd. in Nash 56). This denigration of native languages allowed many observers to 
justify the extensive exploitation of the colonized on the grounds that nature endowed 
the "inferior" races with imperfect human faculties, and thus they were entitled to 
fewer (if any) moral rights. 
Inarticulate speech came to be associated with amorality, since the lack of speech 
suggested to many a corresponding absence of reason, the only faculty which allows us 
to make valuative judgements. Upon encountering non-white races, ancient travelers 
often described these different peoples as monstrous manifestations of God's 
displeasure. They were descended, theologians explained, from the archetypal sinner. 
Or, they speculated, these people had acquired their "aberrations" in speech and 
appearance from worshipping idols and false gods (White 18). The capacity for 
speech was for many theologians an indication of the existence of a soul. By 
extending this analogy, some argued that to possess an "imperfect" language was to 
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possess an imperfect soul. In the period of European colonization, Western observers 
often assumed that. as evidenced by their affinity with animals, indigenous peoples did 
not have a human spirit and thus they warranted little or no moral consideration. 
Attributing animal souls to non-whites allowed colonists and conquerors to justify the 
most horrendous atrocities, all of which they could sanction by scripture. 
In Genesis 1:28 God grants Adam "dominion over the fish of the sea and over the 
birds of the air and over every living thing that moves upon the earth." Once deemed 
"inarticulate," "amoral," and spiritually "inferior," natives were accorded the ethical 
consideration due to animals. This amounted to very little consideration indeed. 
Because animals were perceived as spiritual inferiors, notes historian Hayden White. 
"man could do with animals what he would: domesticate them and use them, or, if 
necessary, destroy them without sin" (White 19). Westerners' dim opinion of the 
linguistic capabilities of non-whites certainly contributed to their justification of 
slavery, imperialism, and other moral atrocities.3 "[I]n a morally ordered world," 
concludes White, "to be wild is to be incoherent or mute, deceptive, oppressive, and 
destructive; sinful and accursed; and, finally, a monster, one whose physical attributes 
are in themselves evidence of one's evil nature" (White 16). 
Not only was inarticulate speech a sign of wildness, but some believed that contact 
3The practice of demonizing an individual or group by associating it with animals 
exists in a variety of forms in contemporary culture. One of the most common 
expressions of this sentiment is the tendency to call criminals "beasts" or "monsters." 
In doing so, society re-categorizes the person as non-human, justifying our punitive or 
violent acts like the death penalty that transgress normal human rights. 
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with the wiidemess could actually erode one's capacity to speak. In the opinion of 
many Renaissance and Enlightenment thinkers, the faculty of speech was stunted or 
perverted by intimate contact with nature. In the seventeenth century, some would-be 
linguists speculated that prolonged periods of solitude in nature could result in the 
atrophy of speech. In Of the Origin and Progress of Language, James Burnett, Lord 
Monboddo, described human progress from a state of speechlessness to literacy as a 
matter of evolution, and, as such, the process was liable to devolution. Alexander 
Selkirk, the model for Robinson Crusoe, "was reported to have almost lost the use of 
language after three years on his island" (Novak 194). Contact with the wilderness. 
commentators speculated, had either diminished his linguistic capabilities or repressed 
their development altogether. 
This perception of wilderness as debilitating was reinforced by pre-modem 
assumptions that one's environment significantly altered human emotional, physical, 
and mental conditions. Commenting on the colonists' adjustment to America, historian 
John Canup notes that "Classical humoral physiology assumed that human beings were 
in many ways creatures of the climate in which they lived" (10). This notion, says 
Canup, led many to conclude that transplanted Europeans would inevitably take on 
characteristics of their environment--the air, water, food etc.--which daily shaped them. 
Commenting on the progress of British colonization, seventeenth-century writer 
Nathanael Carpenter reported that English cattle and crops had been "translated" by the 
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American environment and were greatly altered by their immediate surroundings.-l 
Compelled by their fears of the transformative force of the untamed frontier, the 
Puritan government enacted a law in 1635 requiring colonists to build within a half 
mile of a meetinghouse so the expansion into the wilderness could be kept in check 
(Canup 50). 
For the Puritan colonists, living in such close proximity to vast regions of 
ungoverned space and un-Christian "savages" threatened to bring out the most base 
elements of human nature. Colonists were worried about the advance of the inner 
wilderness, and felt that the untamed environment might induce some to give 
expression to their animal urges. John Winthrop worried that an untamed continent 
afforded a degree of unchecked liberty that would make men "grow more evil, and in 
time to be worse than brute beasts." Colonial minister Cotton Mather, like many 
theologians of his day, believed that human existence involved a struggle between the 
human and bestial elements of our nature. Mather obsessed over his battle with his 
inner "beast" and wrote in his diary of his sense of debasement upon recognizing a 
close correspondence between himself and an animal: 
I was once emptying the Cistern ofNature, and making Water at the Wall. At the 
same Time, there came a Dog, who did so too, before me. Thought I; "What mean, 
4The choice of the term "translated" suggests that the once familiar English cattle 
are transformed or translated by nature into something alien and unfamiliar. If we 
extend the linguistic metaphor, nature, inarticulate and dumb, translates the cows into 
its own wild and uncodified terms--redefining and reclaiming the creatures with a 
foreign tongue inscrutable to English farmers. 
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and vile Things are the Children of Men, in this mortal state! How much do our 
natural Necessities abase us, and place us in some regard, on the same Level of the 
very Dogs!" (Mather 1:357) 
From that moment on he resolved to lift his mind to "some holy, noble, divine 
Thought" whenever he felt himself giving expression to his more animalistic nature. 
For Mather, biological existence threatened to usurp spiritual existence. As defense 
against this unconscionable possibility, it is as if Mather resolves to exercise thought 
and reason-- noblest of human faculties--as a talisman against the impinging forces of 
his own animality. To Mather, Winthrop, Wigglesworth, and numerous other Puritans. 
one need only look at the Indians for an example of the corrosive effects that 
wilderness exerted on the human spirit. 
The Age of Colonization re-ignited speculations about the existence of a wild man, 
a being located somewhere between apes and humanity in the scheme of creation. The 
notion of a wild man is at least as old as Western culture, belonging to "a set of 
culturally self-authenticated devices which includes, among many others, the ideas of 
'madness' and 'heresy' as well" (White 4). The savage represents animality, wildness, 
and a host of other ideas antithetical to humanity and civilization. For some 
theologians, the wild man myth was a manifestation of their suspicions, incited by 
scripture, that corruption of species was possible as a result of bestiality. Others like 
Augustine believed that "savage" races may be outcasts from God's good graces. 
Early evolutionists searching for the missing link between the human species and other 
primates often tried to force indigenous peoples into this niche, attributing to them 
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aspects of both animal and human physiologies. (Some eager and misguided scholars 
even went so far as to report the existence of tribes who possessed vestigial tails.) For 
whatever reason, throughout periods of colonial expansion Western observers 
discounted the humanity of non-whites by claiming that they were living examples of 
the mythic wild man. 
In some circles of society, the status of the wild man was slightly improved. 
Primitivists like Rousseau, Diderot, and Voltaire became enamored with the idea of 
fmding a human individual or culture that had developed in relative isolation from the 
taints of society. Being connected to nature was seen as a positive characteristic. 
because it implied that one had escaped the hazards of indoctrination into the vanities 
and vices of society. An early popularizer of the primitivist sentiment, Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, wrote a treatise on human social development entitled Discourse on the 
Origin of Inequality as a critique of numerous oppressions born of institutionalized 
materialism. Rousseau's interest in the evolution of human society was part of a 
larger movement in the eighteenth century to examine the flaws in European cultures 
by understanding conditions in more "primitive" societies. He dreamed of a society 
free of the trappings of corrupt civility, where latent virtues he felt were innate in 
every human were allowed to flourish unchecked. The setting for the rejuvenation of 
the species is nature, where, stripped of all artifice and convention, the human soul is 
allowed to attain its true perfection. 
At first glance, primitivists' notions of a noble savage seems to contradict the 
prevailing perspective of nature-based cultures as savage and inarticulate. But, as 
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Geoffrey Symcox makes clear in his essay "The Wild Man's Return," Rousseau 
identifies in his natural man many negative aspects of savagery which he found neither 
nobel nor human. Rousseau's theory of social evolution involved four distinct stages, 
only one of which he deems worthy of emulation. His vision of man in nature, 
particularly in the early stages of development, notes Symcox, includes many of the 
negative characteristics that his contemporaries attributed to "barbaric" indigenous 
cultures. Believing that societies progress by degree, Rousseau speculates in Discourse 
on the Origins of Inequality that people in the initial stages of cultural development 
were largely guided by physical or emotional desire. Like those who claimed 
indigenous people lacked reason, Rousseau describes an early stage of natural man 
where passion dominates over rationality. In the first stage, humans possess the 
potentialities for humanity, but lack reflective thought and reason, heeding only 
immediate physical demands. Like other animals, humanity at this stage was morally 
neutral, knowing neither good nor evil. As Symcox points out, this earliest stage of 
Rousseau's nobel savage draws heavily on the wild man myth. The mute spontaneity, 
non-rationality, and unchecked passion of Rousseau's early man suggests a strong 
kinship between man and the rest of the animal kingdom. While Rousseau rejected the 
notion that we were evolved from lower species, he did allow that humanity and apes 
may have a common ancestor, traced back to early stage of human evolution. In this 
earliest stage, humans were, according to Rousseau, without a social life and 
individuals lived a solitary, roving existence. 
In the second stage of development, humanity begins to form small social groups, 
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and emotion and empathy constituted the primary drives for social cohesion. 
Obligation to fellow humans was based on self-interest rather than morals, since at this 
stage mankind had no sense of good or evil. Rousseau's descriptions of amoral man 
echoes earlier pronouncements by theologians which denied full humanity to various 
indigenous peoples. For Rousseau, the natural man who was guided by emotions and 
physical drives was still a brutish creature: 
Rousseau did not idealize this early man: he may not have been bad at this stage. 
but neither was he particularly good or noble. The basis of his feelings was the 
animal instinct and sympathy or pity for his fellows, which led him to adopt as a 
general rule of conduct, "Do what is good for yourself, with the least harm to 
others." The second epoch of man's development was therefore marked by defects 
almost as great as those in the first stage; man was still largely unformed and 
lacking in the qualities which would make him truly human. (Symcox 241) 
It is not until the third stage of development that humanity emerges as fully 
human. Here, reason is balanced by emotion, and human society allows for both 
social cohesion and individual identity. Guided by reason, the expression of human 
emotion gives rise to arts such as music, poetry, and dance. Rousseau regrets losing 
this stage the most, for at this level, humanity was able to strike "a good balance 
between the indolence of the primitive state and the fervid activity of our own vanity." 
Thus, says Rousseau, it "must have been the happiest and most enduring age" (62). 
But no golden age can last and this level of development, says Rousseau, gave way to 
an age of materialism as humanity's new self-consciousness engendered pride and, 
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ultimately, self-aggrandizement. Inequality arises in this fourth and fmal stage as the 
result of a trend towards self-interested acquisition of property. Inequality, argues 
Rousseau, is the impetus for conflict, political oppression, and a host of other 
repressive institutions. 
Those who romanticized nature-based peoples held in mind a vision of these 
societies that bore little resemblance to their actual cultures. Most of these early 
anthropological treatises were founded upon distorted accounts of indigenous cultures 
sent back by missionaries or mercantile adventurers whose continued funding and 
support often depended upon assurances of the tractability of the local people. 5 
Seeking a palliative for the increasingly inequitable distribution of wealth and power in 
imperial Europe, many primitivists turned to reports of idyllic societies for inspiration. 
Rousseau's noble savage is primarily a representation of a psychological or social 
state rather than a commentary on actual indigenous peoples and their relationship to 
nature. Rousseau was more interested in the potential goodness within all humans--
their "perfectibility"--than in ideal nature-based societies. Symcox suggests that the 
noble savage is not a real nature man, but a reconciliation of the savage and civil man 
within: 
5Symcox describes how the seventeenth-century Jesuit authors of Relations, a series 
of progress reports on the conversion of Canadian Indians, primarily addressed their text 
to benefactors. Not only did they want to assure the sponsors that they were working 
diligently to convert souls, but "there was a further reason for presenting potential 
converts in a favorable light: funds contributed to the missionaries would accomplish the 
worthy task of bringing these already noble savages to the final stage of earthly perfection 
by teaching them the true religion" (227). 
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Consciously or unconsciously, Rousseau was reverting to an older tradition which, 
although largely submerged by the newer ideal of rational virtue, had never 
entirely disappeared. He internalized the Wild Man and recognized his presence 
within himself, a presence which he felt was good and necessary. He came to 
realize that the Wild Man exists within us all, even though we may prefer to 
regard ourselves as noble savages: below the civilized overlay of reason and 
balance lies a deeper substratum of feeling inherited from a primitive past. 
Rousseau's rediscovery of the Wild Man was the uncovering and rehabilitation of 
the realm of feeling, which he instinctively felt was essential to an understanding 
of man and society, and without which social life could not be tolerable or 
fulfilling. (Symcox 234) 
Rousseau's nobel savage was a "dynamic model" of human nature which carefully 
blended the best aspects of the rational man and the more primitive and vital qualities 
of the emotional man. 
Like many of his contemporaries, Rousseau identified language as the pivotal 
development in human society, the one attribute that distinguished mankind 
definitively from the animal kingdom. Language did not develop as a result of human 
immersion in nature, but as a consequence of his removal from it into society. The 
first human words, conjectures Rousseau, probably evolved out of a need for social 
cohesion where, when faced by threatening situations in nature, an individual 
instinctively cries for help from others of his kind: 
Man's first language, the most universal and forceful language, and the only one 
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he needed before he had to persuade gatherings of other men, was the cry of 
nature. Because this cry was wrenched from him only by a kind of instinct in 
times of acute urgency, to plead for help in great perils or for relief from terrible 
afflictions. (39) 
Instinctual cries gradually became a sophisticated system of communication which 
allowed for the development of communal bonds, a necessary precursor to family life 
and the eventual rise of nations. 
Rousseau believed that nature drove individuals together and language resulted 
from their mutual efforts to survive in the state of nature. This is not to say, however, 
that Rousseau believed that language was purely a product of human creation. Like 
other theologians and philosophers who have addressed the issue of human language, 
Rousseau agrees that speech is uniquely human, and he suggests that linguistic 
capabilities may be divinely implanted. Upon considering the age-old conundrum of 
whether language invents society or society invents language, Rousseau admits to 
being convinced of the "impossibility that languages could have been created and 
established by purely human means" ( 42). In keeping with conventional wisdom of 
human superiority, Rousseau denies that language exists outside the human species: 
"Furthermore, general ideas can be introduced into the mind only with the help of 
words, and the understanding grasps them only through sentences. This is one of the 
reasons why animals cannot formulate such ideas or acquire the perfectibility that 
depends on them" (41). 
Contrary to what one might be led to expect from Rousseau's romanticization of 
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noble savages, nature is not the impetus for his nobility; it merely provides an 
environment for human development that is removed from the corrupting influences of 
materialistic civilization. Language is still perceived as the exclusive privilege of 
humanity, and linguistic proficiency develops in response to hostile forces in nature 
which threaten human survival. Rousseau's primitivism does not idealize human 
harmony with the natural world, for only by separating from nature to develop the 
faculties of ianguage and reason does the human species attain full humanity. Instead, 
Rousseau's perspective of nature is defmed by humanist assumptions which ultimately 
place humanity above and outside of nature. 
7.3 The Moral Implications of Speaking for Nature 
It is no wonder that philosophers and theologians of various ages and cultures have 
jealously guarded humanity's claim to language. By attributing speech to nature, the 
advocate erases a conceptual boundary between man and beast, effectively re-defining 
humanity as a member of nature as opposed to master over it. Within the rhetoric of 
advocacy, attributes such as reason, imagination, and consciousness which are normally 
the exclusive prerogative of humanity are ascribed to the rest of nature. The rhetorical 
move has a sort of leveling effect, where qualitative value is dispersed to all speaking 
subjects, be they wolves, trees, or the Earth itself. Re-constituted as a political, 
speaking entity, nature lays claim to ethical considerations previously reserved for 
humanity. 
There is a great deal at stake in denying language to animals, since for many 
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language has been used to demarcate a radical difference between humanity and 
nature. To invalidate that hierarchy established by language would impugn, a 
posteriori, almost all of humanity for acts of oppression and destruction committed 
against the rest of the natural world since time immemorial. Furthermore, it would 
demand a comprehensive restructuring of existing philosophies which guide current 
human conduct towards nature. As a result, attempts to attribute language to nature 
and elevate its moral status relative to humanity have been vigorously opposed. 
According to natural historian, Keith Thomas, "In the eighteenth century educated 
writers became increasingly hostile to anthropomorphic stories in which animals 
behaved like human beings, urging that 'all fables which ascribe reason and speech to 
animals should be withheld from children, as being vehicles of deception"' (127). It is 
"deceptive," the argument goes, to assume that animals have language because such a 
determination cannot be made rationally. According to Thomas, "Jacobean lawyers 
maintained that anyone who thought that birds and beasts could converse like 
characters in Aesop should be legally written off as an idiot" (127). 
In his book The Question of Animal Awareness, Donald Griffm outlines a 
hierarchy of acceptable pronouncements concerning animal communication. noting that 
Western society has a long history of resisting any attempts to impart intentionality to 
the "voice" of nature. Under the influence of the behavioral sciences, it has become 
increasingly acceptable to believe that animals communicate, although clumsily, 
through a system of predetermined patterns of recognition (though not "language"). 
However, it is taboo to interpret any communicative behavior in non-human creatures 
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as an expression of free will or consciousness (see Figure 1 below). Attributes such as 
intentionality and conceptual thought have been the exclusive domain of humanity, and 
to ascribe them to non-human life would not only violate rules of scientific validity, 
but would elevate dramatically the moral value we must recognize in the animal 
kingdom. 
Language is the one quality that sets humankind apart from nature as worthy of 
ethical consideration. To interpret animal behavior as language that demonstrates 
intention would challenge the legitimacy of all moralizing based upon humanistic 
premises. If, for example, it were to be discovered that an animal, say a dolphin, 
possessed its own form of language, then we would have no basis for asserting a 
qualitative difference between humanity and animals. Ethologist Dr. John Lilly 
suggests that if dolphins were to be found capable of propositional speech, "some 
groups of humans [would] ... insist that we treat them as humans and that we give 
them medical and legal protection" (211-12). The notion of a "speaking nature" would 
create "a legal, ethical, moral, and social problem" for humanity by undermining our 
assumption of superiority. 
The rhetoric of advocacy deals with the taboo, interpreting the behaviors of 
animals and even the phenomena of nature as language. More threatening, however, is 
the tendency of the advocate to ascribe consciousness and intent to non-human nature. 
By depicting animals or nature in general as sentient or willful, the advocate 
simultaneously argues that nature possesses something comparable to the human 
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Figure 1. Gradient of Acceptability Concerning Terms Applied in Behavioral Sciences. 
From Donald Griffin, The Question of Animal Awareness, 58. 
attributes of soul or intellect. As a result, the language of the advocate is suppressed 
within a humanist culture on the charge that it is irrational, over-sentimentalized, 
confrontational, or disruptive. 
The notion that humanity differs only superficially in kind or by shades of degree, 
raises some disconcerting moral dilemmas for humanists. The ability of nature 
6In a cybernetic concept of awareness, a soli wert is "the value of a sensory input 
which the animal tends to keep constant by adjustments of its behavior" (Griffin 83). 
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advocates to discern in the various behaviors of animals evidence of conscious intent 
suggests that human language is not unique, but just one of myriad expressions of 
language. Implicit in the trope of speaking nature is the assertion that humanity differs 
in degree and that there is a direct line of continuity between all forms of language 
and life. For proponents of this view, intermediate levels of linguistic proficiency are 
possible, and in comparing humanity to animals both possess common linguistic 
attributes, but one surpasses the other demonstrably in a few areas. If linguistic 
capabilities varied from the lowest forms of life to humanity along a contiguous 
spectrum, human speech would just be a different manifestation of language in the 
animal kingdom. Instead of possessing a unique capacity for speech, humans could 
merely be said to exhibit a more sophisticated mode of vocal and written articulation 
than other language users in the animal kingdom. Drawing on the associations 
between linguistic capacity and moral status, the advocate uses the image of speaking 
nature as a metaphor to advance the subversive proposition that humanity and nature 
differ in degree only. If taken to its logical conclusion, the idea of a speaking nature 
implies that we have no basis for justifying our exploitation of non-human life. "I 
would say," speculates the ethicist Mortimer Adler, "that if man differs only in degree 
from other animals, then a sharp line cannot be drawn to separate the world of persons 
from the world of things; in fact, the distinction between person and thing becomes 
meaningless or at best arbitrary if there are only differences in degree, since that 
distinction is either a distinction in kind or no distinction at all" (257). Because the 
rhetoric of advocacy re-envisions nature as a continuum of life which includes 
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humanity, it suggests that we have no normative principle for ascribing rights to 
humans and not to animals. If language gives an entity its moral value, in the 
language-rich world posited by the advocates ethical value would be imparted to all 
beings along the continuum. 
Giving language to nature has broad implications for our world view. The nature 
advocate challenges the assumption that humanity is the highest manifestation of value 
in the universe. Nature representatives seek to displace humanity as the measure of all 
things and implement a more egalitarian "biocentrism" in which ethical value is 
accorded to the entire community of living and non-living entities. Broadly defined, 
biocentrism is a way of seeing the world in which the integrity of the Earth and its 
ecosystems is valued above the satisfaction of the material desires of one species--
humanity. Humans, animals, plants, micro-organisms, rivers and mountains, and all 
components of a life system constitute a community, all members possessing a degree 
of ethical standing. From this perspective, determinations of what is "good" or 
"ethical" are made by assessing the impact of actions on the viability of a whole biotic 
community or the globe. 
Biocentrism, also called Deep Ecology,' "is not so much an attempt to fabricate a 
relationship between humanity and nature based on philosophical principles it holds 
7Deep Ecology is a term coined by Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess. In 1973, 
Naess wrote in his article "The Shallow and the Deep, Long Range Ecology 
Movement" that society needed to fundamentally revise the way it related to nature. 
He advocated a "deep" perspective in which human conduct was guided by an 
assessment of the long range ecological and moral ramifications of our actions. 
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dear, as it is a response that flows from a relationship that already exists and that has 
moved increasing numbers of people to resist in thought and deed what is happening 
to our environment" (Manes l40). In other words. biocentrism is a way to give 
theoretical form to the sense of affinity that people feel with the natural world. For 
many nature advocates, biocentrism is an ethic which develops out of their own sense 
of reverence for non-human life. Because they identify strongly with nature, they are 
inclined to see lines of continuity between themselves and non-human nature, and 
many advocates describe the human species as simply one component of a living web. 
Biocentrists argue for exercising restraint in our dealings with nature on the 
assumption that our self-serving manipulation of the environment will ultimately 
unravel the fragile threads which tie species to species and ecosystem to ecosystem. 
Lynton Caldwell suggests in the book International Environmental Policy that 
biocentrism constitutes a sort of second Copernican revolution in which, by 
recognizing our membership in nature's community, we may be compelled to abandon 
our long-cherished notions that we are the center of the moral universe. The rhetoric 
of advocacy contributes to this biocentric "revolution" in that it shifts the moral center 
of gravity from the human species to the natural community at large. Like the first 
Copernican revolution, this second biocentric revolution is an act of re-definition in 
which the terms we use to explain the universe are altered to facilitate a new way of 
seeing. By re-defining language as an essential expression of nature and not the 
limited faculty of one species, advocates make it possible to perceive the wailings of a 
lab animal, the disappearance of a species, or the death of a river in moral as opposed 
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to strictly physical terms. 
While the terms "biocentrism" and "Deep Ecology" were coined in the latter 
twentieth century, many nature advocates of earlier generations recognized the 
destructive effects of anthropocentrism and worked diligently to invalidate and 
dismantle the humanist ontological hierarchy. For Thoreau, the notion that the whole 
world existed for the sole benefit of humanity was an affront to what he saw as the 
intrinsic spiritual and aesthetic value manifest in all forms of life. Writing about his 
travels to Chesuncook Lake in 1853, Thoreau protests against the selfish utilitarianism 
exhibited by the profiteers who flocked to the wilderness in search of resources: 
Strange that so few ever come to the woods to see how the pine lives and grows 
and spires, lifting its evergreen arms to the light--to see its perfect success, but 
many are content to behold it in the shape of many broad boards brought to 
market, and deem that its true success! But the pine is no more lumber than man 
is, and to be made into boards and houses is no more its true and highest use than 
the truest use of a man is to be cut down and made into manure. There is a higher 
law affecting our relation to pines as well as to men. A pine cut down, a dead 
pine, is no more a pine than a dead human carcass is a man. Can he who has 
discovered only some of the values of whalebone and whale oil be said to have 
discovered the true use of the whale? Can he who slays the elephant for his ivory 
be said to have 'seen the elephant'? These are petty and accidental uses; just as if 
a stronger race were to kill us in order to make buttons and flageolets of our 
bones; for everything must serve a lower as well as a higher use. (A1aine Woods 
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134-35) 
While Thoreau does not demand that lumbermen lay down their axes and hunters their 
guns, he does insist that human conduct towards nature be guided by ethical and not 
simply material considerations. There is, explains Thoreau, "a higher law affecting our 
relation to pines as well as to men." By suggesting that trees be accorded a right to 
exist, Thoreau initiates a radical re-ordering of the moral community to include nature. 
Drawing a comparison between pines and humans, Thoreau equates the 
indiscriminate pillaging of nature with senseless murder, suggesting that nature. as an 
embodiment of spirit, shares with humanity a special dignity. "It is not their bones or 
hide or tallow that I love most," says Thoreau. "It is the living spirit of the tree, not 
its spirit of turpentine, with which I sympathize, and which heals my cuts. It is as 
immortal as I am, and perchance will go to as high a heaven, there to tower above me 
still" (Maine Woods 134-35). 
For many in the realm of science and industry, the indeterminacy of non-human 
nature's ethical status is sufficient cause to treat it as amoral, inanimate matter. For 
John Muir, however, our inability to tell with certainty if nature possesses 
consciousness and will is all the more reason to treat it with reverence, since it may be 
much closer to humanity than we are willing to admit. In his book A Thousand Mile 
Walk, Muir speculates that plants may in fact be sentient. "How little we know as yet 
of the life of plants," observes Muir, "their hopes and fears, pains and joys" (19). One 
may look at the way that roadside plants withdraw from traffic and abuse, says Muir. 
as "evidence of feeling." Like current-day biocentrists, Muir argues that humans are 
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not the highest manifestation of life, but only part of a vast web of nature. Compared 
to "other things in God's creation," says Muir, "[we] all are only microscopic 
animalcula" (Thousand Mile Walk 103). Humanistic hubris, warns the naturalist, may 
lead us to condemn God as an imperfect maker when all creation does not serve us 
exactly as we would like: "The world, we are told, was made especially for man--a 
presumption not supported by all the facts. A numerous class of men are painfully 
astonished whenever they fmd anything, living or dead, in all God's universe, which 
they cannot eat or render in some way what they call useful to themselves" (Thousand 
Mile Walk 139). Foreshadowing the biocentrists of the twentieth century, Muir places 
value on all life and promotes the well-being of the whole community over the self-
serving interests of the individual member. 
Beginning from a more biocentric perspective, Muir is able to account for "facts" 
of nature which cannot be explained by the humanist point of view. While humanism 
has no way to evaluate anything which does not serve our well-being, biocentrism 
completely changes the terms we have at our disposal for defining "worth" in order to 
assess the value of nature independent of human economic measurements. Like 
Thoreau, Muir is critical of those that see plants and animals strictly as functions of 
human utility. He scoffs at the idea that all things dangerous to mankind are evil, and 
submits instead that all life has value as life and not as human resource: "It never 
seems to occur to [some people] that Nature's object in making animals and plants 
might possibly be first of all the happiness of each of them, not the creation of all for 
the happiness of one. Why should man value himself as more than a small part of the 
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one great unit of creation?" (Thousand Mile Walk 139). 
The nature advocate who is most responsible for codifying an anti-humanist 
environmental ethic is Aldo Leopold. In A Sand County Almanac, Leopold outlines a 
"land ethic" to counter the destructive effects of institutionalized anthropocentrism. To 
Leopold, ethics are founded upon the premise that "the individual is a member of a 
community of interdependent parts" (239). However, human society, which has 
historically seen itself as radically different from nature, has yet to formulate an ethic 
for relating to nature because it was considered outside the bounds of the moral 
community. "The land ethic," explains Leopold, "simply enlarges the boundaries of 
the community to include soils, water, plants, and animals, or collectively: the land" 
(239). Since linguistic capacity has traditionally been used to establish the boundaries 
of community, advocates enlarge that territory by extending language to the whole of 
nature. Once nature is re-constituted as a moral being, human desires must be 
weighed the "social good" of the biotic community. "In short, a land ethic changes the 
role of Homo sapiens from conqueror of the land-community to plain member and 
citizen of it. It implies respect for his fellow-members, and also respect for the 
community as such" (240). According to the re-ordered priorities of biocentrism, 
humanity has an obligation to set aside narrow self-interests if our conduct threatens 
the existence or habitat of other members in the community. 
The changes required to move contemporary society from a humanistic ethic to a 
biocentric one, explains Leopold, will entail the creation of an entirely new "social 
conscience." "No important change in ethics," observes the naturalist, "was ever 
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accomplished without an internal change in our intellectual emphasis, loyalties, 
affections, and convictions" (Leopold 246). By investing nature with voice, the 
advocates are effecting just such a cultural re-alignment; the trope of speaking nature 
is more than just a fanc;.ful anthropomorphism intended as a mouthpiece for 
environmentalist ideology. In speaking for nature, the advocate is describing reality as 
it appears from a biocentric perspective, where all members of the community have 
value or "spirit." Writers like Thoreau, Muir, and Leopold work against prevailing 
humanist sentiments to create a space in the social discourse where it is possible to 
identify with nature, subtly transforming "loyalties, affections, and convictions" along 
biocentric lines. To return to the example from cosmology, the effort of advocates to 
define nature as a moral entity amounts to the conceptual equivalent of Copernicus 
explaining the motions of the heavens to a geocentric-minded society in heliocentric 
terms. 
Humanists of various strains have resisted the efforts of advocates to invest nature 
with voice because it promotes a perspective in which the power and authority of the 
human race are severely diminished. Yet, like the first Copernican revolution, this 
second revolution of world views stands up against the criticism of competing 
perspectives because it has broader explanatory powers and improves our 
understanding of humanity's place in the universe. Humanism addresses how we 
should relate to one another, but fails to adequately describe our obligation to the rest 
of the world. By defining the "good" as strictly the human good, humanism leads to 
self-destructive behavior that, ultimately, proves the theory to be self-refuting. 
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Motivated by self-serving interests for short term gains, humanity has generated 
enormous amounts of pollution and severely curtailed nature's regenerative capacity, 
threatening the well-being and existence both human and non-human life. 
Because biocentrism conceives of humanity as one component of a complex living 
system, it can offer us guidance regarding right conduct as members of the whole 
biotic community. While values are a human creation and nature out there may not 
possess the exact human quality of "dignity" we ascribe to it, the only way we can 
apprehend the world conceptually is through such metaphors. As environmental 
historian Christopher Manes points out, "nature of course does not need ethics. but we 
do, and the ethics that [allow] us to live in a satisfactory relationship with nature (and 
hence ourselves) [require] that we extend values and rights to the natural world" (147). 
The value of a metaphor like speaking nature is its ability to enhance our 
understanding of the rest of the world for the purpose of survival. For the nature 
advocates, apprehending our world as an animate community of interconnected 
relationships will have far better results for humans and nature than conceiving of the 
physical world as latent material wealth. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
ADVOCACY'S CHALLENGE TO SCIENTIFIC RATIONALISM 
Heavily influenced by scientific rationalism and humanism, contemporary notions 
of nature conceive of non-human life as an inferior form of existence or as biological 
clock work, devoid of qualitative value. In speaking for nature, advocates are 
simultaneously preserving the wilderness and effecting an epistemological 
transformation necessary to alter the notions that encourage environmental destruction 
in the first place. Reacting against the pervasive positivist spirit of Western 
civilization, conceptualized in the Enlightenment and manifested in the Industrial 
Revolution, nature advocates argue for the reintegration of intuition and experience 
into human knowledge. Whereas the positivist outlook prevalent in science confers 
"truth" upon only those things which are quantifiable, the advocate considers feelings 
and beliefs valid forms of "evidence." Rejecting the notion that truth is either 
objective or subjective, nature advocates describe knowledge and truth arising out of 
the interaction of the observer and the observed, a process that is necessarily facilitated 
through language. The aims of the rhetoric of advocacy are to replace a destructive 
mechanistic world view with a primarily rhetorical concept of meaning in which truth 
is seen as essentially transactional. 
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8.1 Scientific Rationalism and the Mechanistic Model of Nature 
The rise of science and the mechanistic world view had its origins in the 
Renaissance when broad humanistic learning coupled with a variety of revolutionary 
discoveries about the nature of the physical universe led many to question the validity 
of received wisdom. With the astronomical and mathematical discoveries of Galileo in 
the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the objective principles of modem 
science become firmly established. Through the process of experimentation, Galileo 
postulated that nature could be an object of certain and quantifiable knowledge. This 
materialistic approach to nature inspired a mechanical model of the universe where all 
observations could be explained by applying mathematical principles to the motions of 
matter. When applied to humanity, the mechanistic model inspired a division between 
mind and matter, since mind was ultimately an unmeasurable entity. Working within 
the objectivist principles they inherited from Galileo, thinkers like Spinoza, Newton. 
Leibniz, and Locke described human minds as "a class of beings outside nature" 
(Collingwood 103). As a result of the intellectual achievements of the likes of Galileo 
and Newton, reason and the scientific method became the twin pillars of the dominant 
epistemological paradigm for the eighteenth century, dubbed, appropriately enough, the 
Age of Enlightenment. 
The Enlightenment vision of the physical world constituted a significant departure 
from the Greek organic cosmology, where the Earth was perceived as a living 
organism. The notion that nature may be sentient or even willful was acceptable 
within many cultures of ancient Greece. According to intellectual historian R. G. 
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Collingwood, "Greek natural science was based on the principle that the world of 
nature is saturated or permeated by mind. Greek thinkers regarded the presence of 
mind in nature as the source of that regularity or orderliness in the natural world 
whose presence made a science of nature possible" (3). Elements of nature were often 
described as exhibiting rationality, and thus it was easier for humanity to feel a 
psychological and physical kinship to non-human nature. Most classical accounts of 
the natural worid conceive of the Earth as an organism composed of self-motivated 
organisms. For the Greeks "This living and thinking body was homogenous 
throughout in the sense that it was all alive, all endowed with soul and with reason: it 
was non-homogenous in the sense that different parts of it were made of different 
substances each having its own specialized qualitative nature and mode of acting" 
(Collingwood 112). 
In her study of natural history, The Death of Nature, Carolyn Merchant describes 
how, from pre-classical times to the Enlightenment, a predominantly feminine and 
organic model of nature was replaced by a masculine and mechanistic cosmology. 
According to Merchant, Western culture has a rich history of distinctively organic and 
female-centered cosmologies, dating back to pre-agricultural societies and classical 
Greek and Roman cult'..!res. Stoics viewed the earth as an intelligent organism, and 
writers like Pliny and Ovid argued that plundering the earth was like a violation of its 
"body." Prior to the Enlightenment, the earth was commonly represented as a vital, 
sentient organism. Organicism conceived of the world as a "person-writ-large," notes 
Merchant, whose body was both sensitive and self-conscious. Within the whole of 
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nature, each part has its separate existence but performs an indispensable function for 
the aggregate body. From this perspective, humanity, as a component of nature, 
possess attributes common the whole of nature: thus. since humanity has reason and 
will, it is assumed under the organic model that non-human nature possesses these 
same qualities. 
By the Enlightenment, male-centered models had largely replaced the organic 
concept of nature, and scientists began to order the world in hierarchal terms: 
Mechanism, which superseded the organic framework, was based on the logic that 
knowledge of the world could be certain and consistent, and that the laws of nature 
were imposed on creation by God. The primacy of organic process gave way to 
the stability of mathematical laws and identities. Force was external to matter 
rather than immanent within it. Matter was corpuscular, passive, and inert ... 
Because it viewed nature as dead and matter as passive, mechanism could function 
as a subtle sanction for the exploitation and manipulation of nature and its 
resources" (Merchant, Death of Nature 102-3) 
The transition from seeing nature as a community to a subject of domination created a 
nature-culture split, where humanity, and particularly males, were seen as above and 
outside of (female) nature. Women were associated with nature, says Merchant, and 
were "perceived to be on a lower level than culture, which has been associated 
symbolically and historically with men" (Death of Nature 144). 
Under the influence of the mechanistic model, nature became a thing--devoid of 
intellect and life--as opposed to a being. Building on the Christian notion that God 
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was the supreme architect of nature, Bacon, Newton, Descartes, Hobbes, Boyle, and 
others described the physical world as an assemblage of parts held together by a 
variety of absolute laws. When scientists began identifying these principles of nature, 
it greatly increased humanity's sense of its own power, observes Collingwood, "for it 
taught him that scientific laws established by him on earth would hold good 
throughout the starry heavens" (98). The physical universe became an object of spatial 
and temporal quantities, and that which was not scientifically measurable by these 
quantities was deemed unknowable. In the mechanistic model, the force which drives 
nature is seen as something external to nature itself, be it God or natural laws. Hobbes 
argued that nature did not possess any motivating force itself, but was inert matter set 
in motion by God. Organicism's explanations of nature which proceeded from the 
assumption that nature was sentient and self-motivated had to be discarded because 
they were seen as speculations on unknowable qualities, generated from intuition and 
thus unverifiable by empirical methods. 
Francis Bacon was one of the earliest promoters of the mechanistic view. The 
scientist must strive, said Bacon, "to establish and extend the power and dominion of 
the human race itself over the universe" (qtd. in Ecological Revolutions 127). The 
early contributors to the mechanistic model described nature as inert matter and the 
world as a manipulable biological clock: 1 
'The will to control nature was not lone creation of science. As Merchant points 
out, the notion of dominating the earth was a component of both Christianity and 
classical philosophy. "But, as the economy became modernized and the Scientific 
Revolution proceeded, the dominion metaphor spread beyond the religious sphere and 
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The mechanistic construction of nature is based on a set of ontological, 
epistemological, methodological, and ethical assumptions about "reality." First. 
nature is made up of discrete particles (atoms or later subatomic particles). Second. 
sense data (information bits) are discrete. Third, the universe is a natural order. 
maintaining identity through change, and can be described and predicted by 
mathematics. Fourth, problems can be broken down into parts, solved, and 
reassembled without changing their character. And fifth, science is context-free, 
value-free knowledge of the external world. (Merchant, Ecological Revolutions 
199) 
Within this analogy, humanity plays the part of tinkering clock maker capable of 
constructing and deconstructing the physical world. For various prominent 
Enlightenment philosophers, humanity's power over the physical world derived from 
reason, which afforded mankind with "untainted" knowledge of the guiding laws of the 
universe as well as the means for manipulating the external world. 
Furthermore, the shift from an organic cosmology to a mechanical one installed 
mankind as the hierarchal head of all life forms. Whereas life was the centerpiece of 
organicism, the human clock maker is the center of the mechanistic model. As a 
result, things natural became de-valued and things "human" privileged. Since sensual 
experience and emotion were associated with animal passions, these faculties were 
deemed inferior to those attributes which were thought to be the exclusive prerogative 
assumed ascendancy in the social and political spheres as well" (Death of Nature 3). 
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of humanity. With the rise of science, the "masculine" faculty of reason gained 
ascendancy as the principle mode of human perception. The exercise of reason was 
more in keeping with a hierarchical world view, observes Merchant, since fact and 
physical laws were stable and predictable, affording humanity greater control over 
nature's processes: 
In the mechanical world, order was redefmed to mean the predictable behavior of 
each part within a rationally determined system of laws. while power derived from 
active and immediate intervention in a secularized world. Order and power 
together constituted control. Rational control over nature, society, and the self was 
achieved by redefining reality itself through the new machine metaphor. (Death of 
Nature 193) 
Within this new "machine metaphor," women and nature occupied a position 
subordinate to man. Physiologically women were associated with nature for their 
reproductive powers; intellectually, women were deemed inferior because they were 
associated with non-rational approaches to knowing. Within the male-mechanistic 
cosmology, observes Merchant, the conceptual link between women and nature 
resulted in a host of misogynistic cultural practices. Women, like nature, were 
objectified and exploited for the benefit of a patriarchal society. 
The shift to a mechanistic model lifted many of the moral barriers implicit in the 
organic model that had prevented exploitation. Prior to the rise of science, the practice 
of attributing consciousness and will to nature in the organic cosmology had afforded 
it the ethical considerations extended to any sentient being: 
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The image of the earth as a living organism and nurturing mother had served as a 
cultural constraint restricting the actions of human beings. One does not readily 
slay a mother, dig into her entrails for gold or mutilate her body, although 
commercial mining would soon require that. As long as the earth was considered 
to be alive and sensitive, it could be considered a breach of human ethical behavior 
to carry out destructive acts against it. (Death of Nature 3) 
As this organic perspective was gradually replaced with the mechanical model of 
science, the old taboos against "offending" nature were removed, and nature was 
increasingly plundered for commercial gains. "This clocklike mathematical cosmos," 
observes Merchant, "created and repaired by an external engineer, sanctioned the 
human domination of nature through machine technology, experimentation, and 
mathematical prediction and control" (Ecological Revolutions 128). 
The way we describe nature simultaneously reflects and constructs our notions of 
the external world. As Carolyn Merchant, Annette Kolodny, Keith Thomas and other 
environmental historians have noted, language has been intimately connected with 
human domination of nature. The transformation of nature from an organic being to 
an inanimate collection of parts was facilitated through discourse. With the change of 
cosmologies, nature has systematically been re-defmed to conform with an objectivist 
perspective. For instance, prior to the Scientific Revolution, plant names were 
anthropomorphic, fanciful, localized, coarse, sentimental, and expressive. Included in 
the English vernacular are names like dead man's fingers, catsfoot. cuckoo flower, or 
ladies' bedstraw. Such nomenclature was highly mutable and resisted regularization. 
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What's more, they suggested an intimacy and sympathetic affinity between humanity 
and nature. But scientists and merchants found the popular names too unstandardized 
and whimsical and sought to generate a predictable nomenclature in order to facilitate 
taxonomy--a game of linguistic control. 
Furthermore, market economics favored a rational approach to cataloging nature. 
and "The growth of a national market in plants and flowers thus generated pressure 
towards standardization; and it was in order to avoid frauds and confusion through the 
same plant being sold under different labels that a London Society of Gardeners put 
out its Catalogues Plantarom in 1730" (Thomas 84). Under the Linnaean method, 
every plant was given two names, one for genus and one for species. The rules 
Linnaeus outlined in Critica Botanica (1737) for naming plants scrupulously avoided 
any hint of the subjective, "permitting no names based on the plant's scent, taste. 
medical properties, moral character or religious significance" (Thomas 86). Such 
regimentation gave merchants greater control over their market by legitimating their 
scientifically named "products" and squeezing out unsanctioned farmers who sold their 
produce under folk names. 
As science became the primary descriptive medium for nature, the language we 
used to reference nature gradually changed, altering the vocabulary we had at our 
disposal with which to conceptualize the non-human world as animate and sentient. 
Our language, reflecting the mechanistic epistemology, became emotionally and 
morally detached from its subject. This move to adopt objective language served 
science by giving it greater control over nature. "In place of a natural world redolent 
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with human analogy and symbolic meaning, and sensitive to man's behaviour," notes 
natural historian Keith Thomas, "[scientists] constructed a detached natural scene to be 
viewed and studied by the observer from the outside, as if by peering through a 
window, in the secure knowledge that the objects of contemplation inhabited a separate 
realm, offering no omens or signs, without human meaning or significance" (89). 
According to M. Jimmie Killingsworth and Jacqueline Palmer, science propagates a 
culture which favors theoretical arguments, technical language, and jargon over 
referentiality, clarity and thoroughness (Ecospeak 103). The guiding principle in 
constructing scientific discourse is to deal with data or fact, not emotion or norms, in 
as objective a fashion as possible. The more value-free one's observations, the more 
credible. Within science there is a hierarchy of discourse, say Killingsworth and 
Palmer, where basic research--with its "closed, tightfisted arguments" and pure data 
collection--is valued most, and the narrative discourse used to teach science--with its 
careful packaging of information and stylistic conventions--is deemed "primitive, 
unsystematic, and underdeveloped" (Ecospeak 128). Less credible still in the eyes of 
those doing basic science is scientific activism, which allows itself to be "tainted" by 
political objectives and value judgements. Seeking to comply with the demands of 
objectivity, scientific ecologists often feel prohibited, note Killingsworth and Palmer, 
from offering valuative assessments of human conduct. 
"Objective" discourse is that which abides by the conventions prescribed by the 
scientific community. Advocates often point out that the truths that science discovers 
are not immutable facts (consider, for example, how often science has had to revise 
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old facts in light of the new); instead, science's objective description of the world is 
just that, a description--one codified by a community of speakers and privileged over 
other methods of description. The scientist's exclusive faith in reason is nurtured by a 
community which denies the validity of any other avenue of understanding and which 
censures its members for dissent. "When science begins to influence the rhetoric and 
the instrumental realities of the public realm," observe Palmer and Killingsworth, "it 
loses its special character and becomes something other than science as defined by 
scientific authorities" (Ecospeak 126). 
To the nature advocate, detached objectivity, far from being disinterested and 
apolitical, is patently self-serving and highly partisan. The objective truths arrived at 
through detached mathematical reasoning and experiment do not necessarily reflect an 
absolute reality as much as they reflect consensus about the interpretation of reality. 
Hard proofs, suggest many advocates, do not exist independently of those doing the 
interpreting. Scientists agree about the facts derived from their observations of the 
physical world because they share the same conceptual guidelines. In other words, the 
truth arrived at through scientific rationalism is socially constructed within a well-
defmed discourse community. Reason, Nietzsche reminds us, is a concept created 
through consensus, not an infallible human faculty. Humanity constructs a universe of 
concepts, a shifting ephemeral world, says Nietzsche, like a spider web on moving 
water. Since we ourselves have created reason, finding truth in reason, notes the 
philosopher, is like hiding something under a bush only to return to it later and marvel 
at the "discovery" (Nietzsche 892). 
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As an important component of power, the discourse of objectivity is reproduced by 
various hegemonic social institutions. Universities, government agencies, and 
businesses refer to nature in utilitarian terms as a resource. As Killingsworth and 
Palmer point out in Ecospeak, science's view of nature as object and the capitalistic 
state's view of nature as resource share the common assumption that the universe is an 
inanimate mechanism. The language of science serves the interests of market 
capitalism in that it objectifies the living world, making it ready material for 
commodification. Government and developers frequently resort to the mechanistic 
model of the universe when justifying the exploitation of nature: "experimental science 
as it developed since the seventeenth century, with its fabled detachment from all 
natural objects (including human beings) .... has been encapsulated and rigidified in 
government and industry in the form of 'scientific management"' (Ecospeak 12). 
Much in the way that science objectifies the natural world in order to control it 
conceptually, observe Killingsworth and Palmer, the capitalistic state objectifies 
nonhuman nature in order to produce wealth and power: 
A typical analysis of the capitalist hegemony, or power base, indicates a 
harmonizing of science, government, and business made possible by a common 
tendency to use technology as a means of molding the world into productive 
systems, to produce knowledge in science, military strength and information 
("intelligence") in government, and money in business. (Ecospeak 14) 
This powerful "triumvirate" of state, business, and science "has not taken 
environmentalism very seriously," note the authors, in large part because of its low 
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power, low status position in public discourse. 
Proponents of the mechanistic perspective have both ideological and economic 
incentives for maintaining the supremacy of science. As Aldo Leopold points out, 
science, with its drive for physical control over nature, lends itself to capitalism and 
the cult of "progress": 
Professors serve science and science serves progress. It serves progress so well 
that many of the more intricate instruments are stepped upon and broken in the 
rush to spread progress to all backward lands. One by one the parts are thus 
stricken from the songs of songs. If the professor is able to classify each 
instrument before it is broken, he is well content. 
Science contributes moral as well as material blessings to the world. Its great 
moral contribution is objectivity, or the scientific point of view. This means 
doubting everything except facts; it means hewing to the facts, let the chips fall 
where they may. One of the facts hewn by science is that every river needs more 
people, and all people need more inventions, and hence more science; the good life 
depends on the infinite extension of this chain of logic. That the good life on any 
river may likewise depend on the perception of its music, and the preservation of 
some music to perceive, is a form of doubt not yet entertained by science. 
(Leopold 162-63). 
Under capitalism, applied science becomes industry designed to transform inanimate 
nature into product and profit. As nature is commodified, more and more of the 
"intricate instruments"--organisms and ecosystems--are "stepped on and broken." Yet, 
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because of its avowed detachment, science is incapable of evaluating its own actions~ 
the professor does not consider the implications of his or her science so long as it 
increases human knowledge and mastery. The detached observer, worries Leopold, 
values knowledge of a species over the actual existence of that organism. 
As Leopold notes (like other advocates), modern science and capitalism have 
become engaged in an escalating process of expansion, where science facilitates 
commercial production and capitalism promotes profitable science. The objectivism of 
science ends up serving capitalism quite nicely, since "hewing to the facts" excludes 
the nagging moral questions which arise from expropriation and destruction of other 
life forms. The voice or "music" of the river--which might engender an aesthetic, 
emotional, or moral perspective--is effectively silenced by science to make way for its 
transformation to product. Similarly, returning to the example of the vivisectionists. 
the vocal cords of the lab animal are severed to redefine it as a non-being, as animated 
matter. To acknowledge the music of the river or the cries of the animal would 
redefme nature from commodity or resource to being, and, as a result, would raise new 
ethical impediments to exploitative science. The advocate's project of acting to 
promote the interests of non-human life, explains Leopold, constitutes a "revolt against 
the tedium of the merely economic attitude toward the land" (Leopold 203). 
8.2 Advocacy's Romantic Roots 
The effort of advocates to contest the rule of science by extolling the virtues of 
intuition, experience, and emotion clearly identifies them as sympathetic to 
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romanticism. After all, the rhetoric of advocacy is a discourse that developed within 
the nineteenth-century reaction against the Industrial Revolution. Most advocates will 
admit their indebtedness to romanticism. "The romantic view," says Edward Abbey, 
"while not the whole of truth, is a necessary part of the whole truth" (Desert Solitaire 
167). In American literature, authors like Thoreau, Bryant, Hawthorne, Cole. and 
Cooper wrote in the romantic vein, idealizing the rural life, lauding the wild and 
irregular in nature, and extolling the interpretive power of the human imagination. But 
unlike mainstream romanticism which embraced subjectivity, primitivism and 
sentimentality primarily out of humanistic impulses, the advocates' value those aspects 
of the romantic perspective that tend to move people away from humanism towards a 
more biocentric view of life. The goal of most advocates in challenging scientific 
rationalism is not its complete overthrow, but its incorporation into a qualitative 
approach to nature. 
In The Machine in the Garden, Leo Marx traces the anti-scientific sentiments of 
American romantics like Thoreau and Hawthorne, to name a few, to a common 
reaction against science and industrialism. The romantic rebellion constituted a 
challenge to scientific rationalism's claim to absolute epistemological authority. 
Because of its professed stance of detachment, romantics felt that science was an 
extremely untrustworthy measure of anything touching upon values. In both England 
and America, the romantic movement represents a counter-mechanistic ideology which 
sought to undermine purely quantitative definitions of nature and humanity. From the 
romantic point of view, separateness is an illusion, all nature is one connected whole, 
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and all beings owe their existence to another. Industrialism, which depended upon 
compartmentalization and hierarchy, fostered society's alienation from nature and one 
another. Prompted by this sense of fragmentation, romantics attempted to revive the 
Golden Age ethics of harmony and simplicity, idealizing nature-based cultures and 
villainizing the profusion of machines and materialism. 
Believing that intuitive insights gained through nature would remedy society's 
spiritual and physical ills, American nature writers like Thoreau and Emerson 
promoted a regimen of natural aesthetics combined with solitary contemplation. What 
is true of physical nature, they speculated, is true of human spiritual nature; thus, 
knowledge of the human condition could be attained through intimate contact with 
nature. As an antidote to the pervasive feeling of sterility and alienation generated by 
science's strict objectivity, romanticism touted sympathetic intuition as a reliable 
means of apprehending the nature of the universe. In stark contrast to the discord and 
displacement engendered by the Industrial Revolution, romantics advocated for 
humanity's harmonious integration into the natural world. Consequently, romanticism 
represents an organic cosmology, and, as such, shares with advocacy the goal of re-
investing the non-human world with qualitative value, or, in the romantic terms, with 
spirit. 
However, not all romantics are nature advocates. As discussed earlier, writers like 
Wordsworth and Emerson usually speak about nature as a metaphor for human 
existence. For many writers workiDg in the mainstream romantic tradition, the natural 
world is valued not so much for itself, but for its ability to serve as a conduit to some 
transcendent experience or as a catalyst for improving and elevating the human spirit. 
Advocacy differs from mainstream romanticism in that it is anti-humanistic; it is 
concerned with a real nature out there, and it recognizes the value of reason and 
scientific method. Many advocates, like Leopold and Carson, are scientists. Still, 
advocacy is essentially a romantic movement in that it values intuitive ways of 
knowing and it reads in nature meaning beyond the dead interaction of matter. Like 
the romantics, advocates distrust science that remains detached from its subject and 
they actively seek to overthrow the dominant mechanistic world view. 
In The Machine in the Garden, Marx suggests that the sound of the train rumbling 
through the Walden woods signaled for Thoreau the displacement of the organic world 
by the industrial. His seclusion at Walden was in many ways a rejection of the 
mechanistic world of capitalism, with its machine-like labor, systematized trade, 
materialistic values, and, as Marx puts it, its "dehumanizing reversal of ends and 
means" (247). The material progress pursued so diligently by the mechanistic outlook 
may not coincide with moral development; in fact, speculates Thoreau, it probably 
hinders it. The train's introduction into the natural setting scene of Walden represents 
a harbinger of the age of the machine. The fact that humanity has harnessed the 
intellect to create such a powerful tool excites Thoreau, but his enthusiasm is 
diminished by the destruction wrought by industrialism as a result of its 
misapplication. Technology in the service of cold, crass materialism does not elevate 
the human spirit, but demeans it. Describing the intrusion of the train at Walden. 
Thoreau sees it as a Trojan horse, offered to humanity by its creators as a gift, whose 
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appealing surface belies the great destructive potential contained within: 
That devilish Iron Horse, whose ear-rending neigh is heard throughout the town. 
has muddied the Boiling Spring with his foot, and he it is that has browsed off all 
the woods on Walden shore, that Trojan horse, with a thousand men in his belly. 
introduced by mercenary Greeks! Where is the country's champion, the Moore of 
Moore Hall, to meet him at the Deep Cut and thrust an avenging lance between the 
ribs of the bloated pest? (Walden and Other Writings 174) 
Just as the gift of the horse was an act of betrayal, scientific rationalism stands to 
betray humanity's best hopes; inside its appealing exterior, technology, suggests 
Thoreau, is motivated by dubious designs--knowledge for the sake of knowledge, 
power for the sake of power. With its insistence on divorcing fact from value, 
scientific rationalism represents a Faustian bargain which Thoreau and other advocates 
reject vigorously. The way to avoid Faust's amoral materialism, suggests Thoreau, lies 
not in banishing the machine from the garden, but in re-conceiving its incorporation. 
Like others of his day, Thoreau is often moved to marvel at the creations of science. 
But Thoreau worries about how and why we apply our powers to the earth. As he 
mentions in The Maine Woods, Walden, and elsewhere, humanity must reinvest the 
value-free perspective of the scientist with the value-laden view of the poet: "The earth 
is not a mere fragment of dead history, stratum upon stratum like the leaves of a book, 
to be studied by geologists and antiquaries chiefly, but living poetry like the leaves of 
a tree, which precede flowers and fruit,--not a fossil earth, but a living earth" (Walden 
& Other Writings 275). 
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Expressing similar sentiments, Nathaniel Hawthorne's short story "Ethan Brand" 
condemns the tendency of scientific rationalism to sacrifice the human heart for cold 
analysis.2 In the story, a lime-burner, Bartram. meets the monomaniacal Ethan Brand 
by the glow of his furnace. Brand relates to Bartram and a collection of town derelicts 
his life-long search for the "Unpardonable Sin," and in the process reveals that he has 
discovered it, ironically, within his own heart: "The sin of an intellect that triumphed 
over the sense of brotherhood with man and reverence for God" (277). A cold, 
embittered, shell of a man, Brand applied abstract philosophy and calculating intellect 
to an essentially moral question. In his quest for knowledge, he had become a 
renowned scholar but had lost all the attributes of compassion and morality which 
make one human in the fust place. When the others go to sleep, Ethan stares into the 
intense flames of the kiln and, realizing what he has become, is overcome with despair 
and throws himself into the flames. 
In the morning, the lime-burner and his son discover in the ashes of the furnace a 
human skeleton, converted into brittle, white lime. Housed in the rib cage lay a hard 
chunk of lime in the form of a human heart. As Marx sees it, there is ample evidence 
in the text and in author's notes to suggest that Hawthorne associated the moral 
malignancy which afflicted Brand with both scientific rationalism and the 
2While Hawthorne does not regularly employ a rhetoric of advocacy, the suspicion 
he expresses about science and industrialism reflects the romantic reaction against the 
mechanistic world view common to most advocates. Thus, a review of "Ethan Brand" 
helps to illustrate the advocates' concerns that scientific rationalism had severed the 
mind from the human heart. 
industrialization it facilitated: "With the weakening of his moral nature he had become 
a 'cold observer, looking on mankind as the subject of his experiment' [Hawthorne's 
words]. In other words, Ethan is at once an agent and a victim of scientific 
empiricism or 'mechanism"' (Marx 272). The furnace which consumes Brand, with its 
associated images of fire, iron, steam, and smoke, represents the archetypal machine of 
industry. The death of the stone-hearted philosopher by machine suggests that the 
blind pursuit of knowledge and technology, bereft of any valuative assessment, will 
ultimately destroy our very humanity. Nature is the other obvious casualty of the 
human quest for power, and, like the logs that feed Brand's kiln, nature's very life 
force feeds the flames of the industrial furnace/machine. Appropriately, nature seems 
to rejoice at the demise of Brand and the heartless view of the world he represented: 
"Dear Father," cried [the boy], skipping cheerily to and fro, "that strange man is gone, 
and the sky and the mountains all seem glad of it!" (Hawthorne 287). 
Natty Burnppo, Cooper's fictional mouthpiece for nature in the Leatherstocking 
series, also expresses deep suspicion of the scientific world view. In The Prairie. the 
old trapper meets up with Dr. Obed Bat, an incompetent and arrogant naturalist 
engaged in cataloging the flora and fauna of the plains. Dr. Bat is a caricature of the 
scientific rationalist of the nineteenth century who, in Cooper's mind, worshipped 
science as his religion. (The diligent taxonomist was so entirely devoted to the 
mechanistic world view that he preferred to be hailed by the pseudo-latinate title 
"Battius.") A strong humanist theme also runs throughout Bat's speeches, and he 
elevates man to the status of demigod. For Bat, man's reason is infinitely powerful 
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and his creations rival God's in beauty and complexity. To the scientific rationalist. 
no mystery is beyond the comprehension of science, and thus mankind is invested with 
a kind of potential omnipotence and omniscience. For Natty. on the other hand. 
science was marginally adept at answering what and how, but could not answer why: 
Your l'aming, though it is man's boast, is folly in the eyes of him, who sits in the 
clouds and looks down in sorrow at the pride and vanity of his creatur's. Many is 
the hour, that I've pass'd, lying in the shades of the woods, or stretched upon the 
hills of these open fields, looking up into the blue skies, where I could fancy, the 
Great One had taken his stand, and was solemnizing on the waywardness of man 
and brute, below, as myself had often look'd at the ants tumbling over each other 
in their eagerness, though in a way and a fashion more suited to his mightiness and 
Power. Knowledge! it is a plaything--say, you who think it so easy to climb into 
the judgment seat above, can you tell me anything of the beginning and the end? 
(The Prairie 207) 
Natty's ways of knowing are distinctly different from the Doctor's ways of knowing. 
While Dr. Bat pours over his books for an understanding of the physical world, Natty 
gains emotional and moral wisdom by "lying in the shades of the woods, or stretched 
upon the hills of these open fields, looking up into the blue skies." Unlike Bat who 
seeks conceptual and physical control of nature, Natty is guided by the desire to 
understand humanity's place within the whole of nature. 
In Bat, says literary critic Donald Ringe, one can see "the attitude of some 
scientists who would elevate their studies above all others and assume that man has it 
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within his power to understand and control all things" (Ringe 319). Nature advocates 
question the validity of objective knowledge and challenge the accuracy of the 
"evidence" afforded by detached observation. Obed Bat approaches nature as a 
physical storehouse of inanimate specimens and has no idea how all the parts work 
together as a whole. Appropriately, the naturalist spends much of his time lost in the 
prairie, criss-crossing the path of his friends in directionless wanderings, so totally 
engrossed by his taxonomies and specimens that he is scarcely conscious of the drama 
of life going on about him. Furthermore, the Doctor's name, Bat, suggests that, like 
the nearly-blind bat, he has terrible insight and navigates his way around the world "in 
the dark." Bat's absolute faith in the power of reason surpasses his faith in the 
evidence of his own senses, but brings him no closer to a true perception of the world. 
In several instances Bat cannot even identify nature's most common of creatures. His 
own mule he mistakes for a "monster" with talons and horns; a charred buffalo he 
believes to be a horse; and--unable to recognize his own species--he mistakes the 
painted warrior Hard-Heart for a reptile. Bat relies too heavily on his "book larnin" 
and cannot appreciate the evidence of his own eyes. To Natty and for advocates in 
general, science is by itself an inadequate and unreliable means of understanding 
nature. 
At one point in the narrative, Natty demonstrates the limited power of Bat's logic 
by pitting his intuitive and experiential knowledge against the Doctor's powers of 
deduction. Confronted with the mystery of Ishmael's closely guarded wagon (in which 
he holds Inez hostage), Natty, Paul, and the Doctor offer their suggestions for what 
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may be inside. The scientist, testifying to the interpretive powers of reason, explains 
that "evidence" he has gained through deduction proves that the wagon hides a new 
species of ferocious animal. "You have seen the creatur?" asks an incredulous Paul 
Hover. 
Not with the organs of sight; but with more infallible instruments of vision: the 
conclusions of reason, and the deductions of scientific premises. I have watched 
the habits of the animal, young man; and can fearlessly pronounce, by evidence 
that would be thrown away on ordinary observers, that it is of vast dimensions, 
inactive, possibly torpid, of voracious appetite! (The Prairie 115) 
In the middle of this conversation, Natty, Paul Hover, and Dr. Bat are surprised by the 
unexpected appearance of the young officer, Middleton. Standing in the tall grass of 
the plains, the party hears something approaching, and Natty takes the opportunity to 
challenge the frightened scientist to demonstrate the power of science by i~entifying 
the source of the noise: 
"Do you not hear something in the brake? it has been cracking 
the twigs these five minutes. Now tell me what the creatur' is?" 
"I hope nothing ferocious!" exclaimed the Doctor .... It exceeds 
the limits of earthly knowledge! Buffon himself could not tell whether the animal 
was a quadruped, or of the order serpens! a sheep, or a tiger!" 
"Then was your buffoon a fool to my Hector! Here; pup! What is 
it dog? shall we run it down, pup, or shall we let it pass?" (The Prairie 117) 
The dog brought forward, it sniffs the air, stands attentively for a moment, then 
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"peaceably resumed his recumbent attitude." Interpreting the signs offered by the 
animal in light of his years of experience in the wild, Natty proclaims confidently "It 
is a man, if I am a judge of the creatur's ways. There is but little said atwixt the 
hound and me, but we seldom mistake each other's meaning!" (The Prairie 118). He 
is, of course, correct, and Middleton strides out of the grass to greet the trapper. The 
failure of detached objectivity and the triumph of intuition is a recurring theme 
throughout the novel, and it dramatizes the epistemological advantage the sensitive 
nature lover holds over the detached and dispassionate scientist. 
This romantic mistrust of strict objectivity was a central tent!t of advocacy through 
the nineteenth century and exists in the rhetoric of advocacy through the twentieth 
century to present. As Scott Slavic notes in his study Seeking Awareness in American 
Nature Writing, nature writers make a distinction between seeing with the eyes and 
perceiving with the whole self. In order to truly "see" or understand nature, one must 
become integrated with it. One must smell, touch, hear, see, and taste the natural 
world, and by making contact with it be absorbed and absorb it. For Edward Abbey, 
as with other nature writers, one cannot truly appreciate nature without having felt it. 
In his preface to Desert Solitaire, Abbey warns those who would merely look at the 
landscape that they will gain no wisdom from cursory glances: 
Do not jump into your automobile next june and rush out to the canyon country 
hoping to see some of that which I have attempted to evoke in these pages. In the 
first place you can't see anything from a car; you've got to get out of the 
goddamned contraption and walk, better yet crawl, on hand and knees, over the 
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sandstone and through the thombush and cactus. When traces of blood begin to 
mark your trail you'll see something, maybe. Probably not. In the second place 
most of what I write about is going fast ... This is not a travel guide but an elegy 
(xiv). 
Objectivists' assurances that nature is best apprehended at arm's length has been so 
thoroughly propagated within the public that the average tourist will believe that he or 
she can "see" a natural wonder from the window of a speeding car. To advocates like 
Abbey, the entire industrial artifice and "contraptions" like automobiles designed to 
promote our comfort have worked only to dull our perceptive faculties and distance 
humanity from nature. 
Abbey offers a different way of seeing, where the observer perceives nature from 
the perspective of one looking at the world from within, as one fully integrated with 
that which is observed. In Abbey's description of the requirements of this heightened 
insight, the ideal observer symbolically and physically merges with the desert. As 
"traces of blood" seep into the trail, the boundaries between observer and observed 
dissolve and one is compelled to recognize that there can be no separation of the self 
from knowledge, no "unbiased" perspective, as all knowledge is the result of active 
participation with the observed. One is always a participant in nature and in knowing 
nature. Only by overcoming our aloof isolation, argues Abbey, can we revive our 
intuitive faculties, atrophied from too little use in this increasingly positivistic society. 
Speaking for nature works to undermine the stability of the dominant mechanistic 
paradigm in that it opposes objectivity with subjectivity, referenciality with metaphor, 
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determinacy with indeterminacy. The image of nature as "speaking" implies a poetic 
rather than a strictly rational perspective of reality, since there is no rational foundation 
for representing nature as a speaking subject. Attributing language to nature 
challenges the hegemony of mechanistic discourse in that it suggests both an 
alternative interpretive method and an wholly different mode of representation. 
First, by relying on emotion, sympathy, and experience to interpret nature, the 
advocate promotes human perceptive faculties long denigrated and suppressed by 
scientific rationalism. Where reason dictates that the expressions of non-human nature 
are merely the phenomenon of inanimate matter, intuition allows the observer to 
apprehend sorrow in the cry of a lone goose and a declaration of community in the 
howl of the wolf. Such a description of reality is constructed from an alternative set 
of evidence. The advocate's depictions of geese as mourning, trees as lamenting, or 
the earth as pleading are not supported by empirical methods or logic, but derive their 
legitimacy from time-tested experience and sympathy. 
Second, by framing those interpretations in the form of tropes, the advocate 
underscores the impossibility of immediate correspondence of words and things. 
Where scientific discourse strives to create a denotative language in which there is a 
circumscribed and unambiguous connection between referent and reference, the 
rhetoric of advocacy exploits the indeterminacy of language. In Novum Organum, 
Bacon decries discourse shaped by the "apprehension of the vulgar," where imprecise 
words "plainly force and over-rule the understanding, and throw all into confusion, and 
lead men away into numberless empty controversies and idle fancies" (Bacon). The 
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"fanciful" image of nature speaking draws on the connotative force of language to 
evince a more immediate emotional apprehension of nature. Recognizing that external 
nature must always be perceived through unavoidably subjective means, advocates find 
metaphor a truer representation of the imagination's synthesis of understanding. The 
advocate's reliance on tropes suggests that apprehending nature, like apprehending 
metaphors, depends on one's active creation of understanding. 
Because this poetic discourse threatens the hegemony of the mechanistic world 
view, it is aggressively opposed by the dominant paradigm, and in extreme 
circumstances it is associated with insanity. It is not uncommon to hear those in 
business or government castigate environmentalists as "environmental whackos" (a Ia 
George Bush in the 1992 election campaign), "tree huggers," or "wild-eyed 
preservationists." Such depictions of the nature advocate as insane largely derive from 
the fact that they argue outside of the parameters of sanctioned rational discourse. 
Implicit in such criticism is the assumption that the nature representative's connection 
to the wilderness has somehow corrupted their human (i.e. rational) thinking process 
and is reflected within their language. The wilderness, notes nature historian Roderick 
Nash, has long been associated with irrationality. According to Nash, the etymology 
of bewilder comes from attaching the verb "to be" to "wildern." It is used throughout 
English literature to describe a state where one is confused and disoriented (2). 
Wilderness, in addition to being perceived as non-human habitat, is associated with a 
non-human state of mind. "Wild country," says Nash, "was also a setting where 
knowledge came as much from intuition as from reason or science" (259). For 
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environmentalists, this view of nature "was a prerequisite for empathy and sympathy 
with the nonhuman world," but to proponents of the dominant mechanistic model it 
was seized upon as a clear sign of the illegitimacy of the rhetoric of advocacy. 
Using an analogy from psychoanalysis, Palmer and Killingsworth describe the 
environmental crisis created by the mechanistic world view as the consequence of a 
culture of repression. In response to the environmental crisis, the dominant 
technological establishment acts like the human ego and suppresses the 
environmentalists' claims that would threaten its control. Our technological culture 
refuses to acknowledge the voice of the environmental movement, suggest the authors. 
because to do so would force it to confront and redress the underlying ecological crises 
identified by the advocates. In this model, the conflict between the oppressive 
rationalist paradigm and the marginalized environmentalists results in a case of social 
"hysteria," where humanity represents the controlling mind and nature the afflicted 
body. In the case of hysteria, the repressed aspects of the ego ultimately find 
expression in the body in the form of some neurosis or tick. Similarly, industrial 
society tries to repress ecological trauma, but the physical signs of destruction in 
nature and the "hysterical" voice of the environmentalists push through into our social 
consciousness. Killingsworth and Palmer describe the voice of environmentalists 
metaphorically as a "cry of pain" expressed by the ailing body/nature: "Repeated again 
and again in successive environmental catastrophes and in the environmentalist outcry 
that accompanies them, the cry of pain signals the return of the represses, the earthly 
unconscious" ("The Discourse of 'Environmentalist Hysteria"' 14). 
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The strident rhetoric employed by some nature representatives has inspired many 
anti-environmentalists to label them as "hysterical" or irrational. In a culture that 
privileges objectivity and reason, this charge is the equivalent of saying that their fears 
are "all in their heads." But as Killingsworth and Palmer see it, the complaints of the 
environmentalists are inspired by real crises and represent "the coming into 
consciousness of that which, having been avoided for far too long, has created an 
illness within the mind-body system of earthly existence" ("The Discourse of 
'Environmentalist Hysteria"' 3). The apocalyptic discourse they use is, like discourse 
of neurotics, a strategy of last resorts, arising out of their relative powerlessness. 
However, as with the exaggerated rhetoric of hysterics, the hyperbole of 
environmentalists is justified since it symbolizes a very real dysfunction within the 
social mind. One can see this drama played out in the way that defenders of the status 
quo insist that indisputable scientific evidence does not exists for problems like global 
warming or ozone depletion despite the fact that applying inferential reasoning to the 
data available suggests catastrophe is on the way. Their concerns effectively silenced 
by objectivism, environmentalists counter with the "subjective"--emotions and ethics. 
While scientific rationalism still constitutes the dominant paradigm, a number of 
the most influential contemporary thinkers have called attention to the ways in which 
our notions of "rational thought" are historically and politically constructed to the 
advantage of those in power. Throughout his works, the French historian and critic 
Michel Foucault examines the notion of truth as an expression of power. In 1.\lfadness 
and Civilization and The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault contends that madness 
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should not be viewed strictly as a psychological phenomenon, but should be 
understood against the definitions of reason put forth by powerful social institutions. 
The authorities in government, medicine, and religion who defme reason publish a 
threshold of tolerance for behaviors which are complicit with their established rule. 
Actions or discourse which deviate from the dictated norm are excluded or re-
integrated through coercion. 
The discursive relations between hegemonic institutions determine what will be 
recognized as sanity and insanity as well as establish the rules of discourse which 
allow such objects of introspection to appear in the first place. 
Following Nietzsche, Foucault asserts that truth is a social construction and, what's 
more, that its creation is largely dictated by the dominant "scientific discourse": 
In societies like ours, the "political economy" of truth is characterized by five 
important traits. "Truth" is centered on the form of scientific discourse and the 
institutions which produce it; it is subject to constant economic and political 
incitement (the demand for truth, as much for economic production as for political 
power); it is the object, under diverse forms, of immense diffusion and 
consumption (circulating through apparatuses of education and information whose 
extent is relatively broad in the social body, not withstanding certain strict 
limitations); it is produced and transmitted under the control, dominant if not 
exclusive, of a few political and economic apparatuses (university, army, writing, 
media); lastly, it is the issue of a whole political debates and social confrontation 
("ideological" struggles). (Power/Knowledge 132) 
For Foucault, truth and power are intimately connected, as those who are in power 
shape truth and that truth in turn is exercised to wield power. Since the 
Enlightenment. "scientific discourse" has shaped the whole set of relations between 
thought, language, values, and institutions that together constitute Western culture's 
method for organizing knowledge. 
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The object of our scientific institutions is not to really to "discover" truth, says 
Foucault. which is an impossible task to complete with any certainty; instead, the quest 
for knowledge is "a battle about the status of truth and the economic and political role 
it plays" (Power/Knowledge 132). From this perspective, the scientific discourse that 
has controlled the construction of knowledge for centuries has maintained its influence 
because it is economically expedient. The notion of nature as inanimate object serves 
the political and economic interests of the prevailing capitalistic establishment since it 
legitimizes the exploitation and commodification of non-human nature. The rules of 
evidence established by science recognize only humanity as willful, conscious, and 
ethical beings, making the subjection of nature both logical and ethical. 
While Foucault focuses his analysis of exploitation on the human body, his 
observations of the mechanistic world view are equally revealing when applied to the 
"body" of nature. Descartes identified the body as a manipulable object, says 
Foucault. when he formulated his "anatomico-metaphysical" perspective of nature. 
This scientific perspective overlaps with a "technico-political" view which aimed at 
"controlling or correcting the operations of the body." Similarly, nature is made 
machine through scientific discourse, and as such is construed as a "docile" body "that 
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may be subjected, used, transformed, and improved" ("Docile Bodies" 180). Defining 
the human body, or the body of nature for that matter, in mechanical terms makes it 
an object of control to be employed for the production of wealth and power. Just as 
the mechanization of the human body results in coercion, scientific rationalism 
objectifies nature, assuring "the constant subjection of its forces and impos[ing] on 
them a relation of docility-utility" ("Docile Bodies" 181 ). In short, the mechanistic 
view of nature has prevailed despite evidence of its failure--i.e. anthropogenic 
environmental catastrophes--because it perpetuates and legitimizes the power of the 
dominant capitalistic paradigm. 
Within the dominant social institutions, the organic view of nature as conscious 
and sentient is aggressively suppressed. Aldo Leopold, himself a scientist, describes 
the pressures in the world of academia to conform to subscribe to an objective view of 
truth: 
There are men charged with the duty of examining the construction of the 
plants, animals, and soils which are the instruments of the great orchestra. These 
men are called professors. Each selects one instrument and spends his life taking 
it apart and describing its strings and sounding boards. This process of 
dismemberment is called research. The place for dismemberment is called a 
university. 
A professor may pluck the strings of his own instrument, but never that of 
another, and if he listens for music he must never admit it to his fellows or to his 
students. For all are restrained by an ironbound taboo which decrees that the 
construction of instruments is the domain of science, while the detection of 
harmony is the domain of poets. (Leopold 162) 
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To recognize that nature possesses qualitative value--that it exhibits community or 
purpose is "taboo" to the scientist's code of objectivity. Bound by the rules of 
scientific rationalism, scholars may be compelled to ignore or repress the "music" or 
voice of nature or face being sanctioned by their own peers as being at least irrational 
and perhaps even mad. 
The advocate argues just the opposite--that to base human conduct towards nature 
purely on reasoned principles is in itself a form of madness. In Desert Solitaire. 
Abbey describes a meeting with an engineer whose vision of the desert is strictly 
rational and utilitarian. Describing the government's intention to build millions of 
dollars of roads in the desert, the engineer justifies the plan to Abbey by explaining 
that it will bring "twenty, thirty times as many tourists in here as you get now." 
Abbey guesses at the destruction such development will cause and surmises that such a 
view is the height of insanity: 
He was a pleasant-mannered, soft-spoken civil engineer with an unquestioning 
dedication to his work. A very dangerous man .... I knew that I was dealing with 
a madman. (Desert Solitaire 44) 
Turning the dominant epistemology on its head, the advocate contends that, on its 
own, strict objectivity is a form of insanity which results in a wide range of self-
destructive and amoral behavior. After all, some of the most reprehensible violations 
of nature such as vivisection, the wholesale extermination of "pest" species, and the 
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deforestation of much of the world's rain forests can be attributed to a detached and 
dispassionate view of non-human nature. The measure of sanity here is not an 
evaluation of how well one is able to explain, predict. and control the workings of the 
physical world, but in one's ability to place oneself within that world community as an 
ethical participant. To this extent, scientific rationalism fails miserably at providing 
humanity with moral guidance as members of a sentient, living, and thus moral world. 
8.3 The Rhetoric of Advocacy: A Transactional Epistemology 
The problem with contemporary science is that it pursues its quantitative 
measurements to the exclusion of all other means of perception. The advocates 
espouse the virtues of a more holistic approach, demonstrating through their own 
experiences that nature could only be properly understood through a combination of 
observation and intuition. Thoreau, for example, was a great cataloger of species. but 
compiled his lists and measurements in an effort to better understand the complex 
interactions between all organisms in a community. In addition to seeking "facts," 
Thoreau believed in immersing one's senses and emotions in nature in an effort to 
understand its "spirit" as well as we understand its biology. For the advocate, 
interpreting nature involves qualitative measurements which acknowledge and embrace 
the inevitable subjectivity inherent in the act of observation. Rejecting the myth of 
objectivity--that we can step away from our own opinion to render strictly quantifiable 
pronouncements--, advocates recognize that truth is largely a personal and social 
creation. Rejecting simple subjectivism, the advocate contends that there is a real 
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world external to our human existence, and that we can make reliable pronouncements 
about the workings of the physical universe. In their efforts to understand nature. 
these nature writers integrate rigorous measurements of physical phenomena with 
moral, aesthetic, and emotional assessments of personal experience. 
In many ways, the rhetoric of advocacy springs from an epistemological view 
closely aligned to transactional rhetoric. In his overview of the theories of rhetoric. 
Rhetoric and Reality, James Berlin defines the transactional approach as "an 
epistemology that sees truth as arising out of the interaction of the elements of the 
rhetorical situation: an interaction of subject and object or of subject and audience or 
even of all the elements--subject, object, audience, and language--operating 
simultaneously" (Berlin 15). Transactional theories generally fall into three categories 
of emphasis: classical, cognitive, and epistemological. Theorists like Louise 
Rosenblatt, Ann Berthoff and Richard Ohmann who posit what Berlin calls an 
epistemic transactional rhetoric--the view I will be dealing with here--contend that 
language enters into all aspects of the relationship between speaker audience and 
material: "All experiences, even the scientific and logical, are grounded in language. 
and language determines their content and structure. And just as language structures 
our response to social and political issues, language structures our response to the 
material world" (Berlin 16). For proponents of an epistemic rhetoric, truth is created 
through discourse, a position that implies that "knowledge is not discovered by reason 
alone, that cognitive and affective processes are not separate, that intersubjectivity is a 
condition of all knowledge, and that the contact of minds affects knowledge" (Berlin 
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165). 
In her book, The Reader, the Text, and the Poem, Louise Rosenblatt outlines a 
transactional theory of reading that articulates many of the epistemological assumptions 
that advocates bring to interpreting or "reading" the text of nature. Following ideas 
pioneered by John Dewey, Arthur Bentley, and William James, Rosenblatt describes 
how knowing is, necessarily, a "transaction between a particular individual and a 
particular environment."3 Using an ecological metaphor, Rosenblatt characterizes 
reading as an "event" in which the individual responds to stimulus from the external 
"environment": 
The current interest in ecology also illuminates the value of the transactional 
formuJation. To see man as separate from his environment, being affected by it. or 
affecting it, does not do justice to the ecological process, in which man and his 
environment are part of a total situation, to use Dewey's earlier term, each 
conditioned by and conditioning the other. 
In ecological terms, the text becomes the element of the environment to which 
the individual responds. Or, more accurately, each forms an environment for the 
other during the reading event. Sharp demarcation between objective and 
subjective becomes irrelevant, since they are, rather, aspects of the same 
transaction--the reader looks to the text, and the text is activated by the reader. A 
3Rosenblatt includes under the transactionalist umbrella "movements like 
pragmatism, phenomenology, existentialism, and psychoanalysis that seek in one way 
or another to incorporate the human consciousness within a theory of knowledge." ( 16) 
"subjective" response assumes an "object" at the other transactional pole; it is better 
to avoid the use of either in characterizing the reading and criticism of the literary 
work. (18) 
As Rosenblatt notes, ecology shares with transactionalism the notion that the knower 
and the known mutually condition one another. For the transactionalist, a text is 
"meaningful" only by virtue of its relationship to the reader who interprets it. For the 
advocate, the environment is made meaningful when the observer applies language to 
expenence. 
Taken literally, Rosenblatt's metaphor expresses the advocates' philosophy 
regarding humanity's relationship to the environment, as well as their views on 
language. Like transactionalists, most nature advocates contend that our knowledge of 
the natural world involves the interaction of the observer and the observed within a 
social context. Nature really exists out there for our examination, but our experience 
of the external world is always filtered through personal sensations and beliefs; and 
those beliefs influence and are influenced by cultural assumptions. For the 
transactionalist, "interest, expectations, anxieties, and other factors based on past 
experiences affect what an individual perceives .... In short, what is perceived 
involves both the perceiver's contribution and the stimulus" (Rosenblatt 19). 
Like proponents of transactionalism, the advocate recognizes that language plays a 
crucial role in mediating between the object, observer, and audience, facilitating 
personal understanding of nature and constructing social concepts of nature. 
Consequently, the nature advocates frequently emphasize the role of language in 
fostering either a sense of identification or alienation in our relationship to nature. 
The goal of many of these writers is to subvert the language of strict objectivism or 
subjectivism with a discourse which challenges the validity or the usefulness of the 
dichotomy between the two. 
Of the nature writers examined here, Aldo Leopold, trained as a scientists, worked 
most diligently to redefine truth as arising out of the interaction of object, subject and 
language. Most advocates appreciate the contribution that science makes to our 
knowledge of the physical world, but they insist that qualitative interpretation is an 
inevitable component of understanding. For instance, in seeking to explain why a lone 
goose will honk incessantly after a missing mate, Leopold tries to "keep an open 
mind" and admit the evidence of his personal experience and intuition. When 
accompanied by affective insights, the power of science is augmented, and we begin to 
understand the nature of grief that one goose feels for another: 
In thus watching the daily routine of a spring goose convention, one notices the 
prevalence of singles--lone geese that do much flying about and much talking. 
One is apt to impute a disconsolate tone to their honkings, and to jump to the 
conclusion that they are broken-hearted widowers, or mothers hunting lost children. 
The seasoned ornithologist knows, however, that such subjective interpretation of 
bird behavior is risky. I long tried to keep an open mind on the question. 
After my students and I counted for half a dozen years the number of geese 
comprising a flock, some unexpected light was cast on the meaning of lone geese. 
It was found by mathematical analysis that flocks of six or multiples of six were 
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far more frequent than chance alone would dictate. In other words, goose flocks 
are families, or aggregations of families, and lone geese in spring are probably just 
what our fond imaginings had first suggested. They are bereaved survivors of the 
winter's shooting, searching in vain for their kin. Now I am free to grieve with 
and for the lone honkers. 
It is not often that cold-potato mathematics thus confirms the sentimental 
promptings of the bird-lover. (Leopold 22) 
Combining statistical analysis with his intuited sense of birds' grief, Leopold rejects 
the false alternative of having to choose between "cold-potato" empiricism and 
groundless sentimentalism. Leopold and other advocates would argue that such an 
epistemological dichotomy does not exist, that knowledge is intersubjective. Contrary 
to what positivists would argue, science does not proceed from dispassionate 
calculations, but from hunches, hopes, gut feelings, or, in the case of some naturalists, 
"sentimental promptings." Furthermore, Leopold suggests that science does not 
necessarily have to "murder to dissect;" romantic intuition and science can be 
reconciled. In the service of advocates like Thoreau, Marsh, Carson, Leopold, and 
Commoner, science becomes a powerful tool for confirming qualitative speculations 
about the needs or desires of non-human life. If one begins, as Leopold does here, 
from the assumption that nature constitutes sentient, self-motivated life, science serves 
quite well to verify an organic world view. 
For Leopold, the dominance of the mechanistic model within universities has 
further compartmentalized and objectified nature. "Education, I fear, is learning to see 
one thing by going blind to another" (Leopold 168). Perspectives which emphasized a 
holistic method and which employed both descriptive and valuative approaches to 
nature have been systematically marginalized within the curriculum as "soft science." 
With the rise of scientific rationalism, the organic approach to nature was put in 
competition with experimental methods which dealt with nature by breaking it down 
and examining it as isolated components. "It was quite natural that laboratory biology 
soon came to be regarded as the superior form of science," notes Leopold. "As it 
grew it crowded natural history out of the educational picture" (207). 
Despite objectivism's position of privilege in education, Leopold admires amateur 
naturalists who are attracted to science by a love of nature. In A Sand County 
Almanac, he recounts the efforts of an Ohio housewife who maintained detailed 
observations of the interactions of the song sparrows in her back yard for years, purely 
out of the desire to know the "workings of the sparrow community ... and sparrow 
psychology." Yet formal education pretends to extirpate personal passion from science 
and discourages this wide-angle perspective: 
What is our educational system doing to encourage personal amateur scholarship in 
the natural-history field? We can perhaps seek and answer to this question by 
dropping in on a typical class in a typical zoology department. We find the 
students memorizing the names of the bumps on the bones of a cat. It is 
important, of course, to study bones; otherwise we should never comprehend the 
evolutionary process by which animals came into existence. But why memorize 
the bumps? We are told that this is part of biological discipline. I ask, though, 
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whether a comprehension of the living animal and how it holds its place in the sun 
is not an equally important part. Unfortunately, the living animal is virtually 
omitted from the present system of zoological education. (Leopold 205-6) 
Knowing the mechanical details of "bumps on bones" helps us understand the 
workings of isolated parts of nature, but passion and imagination, say the nature 
advocates, enable us to comprehend "the living animal" as a valued member of a 
complex and beautiful living system. 
Within the sciences, some have disregarded the taboos against qualitative 
assessments of nature, and have spoken for nature as opposed to speaking about it. In 
Ecospeak, Killingsworth and Palmer conclude that scientifically trained nature writers 
like Rachel Carson, Aldo Leopold, and Barry Commoner "have brought the message of 
ecological holism to the public and have asserted the radical connection between 
science and social history in the face of strong resistance from the scientific 
community itself' (Ecospeak 52-3). The authors observe that this scientific activism 
allows the scientist to cross the boundary between the "scientific is to the ethical 
ought." Nature advocates working within the sciences present information about the 
natural world which has been gathered using scientific method, but they bring to this 
descriptive task their own valuative insights. Advocacy is accomplished within the 
sciences by assessing the moral implications of technological and scientific 
observations. Thus, for example, it is not enough to simply report PH levels of rain to 
the public; the advocate will interpret the data qualitatively in light of non-human and 
human interests and--stepping out of the role of "disinterested" observer--will assert 
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that such levels are unacceptable and the social conditions which produce the pollution 
are deeply flawed and unethicaL 
The fact that these nature writers write and speak for nature with such conviction 
underscores their faith in the power of rhetoric to shape our way of thinking about 
and, ultimately, our actions. The advocate realizes we do not arrive at an absolute 
understanding of nature through empirical means, but that notions of nature and, 
perhaps more importantly, our conduct towards nature are socially arbitrated through 
language. From Thoreau to Dillard, nature advocates in America have emphasized the 
influence and the importance of the role of language in the process of creating 
knowledge. How a person approaches nature, which entails assumptions shaped by 
social discourse, necessarily influences their perspective, and the language they use to 
describe that experience in turn shapes society's view of the natural world. "It is the 
human subject, the self, that provides the medium through which the objects of nature 
and the objects of the laboratory might be reconciled and mutually interpreted," note 
the authors of Ecospeak: "The mind shapes the world and is shaped by the world. 
One of Leopold's deepest realizations is that scientific intelligence ... simultaneously 
constructs nature and is itself re-formed by nature" (63). The advocates speak for 
nature because they recognize that the "truth" about nature's value as a moral entity 
must be constructed in public discourse, that our understanding of the physical world--
even our way of understanding--will be altered as a result of discourse. 
The very idea of "nature" as an entity which can be destroyed, preserved, revered, 
or represented is made possible through language. If language were not brought to 
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bear on experience, impressions of the natural world would exist only in the immediate 
moment. Language makes it possible for the observer to reflect upon experience, 
synthesizing meaning from a palate of impressions, associations, and concepts. The 
role of the observer as synthesizer or interpreter creates an unavoidable paradox in 
humanity's relationship to the natural world. We can know of things outside 
ourselves, but that knowledge is always mediated through the language-using observer. 
For instance, the nature experience, common to all the writers examined here, is often 
described as an event prior to or outside of language, yet it is only made conscious and 
meaningful when articulated in language. As Dillard describes it, language pulls the 
observer away from raw sensations and the perpetual present to a more distant space 
of contemplation, but this self-consciousness, constituted in language, is necessary for 
making sense of the world: 
Consciousness itself does not hinder living in the present. In fact, it is only to a 
heightened awareness that the great door to the present opens at alL Even a 
certain amount of interior verbalization is helpful to enforce the memory of 
whatever is taking place. The gas station beagle puppy, after all, may have 
experienced those same moments more purely than I did, but he brought fewer 
instruments to bear on the same material, he had no data for comparison, and he 
profited only in the grossest of ways, by having an assortment of itches scratched. 
(Pilgrim at Tinker Creek 81 ). 
Without language, there can be no reflection and hence no recognition of the quality of 
an experience. Language is the only human faculty that makes it possible to derive 
259 
meaning from the mosaic of moments which constitute experience. That constructed 
understanding, then, is in turn brought to bear on experience, ever shaping and 
coloring subsequent observations. 
The advocate expresses an ardent belief in the existence of an external world, yet 
admits that belief must be based on faith, since the mediated nature of understanding 
means that our apprehension is always somewhat imperfect, always a step removed 
from that which is observed. Thoreau and Muir describe this uncertainty as "mystery," 
Abbey describes it as "paradox," and Dillard calls it "indeterminacy." Regardless of 
what they call it, all these writers are referring to the same phenomenon: the 
impossibility of stepping outside of our humanity to know nature unmediated. Dillard 
articulates this sentiment most eloquently in her book Pilgrim at Tinker Creek. To 
her, the natural world eludes perfect understanding, and if we are to adjust our 
behavior to account for this, we must abandon the belief in absolute, concrete, 
uncontrovertible truths: 
Many of us are still living in the universe of Newtonian physics, and fondly 
imagine that real, hard scientists have no use for these misty rambling, dealing as 
scientists do with the measurable and known. We think that at least the physical 
causes of physical events are perfectly knowable, and that, as a result of various 
experiments keep coming in, we gradually roll back the cloud of unknowing. We 
remove the veils one by one, painstakingly, adding knowledge to knowledge and 
whisking away veil after veil, until at least we reveal the nub of things, the 
sparkling equation from whom all blessings flow. Even wildman Emerson 
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accepted the truly pathetic fallacy of the old science when he wrote grudgingly 
towards the end of his life, "When the microscope is improved, we shall have the 
cells analyzed, and all will be electricity, or somewhat else." All we need to do is 
perfect our instruments and our methods, and we can collect enough data like birds 
on a string to predict physical events from physical causes. (Pilgrim at Tinker 
Creek 202) 
But this confidence in our abilities to "reveal the nub of things" is misplaced, says 
Dillard, since we can only apprehend nature in terms of probabilities; we cannot 
predict its actions with certainty. Discoveries in modem physics, the science which 
has delved most deeply into the mysteries of the universe, are now confirming what 
nature advocates have been saying for over a century: that perfect and total knowledge 
is impossible. Dillard uses the relativistic theories of physicist Werner Heisenberg to 
dramatize the point: 
[In] 1927 Werner Heisenberg pulled out the rug, and our whole understanding 
of the universe toppled and collapsed. For some reason it has not yet trickled 
down to the man on the street that some physicists now are a bunch of wild-eyed, 
raving mystics. For they have perfected their instruments and methods just enough 
to whisk away the crucial veil, and what stands revealed is the Cheshire cat' s grin. 
The Principle of Indeterminacy, which saw the light in the summer of 1927, 
says in effect that you cannot know both a particle's velocity and position. You 
can guess statistically what any batch of electrons might do, but you cannot predict 
the career of any one particle. They seem to be as free as dragonflies. You can 
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perfect your instruments and your methods till the cows come home, and you will 
never ever be able to measure this one basic thing. It cannot be done. The 
electron is a muskrat; it cannot be perfectly stalked. And nature is a fan dancer 
born with a fan; you can wrestle her down, throw her on the stage and grapple 
with her for the fan with all your might, but it will never quit her grip. She comes 
that way; the fan is attached. 
It is not that we lack sufficient information to know both a particle's velocity 
and its position; that would have been a perfectly ordinary situation well within the 
understanding of classical physics. Rather, we know now for sure that there is no 
knowing. You can determine the position, and your figure for the velocity blurs 
into vagueness; or, you can determine the velocity, but whoops, there goes the 
position. (Pilgrim at Tinker Creek 203-203) 
The nature of the role of observer seems to be at the root of this impossibility of 
knowing things as they really are. As we perceive the world, we necessarily re-shape 
it, distilling sensations and experience into a new meaning which is neither the object 
itself nor purely the mind of the observer. "The use of instruments and the very fact 
of an observer seems to bolix the observations"; notes Dillard, "as a consequence, 
physicists are saying that they cannot study nature per se, but only their own 
investigation of nature. And I can only see bluegills within my own blue shadow, 
from which they immediately flee" (Pilgrim at Tinker Creek 202-203). Much in the 
way that Dillard's shadow creates a space in which the fish comes into physical focus, 
so, too, language creates the conceptual space in which the fish takes mental shape. 
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And like the fish that darts away from the looming figure, nature out there escapes 
definition through language, remaining always a step removed from the representation. 
In the world of indeterminacy, knowledge must ultimately rest in belief. opinion. 
speculation,--in short, in faith, that component of knowing which objective science 
postures against so vigorously. "All this means," surmises Dillard, "is that the physical 
world as we understand it now is more like the touch-and-go creek world I see than it 
is like the abiding world of which the mountains seem to speak. The physicists' 
particle whiz and shift like rotifers in and out of my microscope's field, and that this 
valley's ring of granite mountains is an airy haze of those same particles [ must 
believe" (Pilgrim at Tinker Creek 204). 
As Dillard describes it, "truth" is belief in the face of indeterminacy. Rather than 
resist uncertainty, she and other nature writers suggest that we embrace it, allowing the 
revisability of knowledge to be a guiding principle of human conduct. Considering the 
impossibility of perfect knowledge, we must try to live with uncertainty as best we 
can, ever testing, ever seeking to improve the efficacy of our knowledge. In some 
ways, the nature advocate is a pragmatist, concerned not so much with what is 
absolutely true (which they admit is impossible to determine), but with what works. 
In each case of advocacy discussed in this study, the writer is motivated by the 
devastating consequences of failing mechanistic theories to offer an alternative view of 
humanity's relationship to nature that will yield positive results for nature. Consider. 
for example, Leopold's land ethic. As Bryan Norton points out in his essay in 
Environmental Pragmatism, Leopold's land ethic developed in response to "a 
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recognition that scientific knowledge is inadequate to guide gross manipulation of the 
ecosystems" (85). Consequently, he outlined an ecological ethic which emphasized 
humanity's moral obligation to nature, a view he believed would be more successful in 
protecting nature and serving long term human interests. "Theory, according to the 
pragmatist," observes Norton, "must ultimately be tested against experience" (94). As 
Norton sees it, Leopold employs a rhetoric which is "deeply pragmatic in spirit," 
relying heavily on his experience as a forester and game manager to prove the merits 
of ecological thinking. 
One of the major problems with the mechanistic world view and scientific 
rationalism which informs it is that it hasn't offered us guidance towards living in 
nature. Rather, it has provided us with methods for dominating the natural world, with 
the unfortunate consequence that we have pushed many species into extinction, 
diminished the carrying capacity of many habitats, and threatened the health and well-
being of humanity. Commenting on the flaws of scientific education, Leopold 
contends that the detached and narrowly prescribed knowledge imparted in schools 
does not improve our ability to understand nature and may even threaten human 
survival by neglecting to inform us how to conduct ourselves in nature, to be good 
"citizens": 
To visualize more clearly the lopsidedness and sterility of biological education 
as a means of building citizens, let's go afield with some bright student and ask 
him some questions. We can safely assume he knows how plants grow and cats 
are put together, but let us test his comprehension of how the land is put together. 
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We are driving down a country road in northern Missouri. Here is a farmstead. 
Look at the tree in the yard and the soil in the field and tell us whether the 
original settler carved his farm out of the prairie or woods. Did he eat prairie 
chicken or wild turkey for his Thanksgiving? What plants grew here originally 
which do not grow here now? ... 
Many students would consider these questions insane, but they are not. Any 
amateur naturalist with a seeing eye should be able to speculate intelligently on all 
of them, and have a lot of fun doing it. You will see, too, that [ecology] deals 
only incidently with the identity of plants and animals. . . It deals principally with 
their relations to each other, their relations to the soil and water in which they 
grew, and their relations to human beings. . . . If education does not teach us 
these things, then what is education for? (Leopold 208-210) 
For Leopold and other advocates, knowledge must be useful; if not, then our theories 
need to be revised until experience proves them to be an effective tool for managing 
conduct. All the nature writers examined in this study agree that the dominant theories 
which see nature as inanimate object have had devastating effects, giving rise to the 
need to replace humanism with biocentrism and, similarly, to replace a host of 
disparate, isolated scientific disciplines with an organic ecology. 
What these nature advocates have worked for is nothing less than an 
epistemological revolution. And, true to their convictions that language is the 
mediating force in shaping understanding, these writers use rhetoric to bring about a 
productive change in attitudes and actions. The act of speaking for nature 
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accomplishes this task by moving nature from the realm of object to being, re-defining 
it as a valuable community of life. As Merchant demonstrates in her description of 
organic cultures, the belief that nature is an ethical, sentient being prevents unchecked 
exploitation, and for that reason a variety of advocates have suggested that this view 
may be a better theory of nature. Perceiving nature as a community which includes 
humanity is a much more useful notion of the natural world because it promotes the 
sort of restraint and reverence necessary to accomplish a shift to sustainable human 
cultures. 
Although language does not construct the physical world, it has the power to 
influence the actions which shape our environment. Even Edward Abbey, who bristles 
at the notion of imposing human constructs on nature, recognizes the power of rhetoric 
to transform the world. When hiking in the canyons of The Maze near Green River. 
Abbey becomes concerned that the fragile wilderness area will fall victim to 
developers. He contemplates naming the magnificent monoliths as a way of claiming 
them for himself and like-minded preservationists or as a means of defining them 
outside of the utilitarian world. His hiking partner, Bob Waterman, balks at the idea, 
suggesting that naming constitutes an act of appropriation. But Abbey persists, 
recognizing that language can exercise a remedial force in society, countering 
dominance with love: "[If] we don't name them," he warns his reluctant friend 
Waterman, "somebody else surely will" (Desert Solitaire 288). 
The power of rhetoric entails great obligations. For Abbey, the act of naming can 
either correspond to the world, improving our understanding of nature, or it can 
266 
become detached from real things and experience, distorting our understanding: 
Through naming comes knowing; we grasp an object, mentally, by giving it a 
name--hension, prehension, apprehension. And thus through language create a 
whole world, corresponding to the other world out there. Or we trusts that it 
corresponds. Or perhaps, like a German poet, we cease to care, becoming more 
concerned with the naming than with the things named; the former becomes more 
real than the latter. And so in the end the world is lost again. No, the world 
remains--those unique, particular, incorrigibly individual junipers and sandstone 
monoliths--and it is we who are lost. Again. Round and round, through the 
endless labrynth of thought--the maze. (Desert Solitaire 288-89) 
The danger in language, suggest Abbey, is when our discourse obfuscates its referent 
or alienates the listener from the subject, much in the way that the language of 
"resource" and "raw materials" has misled many to perceive the natural world as a 
collection of dead matter. When language does not improve our ability to comprehend 
our world, we become "lost," says Abbey, in a "labrynth of thought." As our 
increasing environmental crises suggest, the consequences of distorted conceptions and 
unfounded beliefs about nature can be catastrophic. Rather than leave the naming up 
to those who seek exploit the natural world, the advocates employ their rhetorical 
skills to foster a positive and vital relationship between nature and humanity. 
Ultimately, giving voice to nature is a form of praxis. By speaking for non-human 
life, the advocates initiate a conceptual transformation in which nature takes on a 
greater moral significance in human affairs. Just as the Wolf's Brother represented the 
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wolf people within the Oneida tribe, the advocates act the part of voicing nature's 
interests in their own communities. In doing so, nature advocates subtly and 
permanently alter the warp and weft of the complex cultural tapestry of language, 
society, and its institutions, changing the type and scope of physical actions possible in 
their environments. The advocates discussed here have succeeded in initiating 
significant social change, evidenced by the establishment of numerous wildlife 
preserves, the creation of an Environmental Protection Agency, and the improvement 
of legislation designed to prevent pollution and protect endangered species. More 
importantly, the rhetoric of advocacy has had a dramatic impact of the attitudes and 
perceptions of the public, making it possible for the discourse of advocacy to 
reproduce itself and continue independently of the advocate. The demand for 
environmentally responsible technologies and the popularity of the environment as a 
political issue suggest that, for many, the voice of nature is becoming internalized, 
giving rise to a nascent social "ecological conscience." Largely through the force of 
their metaphors, the nature advocates have initiated an epistemological and moral 
revolution, one whose success or failure will have far reaching implications for all life 
on the planet. 
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